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Abstract: This interdisciplinary and comparative study explores the public 
environmental debate on the Arctic in the context of Russian and Norwegian 
media. The aim of the study is to define how the public environmental debate is 
constructed in the media and is possibly affected by the present resource-oriented 
policy-making processes regarding the Arctic from the perspective of climate 
change. Comparing countries with two different political systems and media 
traditions, this thesis examines how and if public debates contribute to 
environmentally-oriented policymaking. The novel aspect of this study is that 
analysis of the public debate is conducted in parallel with the analysis of official 
debates. The advantage of focusing on two debates simultaneously is that it 
reveals the contradictions or consistencies of opinions between authorities and 
the public sphere. The research is based on the analysis of discourses from 
several Russian and Norwegian media sources from May 2013 to May 2014.  The 
discourse approach represents both a theoretical and methodological framework 
for analysis. An important part of this study concerns the evolution of historical 
representations and narratives of the Arctic, which helps to trace modern Arctic 
narratives and discourses from both countries’ historical contexts. Particularly, 
the environmental aspect of Arctic policies in both countries represents one of the 
key issues of the debate. With focus on media sources – newspapers articles and 
radio programs – in both countries I analyze whether the idea of sustainable 
development is perceived as an efficient and practical alternative to argue against 
resource depletion and for conservation of the Arctic ecosystem. Particularly, the 
role of security in the Russian and Norwegian official debates is considered. 
Taking into account that ethics are an important component of Arctic discourse, 
this study examines how Russian and Norwegian public debates address this 
aspect in their rhetoric.  
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1. Introduction 
...the Arctic is the fastest changing environment on Earth. 
(Berkman 2012:123)  
Since the second half of the 20
th
 century, Arctic ice has diminished considerably, 
placing the region in the limelight of the global environmental agenda. Global 
warming affects the vulnerable Arctic environment, threatening endangered 
species and traditional lifeways of indigenous Arctic peoples. Furthermore, 
climate change will likely fuel increased economic interest in the region, since 
the deicing of the Arctic Ocean will facilitate access to offshore oil resources and 
possibly navigation through the Northern Sea Route. In 2008 the US Geological 
Survey published a report stating that the Arctic contains 13% of world 
undiscovered oil and 30% of world undiscovered gas reserves (Brigham 
2013:371). Additionally, increased international tensions regarding the right to 
exploit Arctic resource reserves brings up the issue of security, feeding 
speculation about the possibility of military conflict between Arctic states. 
According to Griffiths (2011:6) “the region is coming alive politically under the 
effects of climate change, resource scarcity, and geostrategic competition.” This 
study endeavors to explore these aspects of the Arctic debate. 
The opening of the Arctic has become a significant international media topic in 
recent years. My intention is to scrutinize this debate in the context of two 
countries: Russia and Norway. In the broad sense, this comparative study will 
map the main perspectives of Arctic discourses in Russian and Norwegian media 
over the period of May 2013 to May 2014.  
Russia and Norway are two of the main claimants attempting to benefit from the 
opening of the Arctic due to global warming. I chose these countries for my study 
since Russia and Norway are two of the five Arctic coastal states with resource-
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based economies. Such dependence means that resources are vital economic 
interests, explaining why authorities of both countries confidently follow pro-
resource extraction discourses (Jensen 2007). Moreover, the governments of both 
countries, though they claim to have a high level of commitment to protecting the 
Arctic’s vulnerable ecosystems, continue on with their plans to drill in the region. 
This tendency is broadly reflected in the official debate present in the media of 
both countries. 
A perspective favoring environmental conservation in the public debate serves as a 
firm alternative to an economic one. In this respect, Lassi (2013:41) stresses the link 
between environmental policies and the public sphere. Since the “environmental 
awakening” began in the 1960s, the public sector became the main initiator of 
environmentally responsible policy (Lassi 2013, Dryzek 2013). Politicization of this 
issue, as a result, has led to the emergence of “international environmental politics 
and environmental security” (Lassi 2013:43).  
The public “sphere” (or “space”) is an ambivalent notion. Cârstea (2012:125) points 
out that the general definition regards the public sphere as “any form of association 
in the name of dialogue and free debate”. Jürgen Habermas focused on this 
phenomenon in his work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1962). Fraser (1990:57) points out that in Habermas’s sense the public sphere 
“designates a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk (...) the space in which citizens deliberate about their 
common affairs, hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction”. 
Therefore, the public sphere “is conceptually distinct from the official-economy; it is 
not an arena of market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a theatre for 
debating and deliberation rather than for buying and selling” (Ibid. 57). However, it 
is important to stress the modern tendency of “marketization” which affects the 
media sphere, since commercialization processes and business lobbyism started 
playing a significant role in policies of modern democratic states (Midttun and 
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Witoszek 2014).  I consider this tendency important while analyzing Russian and 
Norwegian media sources. 
This study is addressed and intended to contribute to discussions amongst political 
and environmental discourse scholars, as well as researchers of official and public 
debates, Northern Dimension policy, Russian-Norwegian inter-governmental 
cooperation and civil society development. 
1.1 The Aim and Research Questions of the Research 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of the public environmental debate on 
the Arctic, namely its construction and capacity to influence current Russian and 
Norwegian policy-making. This research will identify the similarities and 
differences between Russian and Norwegian public debates. In order to solve the 
“research problem” it is important to choose the right sources of information. 
Public debate is a broad sphere that includes various sources of information. The 
task, thus, is to identify and compare the various discursive elements (for 
example, key story-lines, metaphors, nodal points, etc.) which will allow one to 
see how the actual public debates in Russia and Norway are constructed. At the 
same time, comparative analysis demands these sources correlate with each other. 
This study examines official and public debates from a broad range of texts from 
the press, including print, digital and radio forms.1 Discourse analysis is a 
combined theoretical and methodological tool for textual analysis (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 2002). In the theoretical part of this study I will draw on the explanation 
of discourse theory stipulated in Michel Foucault’s philosophy, and use the 
analytical method proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (2013), with reference to 
Fairclough’s (1989) critical discourse approach and other discourse methods from 
                                              
1 According to Faiclough, all types of verbal and visual language represent a form of text (Fairclough 1989:27). 
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various other scholars (Dryzek 2003, 2013; Hajer 1995; Jensen 2007, 2013b; 
Jensen and Skredsmo 2010; Jensen and Hønneland 2011; Ó Tuathail et al. 2006). 
There is a considerable amount of literature on different aspects of the official 
debate on the Arctic in Russia and Norway, but there has been little written on the 
public debate.  Thus, the aim of this thesis is to study this less-examined 
dimension. To delimit my study in this very broad topic, I have thus chosen to use 
a limited number of media sources and a strict timeline. I expect that this study 
will contribute to partly fill the gap in the literature on the public sphere’s 
environmental perspective on the Arctic. I believe that viewing Russian and 
Norwegian patterns of public debate on the Arctic will reveal a broader picture of 
environmental consciousness and behavior in these countries in terms of the 
capacity to oppose or influence policymaking processes.  
The central questions of this interdisciplinary study are the following:  
- How has the environmental public debate on the Arctic been constructed 
in the Russian and Norwegian media from May 2013 to May 2014? 
- What impacts have Russian and Norwegian patterns of public debate had 
on actual environmental policy regarding the Arctic? 
In addition, the following secondary research questions are addressed: 
- What are the main narratives of the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian 
historical and cultural traditions that are commonly used in public 
discussions? What is their importance? 
- Who are opinion-makers of the debate and what are the key discursive 
issues? 
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- How do the governments of the countries tackle the dilemma of the 
choice between ecological stability in the Arctic region and using its 
hydrocarbon deposits for the purpose of national economic policy? 
- What role does the issue of security play in the official debate and how is 
it reflected in the public debate? 
- What environmental discourses do the Russian and Norwegian public 
draw on according to Dryzek’s (2013) classification? 
- What ethical aspects are addressed in the environmental public debate? 
- What is the main source of ethical values in the public debate: historical-
cultural background, environmentalist agendas or the official discourse? 
Since the theme of Arctic discourse is broad, I detail its background and context 
in the next sections to help clarify the origin of different perspectives on the 
Arctic in the present day.  
1.2 Background for the Study: Arctic Foreign Policy and 
Fundamental Arctic Policy Documents in Russia 
and Norway 
Greenberg (2009:1316) points out, that “Arctic regional history is a theatre in 
which international history has played out from its beginning”. The Arctic is 
important for domestic and foreign policy both in Russia and Norway and several 
international events have had an impact on the countries’ rhetoric on and 
development policies for their respective northern territories.  
The study of the official Russian and Norwegian foreign policy discourse 
conducted by Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:439) has shown that both countries 
perceive the Arctic territories as a “future energy province”, while Arctic 
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resource reserves are of “vital national interest”. Furthermore, the authors point 
out that within the international arena Russia is portrayed as an assertive nation 
highly engaged in “competition” over the Arctic. From his first presidential term, 
Vladimir Putin demonstrated heightened interest in redrawing maritime borders 
in the Arctic region. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, United Nations 1982) Arctic coastal states are prescribed exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) in the Arctic which stretch 200 nautical miles from their 
coasts. Moreover, Arctic countries have the right to extend their borders beyond 
the EEZ through application to the UN Commission for Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS). This extension of maritime borders would mean increased 
economic activity in the resource abundant Arctic waters. 
Russia was the first country to submit a claim about the revision of the Arctic 
maritime borders to the UN CLCS in 2001. The commission responded, stating 
that the applying country should provide supplementary information and resubmit 
its application by 2009 (which was later extended to 2015). Norway submitted its 
claim to the CLCS in 2006, becoming the first country to gain exclusive access to 
three separate areas in the northeast Atlantic and the Arctic in 2009 (UN CLCS 
2009).  
Since 2005, discourse on ‘the High North’ (nordområdene) has led to broad 
discursive mobilization in Norway. This period was marked by the document, 
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,2 issued by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). The politics of the High North, thus, became 
an issue widely referred to in the press, leading to the circulation of the story-line, 
‘it’s happening in the north’ (Jensen and Hønneland 2011:44). Remarkably, the 
document led to a shift in focus from the Barents Sea to an area further north, 
termed ‘the High North’ (Skagestad 2010). The following political purpose is 
                                              
2 Hereafter referred to as The High North Strategy (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006)  
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formulated in the strategy document: “The Government's aim is that Norway will 
be the best steward of resources in the High North, with oil and gas operations 
that meet very stringent environmental standards, and with continual knowledge 
generation, research and development in the petroleum sector” (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:55).  
According to Skagestad (2010:15), under ex-Norwegian Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg’s government (the ‘red-green’ coalition), the High North was 
designated “as Norway’s most important policy priority in the years to come”. In 
2009 a ‘renewed’ strategy, New Building Blocks in the North (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009), was presented. However, this document added 
nothing new to existing policy except concretization of the High North policy 
direction (Ibid.). In general, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs framed 
their High North policy with emphasis on cooperation in the sphere of resource 
management and environmental protection of the Arctic. According to the 
documents, Russia is presented as a key-actor in Norwegian foreign politics in 
terms of business and scientific cooperation in the region. Apart from resource 
and environmental dimensions, the document puts emphasis on the issue of cross-
border security.  
Peace-oriented Arctic foreign politics, however, have been strained after the 
Russian expedition to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August, 2007. During 
this expedition, led by Arthur Chilingarov, the Russian team planted the national 
flag on the sea floor of the North Pole. The expedition’s aim was to collect data 
in support of the Russian claim of an extended continental shelf. According to 
Wegge (2011:166), “Even though the Russian action had no legal status under 
international law, it had a great symbolic effect in triggering public response and 
media attention all over the world”. Dodds (2010:70) points out two reactions 
among the coastal states: first, it stimulated “further investments in the Arctic-
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based activities” and secondly, “it has led the five Arctic coastal states to act 
more strategically with regard to their collective interests in the region”. 
Such an unexpected and assertive acknowledgment of the value of the Arctic’s 
resource potential by the Russian government forced the need for framing of a 
national strategy. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the only document on Arctic 
management was Gazprom’s Russia’s Energy Strategy Towards 2020 (Gazprom 
2003). The development of an official Arctic policy-framing document was 
announced by president Putin and issued during president Medvedev’s term in 
2009. The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic 
up to 2020 and beyond3 concluded on a “rather general and cautious” approach to 
the Russian Arctic (Zysk 2013).  
First of all, The Fundamentals of State Policy (Russian Government 2009) states 
the transformation of the Russian Arctic into the main strategic resource base for 
the national economy by 2020. The document outlines several policy priorities, 
including environmental protection of the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem – 
amounting to environmental security – and utilization of the Northern Sea route. 
The issue of ‘environmental security’ includes several precautions: “conserve and 
support the protection of the environment in the Arctic, liquidate the 
environmental consequences of economic activity in the circumstances of 
increasing economic activity and global climate change” (Svendsen and Bunik 
2009:217). This policy document puts strong emphasis on economic resources 
and national security issues, and it mentions climate change, but without any 
reference to its anthropogenic nature. 
The fact that this document was issued by the Russian Security Council along 
with the planting of the flag during Chilingarov’s expedition strengthened the 
                                              
3 Hereafter referred to as The Fundamentals of State Policy 
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anxiety about possible military conflict in the region. As a result (and as 
previously mentioned), geopolitical tension in the Arctic was increasing, but 
importantly, this information was broadcast to the world by the media. Western 
media, according to Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:446) has tended “to interpret 
Russia’s actions in Cold War terms.”  The official Russian Security Council’s 
position, published in Russian media, downplayed this issue: “this does not mean 
that Russia is trying to militarize the Arctic. We are focusing on the creation of an 
effective system of coastal security, the development of arctic border 
infrastructure, and the presence of military units of an adequate strength” (RIA 
Novosti 2009).  
In sum, the Arctic dimension of Russian and Norwegian foreign policy made an 
impact on the framing of the fundamental development documents and defined 
official national positions with respect to the issue. 
1.3 The Political System and Media Models in Russia 
and Norway 
The political system of a country is responsible for shaping the state-media 
relationship. The Russian political system reveals centralization of power in the 
President’s hands, whereas the long-term and stable tradition of ‘corporatist’ 
democracy (further defined below) in Norway provides cooperation of several 
political actors and the creation of coalitions and consensus-based decision 
making. Specific models of media systems in both countries form different 
patterns of public debate and its capacity for opinion mediation. 
The ‘superpresidential’ system in Russia, on the other hand, has been described 
as “towering over government, parliament, and the juridical system while 
reproducing a ‘monocentric’ system to which all socio-political life is 
subordinated” (Makarenko 2007 as quoted in Sakwa 2012:3010). ‘United Russia’ 
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(Edinaya Rossiya), the majority political party in power since 2003 presents a 
stronghold for presidential power. Its political performance contributes to the 
merging of legislative and presidential rhetoric.  
Vladimir Putin’s, due to his long-lasting presidency made him the most 
authoritative media opinion-maker. The absence of a democratic media system in 
Russia results in a lack of freedom of speech, unequal access to alternative media 
sources, a low degree of pluralism, and media dependence on state. Becker 
(2004:140) points out that “...the press system under Putin has regressed and […] 
Russia has failed to consolidate the nascent democratic media system that began 
to emerge under former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia’s first 
president, Boris Yeltsin”. Furthermore, the author refers to the Russian system as 
a neo-authoritarian type of media: 
Under a neo-authoritarian system, state-owned media have limited 
autonomy, and appointments to key positions are linked to political 
loyalty. Access to the media may be open and private ownership 
may be tolerated, but other mechanisms are used to control 
messages. Subsidies, targeted tax advantages, government 
advertising and other forms of assistance are used to promote 
support. To silence critics, the state does not resort to pre-
publication censorship so much as economic pressure through 
selectively applied legal and quasi-legal actions against owners, as 
well as broadly worded laws which prescribe criminal and civil 
penalties for journalists concerning such issues as libel, state 
interests, national security and the image of the head of state. 
(Becker 2004:147) 
The Norwegian media system is an example of a democratic corporatist model, 
according to the classification of media models by Hallin and Mancini (2004). 
The Norwegian political system belongs to the group of European welfare state 
democracies. The main characteristic of this system is that the role of the state is 
significant but its power corresponds to a social democracy tradition rather than 
to an authoritarian one (Rolland 2009:265). As within a liberal democratic model, 
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media draws on general principles of pluralism, freedom of expression, free 
access to information, etc. In practical terms this model is different from the 
liberal one due to the prevailing value of social responsibility over economic 
profitability: “media are social institutions first, and only second, business 
enterprises’’ (Ibid.). The distinguishing trait of this model according to Hallin and 
Mancini (2004:298) is political parallelism, “a surviving advocacy tradition that 
sees the media as vehicles for expression of social groups and diverse 
ideologies”.  
The Arctic as a broad issue has gained much attention in Russian and Norwegian 
media during the last 10 years. After the collapse of the USSR, all the Russian 
Arctic’s development projects were scrapped because of funding shortages. 
Discovery of huge offshore resource reserves gave an impulse to develop the 
northern territories and increase polar research nationally. The strong national 
interest articulated by Vladimir Putin from the beginning of 2000s is an example 
of how the Arctic initiative in Russia has always been dependent on the strong 
leaders’ ambitions.4 In Putin’s rhetoric the Arctic is used as a tool to justify the 
ambitions of modern Russia as a strong, rapidly developing country. 
Increasing importance of High North politics in Norway led to a discursive 
mobilization among the population (Jensen 2007). This mobilization happened 
when “a wide range of actors […] felt called [upon] to explain their views, 
although nothing significantly has really happened materially in the North since 
the debate began” (Jensen and Skredsmo 2010:443). Public opinion makers draw 
on the environmental aspect of politics in the High North. It has become one of 
the most important issues addressed by Norwegian political parties during 
election campaigns. The most recent example is the debate around opening of oil 
drilling around the nationally significant Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senia 
                                              
4 For more examples of leaders’, ambitions, see Chapter 3. 
12 
 
archipelago.5 This process is closely related to the 2013 parliamentary campaign 
and is represented as one of its main symbols. Norwegian parties were split about 
the islands’ future, which in turn was reflected in the media.  
1.4 Sustainable Development as a Turning Point of the 
Environmental Discourse 
The global problem of climate change is the major backdrop overshadowing any 
question about the Arctic. The most influential idea relating to climate change 
mitigation is the concept of ‘sustainable development,’ which became famous 
after being presented in the report, Our Common Future (also known as the 
Brundtland Report, WCED 1987) during the session of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. Later, in 1992 during the 
Rio Earth Summit this concept was approved as a principle of the document, 
Agenda 21 which outlined sustainable development as a global action. Russia and 
Norway were among 178 countries which ratified Agenda 21.  From then 
onwards, commitment to the doctrine resulted in a number of state decrees and 
projects developed in both countries. However, during the period between the 
first two Earth Summits (1992-2002), Russia and Norway seemed to go through 
the same stages of commitment to the global environmental issues: “the 
commitment declines progressively in the post-Rio decade and only re-emerges 
immediately before and after the WSSD in Johannesburg” (Lafferty et al. 
2007:186). 
This idea of combining the development of socio-economic sectors along with 
environmental conservation became a popular global initiative raising hopes to 
prevent the climate change.6 At the national level, this led to framing of new 
                                              
5 Hereafter referred to as ‘Lofoten case’. 
6 For the discussion on the definition of ‘sustainable development’, see Chapter 2. 
13 
 
policies with respect to the principles of sustainable development. Norway is a 
strong adherent to the idea of sustainability since the concept was first introduced 
by its former prime minister, Gro Harlem Brudtland.  Two key documents 
framing sustainable development policies were issued in Norway: the National 
Strategy for Sustainable Development (2002) and the National Action Plan for 
Sustainable Development (2003). However, Lafferty et al. (2007) point out the 
irony of how “the land of Brundtland” treats its homemade concept. The authors 
state that the realization of Norwegian national strategy for sustainable 
development corresponds to the story-line ‘high ambitions–disjointed follow-up–
inconsequential results’ (Ibid. 185). 
The official Russian scientific community has been seeking to integrate the idea 
of sustainable development since 1992 when the transition to sustainable 
development was announced as a national objective (Presidential Decree 1996). 
The Ecological Doctrine (“Ekologicheskaya Doktrina”), which corresponds to 
the principles of sustainable development, was embraced at the beginning of 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 2002. However, Russian scholars ascribe the 
current absence of any effective sustainable development policy to specific socio-
economic and political problems in Russia. (Veber 2000:109). Moreover, the 
prevailing majority of Russians are not aware of this idea (Kozhina 2011, Veber 
2000). Later on in Chapter 5, I discuss how the Russian perspective on 
sustainability (as framed in Presidential Decree of 1996) coincides with 
Vernadsky’s concept of ‘noosphere’ (‘sphere of reason’)7 (Oldfield and Shaw 
2006).   
Another problem is the translation of the essence of ‘sustainable development’ 
into Russian. Many Russian scholars criticize the variant of the translation, 
                                              
7 Russian, and later Soviet, scientist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863-1945) developed a model of evolutionary 
change within which he outlined phases of transformation from a “biosphere” to a “noosphere” (Oldfield and Shaw 
2006). 
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ustoichivoe razvitie, which is commonly used in official Russian documents, 
meaning ‘stable development’, in a very broad sense. In order to specify the 
meaning of the concept, Gusejnova suggests the alternative variant “harmonious 
development of social sphere and nature” (garmonichnoe socioprirodnoe 
razvitie) (as quoted from Kozhina 2011:8). Another example is the variant 
proposed by Rutkevich (2002:25), “self-sustaining development” 
(samopodderzhivajuschee razvitie).  
Nevertheless, what are the obstacles of implementation of a sustainable 
development framework in the national development strategies of Russia and 
Norway? On the one hand, the broad understanding of the concept increases the 
possibility of its interpretation and adaptation for practical implementation. 
According to Dryzek (2013:235) the great number of definitions of sustainable 
development can be considered advantageous since it provides constant 
experimenting with the understanding and explanation of what sustainability is. 
At the same time, governments are able to experiment with the concept and 
propose visions fitting within national priorities. Secondly, such an eco-oriented 
economic approach to solve climate change does not prevent Russia and Norway 
from putting emphasis on resources as the primary economic base of both 
countries. 
1.5 The Origins of Environmental Discourse and Green 
Politics in the Arctic in Russia 
The reforms of the Russian party system starting in 2001 created strong barriers 
for the registration of political parties and their participation in parliamentary 
elections. President Putin’s main intention was to reduce the number of parties in 
order to ensure that the remaining ones would participate actively during 
elections (Sakwa 2012). It has resulted in the presence of only four political 
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parties in the Russian Parliament.8 None of these parties have a clear ecological 
policy or are eco-oriented because at the time they emerged, the country was 
facing more urgent socio-economic problems. Neither global environmental 
degradation nor climate change have been their foci. 
The majority party, United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya (UR)), has been in power 
since 2003. Its political platform still lacks ecological concerns, and it does not 
even mention climate change. One of their projects is called “Russian Ecology,” 
and it contains rather general priorities, among which are: environmental 
protection, energy efficiency, betterment of ecological regulatory and legal 
frameworks, and creation of an effective ecological economic sector.  
Russian parliamentary elections in December 2011 and presidential elections in 
March 2012 provoked waves of protests arguing for “faithful elections”. In order 
to respond to the public outcry Putin passed reform measures which eased the 
formalities of registration of new political parties and their participation in 
elections. Leaving behind the discussion of the main political outcomes of this 
reform, I would like to point out that it contributed to the creation of political 
room for green politics in Russia for the first time. 
The Russian Ecological Party, known as “The Greens” (Rossijskaya 
ekologicheskaya partiya, “Zelyonyye”), who have existed since 1992 - either in a 
form of political party or social movement - were revived in 2012. The same 
year, The Alliance of Greens – The People’s Party (from 2014, the Alliance of 
Greens and Social Democrats) was created. Both parties refer to the principles of 
sustainable development in their program documents. However, the Alliance of 
Greens and Social Democrats claims to be more western-oriented due to 
                                              
8 This term of the present parliament is from 2011 to 2016 and power is shared by the majority party, United Russia 
(UR), as well as the Communist party (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and ‘A Just Russia’  
(SR), all of which are the oldest survivors on the unstable Russian political stage. 
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cooperation with European Green Party. The older party, “The Greens” during 
the time of its existence created several alliances with different Russian political 
alliances. The present alliance with UR was established in 2012.  
Another contributor to green politics in Russia has been made by the Civic 
Chamber of the Russian Federation. It is an organization which is aims at 
building a dialogue between citizens, NGOs, state government bodies and local 
authorities. In 2009 the Sustainable Development Institute was created under the 
government of the Civil Chamber of the Russian Federation (Obsjestvennaja 
Palata Rossijskoj Federatsii). The Institute promotes the concept of sustainable 
development on the social and state levels. Despite the large number of 
documents created by the working group, the participation of this organization is 
hardly seen on the level of the public debate. Unfortunately, the Russian political 
realities contain the risk of being excluded from active political discussions, thus, 
leaving no space for practical application of the civic initiatives.  
1.6 Norwegian ‘High North’ Politics  
The period of “High North” political discourse in Norway is associated with the 
“red-green” coalition (September 2005 - October 2013) headed by the ex-prime-
minister, Jens Stoltenberg (representative from the Labor Party, or 
Arbeiderpartiet (AP)). Other key figures who have contributed to the High North 
rhetoric are Jonas Gahr Støre – Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2005 
to 2012 – and Ola Borten Moe – Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy 
from 2011 to 2013. ‘Obsessed’ by the north, these politicians emphasized the 
primary Norwegian interests in northern Norway and the Arctic: “Petroleum and 
marine resources in the High North will help provide a foundation for our future 
prosperity, and we remain determined to preserve the unique Arctic environment” 
(Støre 2012:19). 
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The core of the coalition included the Labor Party (AP), the Socialist Left Party 
(Sosialistisk venstreparti (SV)), and the Center Party (Senterpartiet (SP)). 
However, its green orientation was conditioned by cooperation with the Center 
Party (one of the Nordic agrarian parties) which is not the most ecologically-
oriented one. The ‘red-green’ government contributed to the discursive 
mobilization around the Arctic issue with emphasis on energy, security and 
environmental aspects. In the end of 2013, several months before the new 
elections, the coalition’s ‘green standings’ were undergoing a test. The key issue 
of the campaign’s debate was “to open, or not to open”, the sea area around 
Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senia islands for the petroleum industry.  
This issue was actively discussed in the media. The participants of the 
parliamentary campaign were split in opinions. The main supporters of the “pro-
extraction” discourse (AP, the Conservative Party (Høyre), and the Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet (FRP)) claimed there would be more possibilities for 
economic development of the region with resource extraction. Surprisingly, the 
eco-oriented image of the ‘red-green’ coalition appeared to be deceptive, because 
“the idea of the oil-free areas was removed” (Trædal 2012:28). The worries were 
further intensified since the center-right Conservative Party, and the right-wing 
Progress Party were considered to be the frontrunners of the campaign.  
The “anti-extraction” protagonists claimed that the oil industry would bring 
irreparable harm for the marine ecosystem. The main opponents of leaving the 
area’s resources untouched were the Liberal Party (Venstre (V)), the Socialist 
Left Party, and the Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne). Hanna E. Marcussen, 
leader of the Green Party, points out that Norwegian responsibility for the High 
North “...would be to leave these resources where they are” (Marcussen 2012:21). 
The results of the election would seem to have defined the future development of 
the islands. A coalition between Høyre and FRP was formed after they won the 
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majority of votes in October 2013
9
. However, the alliance signed a Government 
Platform agreement (Regjeringsplattform mellom Høyre og Fremskrittspartiet) 
on October 7
th
, which claims that the sea area around Lofoten, Vesterålen and 
Senja will not be opened for the oil industry for the period between 2013-2017 
(Regjeringsplattformen 2013:63). The Platform emphasized environmental 
concern about the area with focus on sustainable development, declaring the 
establishment of a special environmental protection center 
(miljøbase/oljevernbase) on the islands. Does it mean that the right-wing 
coalition presents a more green stance than the previous government? The answer 
is not yet known. So far, the political decision to postpone the issue of drilling in 
the north of Norway leaves the question about the future of the environment in 
the Norwegian Arctic open. 
                                              
9 Hereafter the coalition between Høyre and FRP referred to as the ‘blue-blue’ coalition. 
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2. Theory, Method and Thesis Structure 
 
The analytical framework for this study is based on the approach of discourse 
theory, deriving from structuralist linguistic theories, such as that of Saussure10. 
Structuralist theory was first to emphasize the crucial role of language in 
maintaining our representation of the world through the creation of meanings and 
identities. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:9) point out that structuralism and 
poststructuralism are considered to be subcategories of the broader umbrella of 
social constructivism. Hence, the discourse theory approach is related to the 
constructivist paradigm, which states that our understanding of the world is based 
on mental “categories” which are changeable depending on the historical and 
cultural contexts in which they are embedded (Ibid. 5). The theory assumes that 
our worldview is directly influenced by our social interactions – through which 
we define what is true or false – and different ways of acting, which are 
conditioned by different understandings of the world, “therefore the social 
construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences” (Ibid. ).  
Initially, discourse theory was developed by Michael Foucault, who worked with 
the notions of power, language and knowledge. In The Archeology of Knowledge 
(1969) Foucault poses the notion of an ‘episteme’ in order to determine how a 
“historical system of thought” (or ‘social mentality’) can be formed by “the 
preconditions for thought...” which in turn can “...define the limits of what can be 
thought or said” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:217). Foucault invented the 
‘archeological method’ of discourse analysis in order to study discourses of the 
                                              
10 According to this theory, signs (or words) possess a structure which consists of two levels: langue and parole. 
Langue is understood as a "structure of language" which is "fixed and unchangeable" (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2009:10). Parole is a ''situated language use, the signs actually used by people in specific situations" (Ibid). Within 
structuralism the main attention was devoted to langue, since this level was considered to be stable and independent 
from possible contextual mistakes or vitiations of language. The underestimation of parole led to the critique of 
structuralism and further, the development of poststructuralism. 
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past that are built on the scope of meaningful and true statements specific to each 
historical epoch (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:12). In his later work Foucault 
focuses on relations between knowledge and power and stresses the role of power 
in the construction of discourses and establishes the ‘genealogical method’ to 
study discursive practices. In his view, power can not necessarily be defined as 
oppressive, but is productive while it constitutes knowledge and discourses and 
spreads across social practices (Ibid.). 
In spite of a broad theoretical grounding, Foucauldian discourse theory does not 
provide any specific methodology for the analysis of written or spoken language. 
His theory has been further developed by poststructuralist researches with the 
creation of methodological tools. According to Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:440) 
discourse analysis “is an integrated theoretical and methodological approach to 
analysis” that emphasizes “the role of language in the social construction of the 
world”. 
For this study I chose the particular discourse methodology developed by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2013), and part of Norman Fairclough’s (1989) 
critical discourse theory. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) the strength 
of discourse analysis is that it can combine several methods from different 
theoretical approaches, as I have chosen. In addition, the methodological 
framework presents key concepts of this study: ‘geopolitics’, ‘soft securities’, and 
‘sustainable development’. These are supplemented by John Dryzek’s (2013) 
classification of environmental discourses and Hajer’s (1995) concept of ‘story-
line’.  
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2.1 Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory 
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) point out that Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory is an abstract but elaborate analytical approach. Language is understood as 
an unstable network of signs within language structures in contrast to 
structuralists who assume that “signs are locked in particular relationship with 
one another: every sign has a particular location in the net and its meaning is 
fixed” (Ibid. 10). Instability of structures explains why meanings can never be 
static and structures are always flexible and can be extended. Furthermore, such 
‘vulnerability’ within language allows different discourses to participate in the 
battle for meaning and hegemony, which as a result will lead to the establishment 
of “dominance of one particular perspective” (Ibid.7).  
Following the logic of this theory, the discourse analysis of the media public 
debate on the Arctic in both Norway and Russia can define the main competing 
discourses and reveal their struggle for dominance. According to Jensen (2007), 
one of the most dominant discourses around the Arctic in these two countries 
concerns petroleum production. The competing discourses include the 
environmental discourse, which derives from the dilemma of economic benefits 
versus nature conservation, and geopolitical discourse, focusing on resource 
sovereignty and security. 
The discourses mentioned above consist of specific elements, or nodal points 
that, as Laclau and Mouffe stated, have a privilege to be the central signs around 
which the other signs are ordered (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Furthermore, the 
whole scope of potential but excluded meanings, according to Laclau and 
Mouffe, find their place in the field of discursivity or a “reservoir for the ‘surplus 
of meanings’ produced by the articulatory practice” (Ibid. 27). While the nodal 
points demand that meanings are fixed and belong to the signs that surround 
them, it is possible to assess what meanings are excluded, purposefully or not, by 
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the terms in special contexts. Following this logic, if the fixed meanings are 
represented by ‘moments’ and unfixed meanings by ‘elements’, Laclau and 
Mouffe formulate the aim of discourse as an attempt “to transform elements into 
moments by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning” (Ibid. 28). 
Nevertheless, a nodal point can lack meaning until it is placed in a specific 
discourse. For instance, if a nodal point possesses a property of an element, it can 
be defined as a floating signifier. This notion is introduced in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory (2013) in order to depict the essence of the nodal 
point: on the one hand, it gets a fixed meaning (moment) in a certain discourse, 
while on the other hand, as a floating signifier (element), it is the target of the 
struggle between discourses.  
2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The critical approach to discourse analysis proposed by Fairclough (1989) has 
also proven useful for this study. Fairclough claims that not all social practices 
can be defined as discursive, so there is a distinction between discursive and non-
discursive practices. Furthermore, according to Fairclough, discourse is “a form 
of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by 
other social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:61). 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a primarily text-oriented 
approach combined with social analysis. However, it is also useful for the 
analysis of visual semiotics, or visual images related to text, in which there is a 
close connection between images and language (Ibid. 61). CDA is critical 
because it accepts unequal relations of power as a norm in the social world, but 
seeks to be politically committed to social change through reaching more equal 
power relations in the communicative sphere (Ibid. 64). Thus, according to 
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Fairclough, the aim of CDA is to explore “the role of discursive practices in the 
maintenance of the social order and in social change” (Ibid. 69).  
Applying CDA to the public debate on the Arctic in Norway and Russia will help 
to understand, how the debate is constructed, the character of the power relations’ 
balance, and how the existing discursive structures can contribute to real policy 
making. The comparison of discursive structures of the official debate in Russia 
and Norway through secondary sources will make it possible to detect their 
mobilization and manipulative capacities and to contrast their influence on the 
Russian and Norwegian public debates. 
The central notion proposed by Fairclough (1989) is the order of discourse that 
“is the sum of all genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social 
domain” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:72). In contrast to the field of discursivity 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2013), the order of discourse narrows down the discursive 
logic and choice of rhetorical tools according to the special order that exists in the 
social domain. It can delimit what can be said, but it is open to change. It means 
that Fairclough does not underestimate the possibility of language users to be 
creative and in a way improve this order by ‘importing discourses and genres 
from other orders of discourse’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:72). Other important 
elements of CDA are interdiscursivity (articulation of different discourses and 
genres in the communicative event) and intertextuality (intersection of a current 
communicative event with one or more earlier communicative events) (Ibid. 73). 
Fairclough points out that interdiscursivity of a high level is likely to produce 
changes, while low interdiscursivity will lead to reproduction of the order (Ibid. 
82).   
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2.3 Dryzek's Classification of Environmental Discourses 
In addition to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and Faircloughs CDA, this 
study also relies on John S. Dryzek’s classification of environmental discourses. 
According to Dryzek (2013), environmental discourse is closely connected to 
industrialized society and appeared as an alternative understanding of the world 
facing environmental problems resulting from society’s commitment to the idea 
of growth and material wellbeing. 
To analyze environmental discourses, Dryzek (2013) uses the concept of ‘story-
line’ by Maarten Hajer (1995) and supplements it with specific analytical tools. 
Hajer interprets the story-line as “a generative sort of narrative that allows actors 
to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or 
social phenomena [...] [and since] people do not draw on comprehensive 
discursive systems for their cognition, rather these are evoked through story-
lines” (1995:56). Sioni and Birkeland (2014:215) point out that a story-line “is 
therefore a mechanism for creating and maintaining meaning, and it speaks to 
particular ways of constructing a problem”.  In this context the change of 
environmental politics can be conditioned by the emergence of a new story-line 
and a corresponding change of perception and understanding of an issue (Ibid. 
56). For his classification, Dryzek (2013) defines and analyzes four building 
blocks of a story-line, such as basic entities (the core ideas around which the 
discourse is constructed), assumptions about natural relationships, agents and 
their motives and key metaphors or rhetorical devices. 
Within environmental discourses, Dryzek (2013:14) divides two main departures 
for the classification: prosaic and imaginative. The prosaic one emphasizes the 
necessity to limit economic growth in order to respond to the environmental crisis 
in a more effective way. The imaginative dimension can refer to environmental 
problems as “opportunities rather than troubles... treating environmental concerns 
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not in opposition to economic ones, but potentially in harmony” (Ibid. 15). These 
departures correlate with either radical or reformist ability to act and bring 
changes. Thus, the classification includes four main discursive lines, or 
abbreviated story-lines that, in turn, are divided into several other filiations, 
which are summarized below: 
The discourse of limits, boundaries, survival and its denial (prosaic-radical): 
The discourse of survival and limits follows the story-line that “human demands 
on the life support capacity of ecosystems threaten to explode out of control, and 
drastic action needs to be taken in order to curb these demands” (Ibid. 40); 
Promethean discourse, however, recognizes the scope of problems but is 
persuaded by the infinite possibilities of technology to confront this scope 
successfully (and in addition appreciates market regulation tools) (Ibid 58). 
The discourse of problem solving (prosaic-reformist): 
Administrative rationalism “seeks to organize scientific and technical expertise 
into hierarchy in the service of state” (Ibid. 88); 
Democratic pragmatism sees democracy as a key “way of approaching the 
problems” (Ibid. 99) through its ability to put public interest ahead of private 
interest (Ibid. 113); 
Economic rationalism is committed to “the intelligent deployment of market 
mechanisms to achieve public ends” (Ibid. 122). 
The discourse of sustainability (imaginative-reformist): 
Sustainable development “rests on integration and a balanced consideration of 
economic and environmental goals and objectives in both public and private 
decision making” (Ibid 147); 
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Ecological modernization  follows the story-line that “the capitalist political 
economy needs conscious reconfiguring and far-sighted action so that economic 
development and environmental protection can proceed hand-in-hand and 
reinforce one another” (Ibid. 173). 
The discourse of green radicalism (imaginative-radical): 
Discourse of green consciousness aims to change the way people think about the 
natural world towards a more empathetic attitude of nature (Ibid.); 
Discourse of green politics stresses that “the social and ecological crises can only 
be resolved through political action and structural change” (Ibid. 218). 
This study will examine what types of discourse are dominant in Russian and 
Norwegian public debates in terms of Dryzek’s classification. At the same time, I 
wish to find out to what extent discourses in public debate coincide with the 
dominant discourses in the official debates of Russia and Norway. 
2.4 Classical and Critical Geopolitics 
Discussing the Arctic from the perspective of security and energy conflicts is a 
significant part of the public debate in the region, which is why I refer to the 
concept of “geopolitics” in the analytical framework to this study. 
The Arctic has historically been a region of limited geopolitical importance until 
recently when the United States Geological Survey (USGS) announced the 
discovery of extensive hydrocarbon deposits in the region,11 leading to global 
media attention, and thus the need for securitization. Dittmer et al. (2011:203) 
point out that “the Arctic Ocean is being configured as an ‘anarchic space’”, 
                                              
11 In 2008 the USGS published a report that the Arctic region contains 13% of word oil and 30% of world gas in 
undiscovered reserves (Brigham 2013) 
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requiring it be brought back to the center of realist geopolitics. According to the 
classical geopolitical approach, the aim of the geopolitical actor is to reach some 
specific goal regarding the actor’s interests. As Ó Tuathail et al. (2006:6) note, 
“states must compete to survive”. Thus, this approach is strongly connected to 
political realism which characterizes competition between states as a struggle for 
power. At the same time, it pays no attention to the landscape of the territory and 
its inhabitants, so environmental issues are not taken into consideration. As an 
outcome, within geopolitical discourse, Lassi (2013:38) points out that the 
meaning of security was extended, shifting the focus from national to 
environmental and human security (also see Berkman 2012). The latter types are 
often referred as “soft securities” (Jensen 2013b, Lassi 2013, Zysk 2013). 
In this regard, when speaking about the Arctic, human and environmental 
security must be in focus. The approach of critical geopolitics, as a new trend in 
geopolitical studies, is said to be strongly connected to discourse theory and 
includes any type of “soft security”. The authors of this concept, Ó Tuathail et al. 
(2006), stress three main limitations of the concept of classical geopolitics. First 
of all, it is an erroneous framing of the empirical history of international politics 
because the survival of states was not dependent only on competition and wars, 
but also cooperation. Secondly, he argues that political realism is a discourse that 
“does not see that it itself is a set of beliefs” (Ibid. 6). Thirdly, in their 
methodology, political realists look at world politics as a separate reality that, 
according to Ó Tuathail et al., is a limitation because people can view and 
understand the world through culture and language: “Discourse is not a neutral 
tool that describes objects already existing in the world but is involved in the very 
recognition and constitution of those objects (in worlding)” (Ibid. 7). 
Moreover, common traits of classical geopolitics are state-centrality and 
importance of decision-making by elites, for example, a group of “wise men” 
who are responsible for everything. Ó Tuathail et al. (2006) argue that critical 
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geopolitics provides us with broader understanding beyond elitist conception and 
that each state has its own geopolitical culture “of conceptualizing their state and 
its unique identity, position and role in the world” (Ibid. 7). Geopolitical culture 
is supposed to be formed historically according to different forms of state-
building and development of the state apparatus and legal structures. 
Furthermore, it shapes “how states behave culturally in the world” (Ibid. 8). 
Within his critical theory, Ó Tuathail distinguishes between three types of 
geopolitical discourse: formal, practical and popular. Formal geopolitics is 
provided by intellectuals as their vision and theory regarding geopolitical issues. 
Practical geopolitics, according to Ó Tuathail et al. (Ibid. 9) refers to the 
narratives used by policy makers and politicians in the actual practice of the 
foreign policy –literally speaking, political speeches and actions. Lastly is 
popular geopolitics, whose discourses can be founded in the public debate, and 
furthermore is the most important type used in this study. The three-dimensional 
model of the critical perspective on geopolitics is much broader that the classical 
one. In terms of the issue of security within Arctic discourse it opens the 
possibility to extend the focus from purely ‘national security’ to ‘environmental’ 
and ‘human security’.  
2.5 Sustainable Development: a Definition 
The most common definition of sustainable development is usually cited from the 
report, Our Common Future, and is said to be a form of development that “meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). According to Nilsen (2010:496), the main 
focus of this definition “…is on maximizing the utility of human beings” which 
will not decline over time. However, all possible approaches to define sustainable 
development can be divided into two groups: “weak sustainable development” 
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(WSD) and “strong sustainable development” (SSD). The 1987 WCED 
definition, which is by far the most accepted definition, is a variant of WSD. 
Ultimately, Nilsen (2010) concludes that the global community and national 
governments should admit the efficiency and enforce the transition towards the 
SSD paradigm. From the position of SSD “interests of humans are not to have an 
overriding priority over the interests of nature”, plus “economy and nature are 
both to be sustained as they are complementary” (Ibid. 495).  
2.6 Sources under Scrutiny 
The methodological framework of this study is based on two methods: the 
comparative method and discourse analysis. The comparative method of 
differences is used to compare several correlated variables, for example, orders of 
discourses and story-lines. According to this method, comparison is made 
between systems which “share a number of common features as a way of 
neutralizing some differences while highlighting others” (Moses and Knutsen 
2012:99). In order to conduct the comparative analysis, the sources of 
information should be chosen according to the principle of correlation.  
Comparative study of Russian and Norwegian debates on the Arctic includes a 
timeline from May 2013 until May 2014. During this year my focus on press and 
radio sources aimed at examining both official and public perspectives on the 
issue. Official documents (The Fundamentals of State Policy and The High North 
Strategy) are used further in this research. The debate platform for the analysis 
includes: two general audience and two business newspapers and two radio 
channels. These media sources presented material in both Russian and 
Norwegian, and all examples from these texts are presented as my own 
translations of the source.  
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For the purpose of this study, newspapers such as the Russian Rossijskaya gazeta 
and the Norwegian Aftenposten represent how the Arctic issue has been covered 
by official newspapers during the last year. In total, the database for this research 
contains 54 articles from Rossijskaya gazeta and 50 articles from Aftenposten. In 
order to examine the economic perspective on the Arctic, two business 
publications were chosen, the Russian paper, Kommersant and the Norwegian 
paper, Dagens Næringsliv (40 and 31 articles, respectively). All the articles have 
been retrieved via digital archives through keyword searches in Russian and 
Norwegian of the terms for ‘Arctic’ and ‘high north’ (nordområdene), combined 
with terms such as ‘oil and gas’, ‘resources’, ‘Northern Sea Route’, ‘security’, 
‘sustainable development’, ‘environment’ etc.   
The radio channels analyzed discussing Arctic issues during the period of study 
include the Russian station, Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow), which held 12 
debates about the Arctic on different program such as “Osoboje mnenije” 
(Special Opinion),  “Oblozhka-1” (Cover-1), “Blog-Aut” (Blog-Out), “Bolshoj 
Dozor” (Big Watch) and “Ischem vihod” (Search for Remedies). On the 
Norwegian radio station, NRK P2, there were fourteen debates on the program 
“Dagnytt Atten” and seven debates on the program “Ekko”. All of the sources 
have digital archives through their homepages. 
2.7 Relation of the Theory to the Thesis. 
This study explores environmental public debate in the broad context of Arctic 
discourse in Russian and Norwegian media. This context includes the scope of 
discourses which circulate in the Arctic discursive space. I focus on the key 
issues (nodal points) which represent the dominant discourses in the examined 
media. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2013) these discourses are ‘struggling’ 
to establish a hegemony of the ‘Arctic’ meaning. Furthermore, these discourses 
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are framed differently within two debate dimensions – official and public.  Both 
perspectives are taken into account in this study. Thus, I intend to examine the 
position and power of the Russian and Norwegian public spheres in terms of 
advancing and defending their environmental standings regarding the Arctic. The 
role of the researcher, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:21), is to “work 
with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the 
statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive 
representations of reality”. 
As has already been mentioned in this section, this study is embedded in a 
constructivist knowledge paradigm. The representations of the world are 
changeable depending on historical context. As we will see in the next chapter, 
various Arctic narratives retrieved from history have the capacity to shape our 
modern representations about this region and frame the Arctic debate. 
Furthermore, the interdisciplinary character of this study implies that the 
environmental aspect of Arctic discourse is tightly intertwined with other issues, 
so must be examined in relation to them. These include political, social, 
economic, ecological, and geopolitical perspectives of the Arctic discourse.  
2.8 Outline of the Thesis 
The first two chapters of the thesis are devoted to the research design. The aim 
and research questions of the thesis are presented in the first chapter, as well as 
background information to clarify the context of the Arctic discourse. The 
theoretical and methodological framework is presented separately in the second 
chapter along with the main concepts used in the study and data collection 
description.   
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The third chapter sets the scene with a historical description reaching back to 
ancient times. Additionally, I focus on the narratives of the Arctic region 
according to the Russian and Norwegian historical-cultural backgrounds. The aim 
of this chapter is to discover how those images have influenced the modern 
public debate while creating an argument in favor or against the current 
‘Northern Dimension’ policy of the Russian and Norwegian governments. 
The fourth chapter is entirely devoted to the discourse analysis of the previously 
mentioned media sources. It points out the key Arctic issues and main 
stakeholders within the debate. Further, it gives a detailed analysis of resource, 
security and environmental discourses. In the end the power and engagement of 
the Russian and Norwegian public spheres in terms of environmental debate will 
be partly investigated. 
The fifth chapter examines ethical aspects within the environmental debate. It 
elucidates the major dilemmas, sources of ethics and whether Russians and 
Norwegians draw on ecological consciousness in respect to the Arctic issue. In 
general, this chapter aims to present a broad picture of the environmental debate 
in the Arctic. 
The main findings and conclusions are summarized in the last chapter, present my 
reflections about the impact of public debate on an actual ‘Northern Dimension’ 
policy in both countries.  
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3. Arctic Narratives 
The Arctic is a landscape of lichens and mountains, snowflakes and 
icebergs, saxifrage, creeping willow, pebbles ground to gemstone 
perfection, and vast formations of ice, contours of rocks, sweeping 
geomorphic crenellations draped with greys and smoky greens, 
draped with the shadows of winds and the colours of snow. 
(Moss 1997:4) 
 
The Arctic has tantalized the human imagination for many centuries, and in the 
modern age, it has become “the last frontier of civilization’s global, national, and 
commercial development” (Greenberg 2009:1310). One of the most important 
components of Arctic discourse is presented by narratives which are deeply 
embedded in the historical and cultural legacies of many states. In this regard, the 
narratives produce representations, attitudes and beliefs that strike a chord with 
national identities. When issues about the Arctic are discussed in the public 
sphere, argumentation is usually bound by cultural and national lines of 
reasoning.  
This chapter aims survey the evolution of meaning in narratives about the Arctic 
through the cultural-historical lenses of Russia and Norway. The term 
“narrative’’ comes from literature studies and, refers simply to a sequence of 
events. They are typically used in both textual and visual forms. Fludernik 
(2009:6) defines a narrative as “a representation of a possible world in a 
linguistic and/or visual medium, at whose center there are one or several 
protagonists of an anthropomorphic nature who are existentially anchored in a 
temporal and spatial sense and who (mostly) perform goal-directed actions’’. 
Thus, narratives are the stories that create our representations of the ‘object’ 
through the power of images. Moss (1999:339) points out, that “words in 
narratives deliver images within, where the visceral encoding of seen and unseen 
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merge, and the artfully imagined takes precedence over actuality’’. Arctic history 
is filled with rich narratives that shape our representations of the region in the 
present day. 
Tracing these narratives in the public debate helps to decipher diverse patterns of 
understanding of the Arctic. In a long-term perspective, these patterns have 
always been a part of various Arctic discourses. Through the agency of language, 
narratives are able to ‘load’ the key nodal points with specific meaning. 
Moreover, discourses of the Arctic have always been highly intertextual due to 
their connection with realities from different contexts (Schimansky and Spring 
2010). Interestingly, as an important part of the historical-cultural background, 
national narratives can be invoked either consciously or unconsciously in the 
public debate (Ryall et al. 2010). 
Exploration of the last blank spot on the map implied that Arctic discourse was 
closely intertwined with colonial discourses (i.e. Ryall et al. 2010, Schimansky 
and Spring 2010, Chartier 2006). Susanne Frank points out that “as a part of 
colonial discourse, the Arctic discourse can be seen as an occidental discursive 
unit common to all nations directly or indirectly involved in the conquest” 
(2010:106). As a part of colonial discourse, Arctic discourse put emphasis on the 
relations/opposition between man and nature in contrast to a classical opposition 
of different human cultures (Ibid.). 
In order to get a detailed overview of the Arctic narratives that Russian and 
Norwegian public debates draw on, the chapter is divided into six parts. The first 
part briefly reviews representations of the Arctic in world history, since their 
influence can be traced to the present. The second and the third sections give an 
overview of the main national narratives present in Russian and Norwegian 
public debates. The fourth and the fifth parts present the Arctic from the 
perspective of indigenous communities and “outsiders”. And the sixth part 
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presents the important dichotomy of a warm vs. cold Arctic, whose role is 
discussed at the end of the chapter. 
3.1 Representations of the North in World History  
Today, the Arctic can be viewed as a kingdom of the polar bear and a region rich 
with natural resources. It is difficult to imagine that millions years ago it was 
constituted by different animals and representations. Moreover, in prehistoric 
times, the climate of the North was much warmer, so that it supported a vastly 
different ecosystem than the present, which today would seem as if out of a fairy 
tale to modern Norwegians, Russians, Inuit or Sami peoples.12  Generally, the 
earth’s climate fluctuates between warming and cooling periods, which has 
influenced Arctic ecosystems and cultures alike. What today appears like a stable 
landscape and cast of human cultures is actually in flux.  The process of 
colonization of the Arctic by prehistoric peoples attests to this as people settled 
the region in several waves (Kozlowski and Bandi 1984:360), causing several 
changes in turn, like the extinction of mammoths. 
Thousands of years later, citizens of the ancient “center of the world” in Greece 
were lost in conjectures about the world beyond the known frontiers. Hellenic 
peoples were the first who informed the modern world about their representations 
of the North through written sources. Although it was not possible for them to 
know about the existence of polar bears in the most remote northern part of their 
imaginative world map, the main bearings for ancient mariners were 
serendipitously the celestial constellations Ursa Major and Ursa Minor. 
Referring to Greek myths, these ursae or “bears” guided boats as well as 
                                              
12 For instance, once paleontological study estimated that the “Arctic was approximately 40ºC warmer than it is 
today” (Greenberg 2009:1318) in the Eocene period (55-50  million years ago), meaning the Arctic was essentially 
subtropical. 
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imaginations out at sea and in the broader culture. One of the versions of the 
myth says that Zeus turned his lover Callisto into a bear in order to save her from 
his jealous wife, Hera. Despite reliance on these navigation ‘guides’, the 
Northern edge of the world was rather a subject of myth-making than of 
exploration. In anticipation of later discoveries in of the savage Arctic beast, 
ancient Greeks referred to north as àrktos, or “bear” (Schimansky and Spring 
2010:34, Lopez 1986). 
Myths related to the unexplored lands fulfilled important functions in Hellenic 
period. For instance, the story about the mystical island Hyperborea – meaning 
“beyond the northern wind, Boreas” – narrates the lives of the mysterious and 
prosperous Hyperboreans. Favored by the gods, their level of purity and virtue, 
along with a festive lifestyle were the traits that distinguished them from Greeks 
(Romm 1992:67). Favored by Apollo, and of an apparently “superior race”, 
Hyperboreans could afford being arrogant and, thus, challenge the value-system 
of the Greeks. Romm (1992) emphasizes the capacities of the “...godlike 
Hyperboreans” who seemed able to “...outshine the Greek at every turn” (Ibid 
61). The belief in the existence of a superior northern people reflected evidence 
of the Greeks’ awareness of their own imperfection. Additionally, the 
representations of the ocean at that time were important. The ocean represented 
uncontrollable and unpredictable forces, and it was not until the time of 
Alexander the Great that the extent of the reach of the sea even began to be 
known. 
During the Roman Empire, knowledge about the island Thule on the northern 
edge of the world appeared after Marseillan Pytheas’ travels (around the 4th 
century BCE). He claimed to have discovered the last unknown and the most 
remote area on the map. On the one hand, this fact inspired many Roman 
politicians and artists. Seneca in his drama, “Medea”, was the first who used the 
phrase, “Ultima Thule” (the edge of the world) (Malaurie 2003:9). The image of 
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the mysterious island beyond the oikoumene (known land) ended up being “a 
powerful symbol of Rome’s renewal and future greatness” (Romm 1992:123). 
On the other hand, this perspective frightened those who did not share the state’s 
ambition to gain wealth and fame from finding Thule. Such skepticism was 
actively expressed by the famous Roman consul, Seneca and Roman poet, 
Horace. The main barrier on the way to the island was considered to be created 
by the ocean. Influenced by Pytheas’ representation of the sea around the island – 
“a sea congealed by the cold” (Malaurie 2003:9) – Tacitus admits the 
impossibility of reaching Thule. Roman historians seemed to believe “...that this 
one region of the world, where Rome faced a boundary imposed by nature rather 
than by barbarian armies, must remain forever closed, and that divine anger 
would destroy any further expeditions sent out to explore it” (Romm 1992:149). 
The motive for crossing the remotest frontiers without fear was followed by the 
counter-discourse, stating that “Seneca and others see Rome’s maritime 
expansion as the final stage in a long slide toward reckless ambition, amorality, 
and self-annihilation” (Ibid. 123). 
While Thule for Romans remained in the realm of dreams, their ambitions and 
curiosity allowed the conquering of part of the British Isles. Not until the Middle 
Ages did European explorers finally penetrate further northwards. Vaughan 
(1987) points out, that the first medieval explorer of the Arctic may have been 
from Ireland. The sixth-century voyages led by Abbot Brendan (St. Brendan the 
Navigator) resulted in the first realistic Arctic narratives. Archeological evidence 
and place-names showed that Irish explorers visited a number of existing lands, 
even though their narratives contain such fabulous features as islands inhabited 
by laughing and weeping people, cats’ heads and other unlikely phenomena 
(Ibid.).  
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Later, from the ninth century, the northward advances were conducted by 
Vikings. Driven by the search for new lands, they established trading connections 
with the settlers of the White Sea coast (Bjarmaland expeditions) and founded 
colonies in Iceland and southern Greenland (discussed in more detail below). 
Nevertheless, Vaughan (1987:337) points out the prevalence of “medieval 
ignorance about the Arctic”. Of course, several realistic features about the North 
can be found in medieval sources due to the contribution made by several 
medieval explorers, cartographers and chroniclers. For instance, the Irish monk, 
Dicuil, mentioned Iceland, identifying it as Thule. The Saxon cleric, Adam of 
Bremen, gathered information about Vikings’ advances to the North. The Danish 
chronicler, Saxo Grammaticus, described the life of indigenous Finns and their 
skiing skills (Ibid.). However, the majority of the medieval references to the 
North usually contained a thin line between the real and the imagined.  
Olaus Magnus, a priest from Sweden, likely made the most remarkable 
contribution to medieval knowledge about the North. In his work, On Animals, he 
made accurate descriptions of polar bears, walruses, falcons, and even made the 
earliest description of whaling. Magnus is also known for the work, Carta 
Marina (1539), which contains descriptions of the North and its marvels (Lewis 
2013a). According to Vaughan (1987:337), Magnus “includes a good deal of 
legendary or fanciful material, much of it medieval: [...] huge fishes swallow 
ships; giants have a special section devoted to them, and there are duels with 
dragons and serpents”. According to Chet van Duzer (2013), the beastly art was 
used by cartographers in order to illustrate the possible dangers of seafaring in 
unexplored regions of the world.  
The embellished maps and globes of the Middle Ages testified to the general 
ignorance of the Arctic of the times (Vaughan 1987). The summary knowledge of 
the Arctic held by medieval Europeans did not go beyond the image of a cold, icy 
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place, inhabited by fearsome animals and monsters with the backdrop of the 
midnight sun in summer and the winter darkness. 
If curiosity about the North appeared in the Middle Ages, it was supported by 
economic interest. Commercial attention was directed at the natural resources of 
the North. In the 13
th
 century, relatively advanced maritime explorations resulted 
in the establishment of the trading routes between Greenland, Iceland, Novgorod 
and its hinterlands, Bergen in Norway and several German cities (Ibid. 332). It 
was a time of commercial prosperity for the Hanseatic League, and Norway and 
Russia were the main resource exporting countries of the period.  
From the perspective of northern territories, coastal settlers from northern 
Norway and the Kola Peninsula (northwest Russia) had established trading 
connections ever since the time of the Vikings. These trading routes existed 
through the Middle Ages and from the 17
th
 century, the trading pattern became 
known as “Pomor trade”. 
Later, in the age of discovery (15
th
-18
th
 centuries) maps of the North were 
improved significantly. Part of North Sea route was explored by the Dutch 
navigator, William Barents (1550-1597), whose goal was to find a shorter way to 
the East Indies. As a result, he was the first to discover the Spitsbergen 
(Svalbard) archipelago and reached the Eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya Island in 
1597. Russian advances to the north and east occurred instead as a land-based 
conquest. Driven by the search for fur, all of western Siberia was seized by 1620 
(Greenberg 2009). At the same time, a series of geographical explorations 
defined clearer borders of the Canadian North.  
From the perspective of the main medieval consumer of goods – Catholic Europe 
– “the riches of the North” undoubtedly contributed to overcoming the common 
ignorance of the Arctic region. While the demand for furs and fishery products 
was increasing, economic development of the Russian and Norwegian “resource 
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provinces” and trading centers occurred. The fishery sources of the Barents Sea 
supported the Norwegian export of cod, salmon, walrus tusks, and whale oil until 
the decline of Hanseatic trade. While dried cod filled the Norwegian treasury, 
furs and pelts were the “soft gold” (Slezkine and Diment 1993) for Russians. To 
secure access and the supply of furs, constant military incursions were made to 
Siberia. According to Bobrick (1992), however, the decline of the fur trade 
started from the early 18th century.  
The resources from the North have been continuously depleted since the Middle 
Ages. The period from the 16
th
 to 18
th
 centuries was marked by industrial 
whaling. Greenberg (2009:1346) points out, that “the most important driver for 
aggressive Arctic whaling […] was the extraction of whale oil and fat for energy 
markets and industrial production throughout Western Europe”. As a result, the 
rapid decline in numbers of species had a crucial impact on the Arctic ecosystem. 
The populations of several whale species have still not fully recovered from 
whaling in this period. It is estimated that around 38,000 Greenland right whales 
were killed by the British fleet in the Davis Strait fishery, and as of 1986, the 
species numbered only 200 (Lopez 1986:10).  
Polar exploration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries uncovered the last 
blank spots of the Arctic. The Austro-Hungarian North Pole expedition in 1872 
reached the Franz Josef Land archipelago. Norwegian polar explorers conducted 
several successful expeditions, reaching the North and the South Poles (more on 
this below). These achievements became sensational media events which 
proclaimed the Arctic to be more accessible and explorable than previously 
thought.  
As we can see, the history of human contact and interaction with the Arctic is 
long and varied, which in turn has affected the evolution of the region’s 
representation. But over the course of the twentieth century, a foundation was 
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laid for the demystification of the Arctic in the Western public discourse. Chartie 
(2007) points out that modern understanding and representation of the North are 
buttressed by two important aspects. First of all, “denothernization” was 
influenced by demographic, economic development and climate change that 
decreased the severity of conditions in the Arctic (Ibid. 36). The second aspect is 
the concept of “receding the North” in which exploration and research of the last 
blank spot on the world map also caused the boundaries of the discourse to be 
constantly pushed back towards the North Pole. This, according to Chartie (2007) 
revealed “the inflexibility of the conception of North, which is at the root its 
inevitable disappearance” (Ibid.). 
Reinforcement of the resource discourse happened in an epoch of rapid industrial 
development. In the context of the demand for minerals, the Northern territories 
were far but left out. In the Western Hemisphere, passions were running high 
with “Gold fever” (1896) as prospectors flooded north to the Klondike. Who 
could have thought at the time that this northern territory could be valuable for 
anything other than its gold? Indeed, the US infatuation with Alaska’s mineral 
riches has a long history (see Greenberg 2009:1353).  
To the east, a new Bolshevik government “...intensified efforts to exploit 
Siberia’s natural resources for Soviet national development” (Ibid. 1354). 
Present-day Russia places a stake on the Arctic deposits of fossil fuels with the 
same motive. Similarly, the North Sea oil deposits, found by Norwegian 
companies in 1960s have provided economic development and prosperity for 
Norway up to the present-day.  
To sum up, the 20
th
 century was a turning point in Arctic history. The resource 
cocktail – furs, fish, whales, gold, minerals, oil, and gas – has historically 
promoted exploration, colonization, and exploitation of the Arctic region. The 
neighboring countries of Russia and Norway have been complicit in the various 
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resource rushes of the Arctic from the very beginning, which in turn have had an 
impact on the environmental history of the region.  
The following sections deal with the specific historical backgrounds of Russia 
and Norway and national Arctic narratives. Nowadays, both countries are active 
participants in the discussions about the Arctic’s future. The discursive spaces 
that they share include economic, security, environmental and scientific 
dimensions.  
3.2 Arctic Narratives in Russian History and Culture 
The Russian Arctic consists of the northern territories of European Russia, north 
of the Ural region and Siberia, and northern Asia. Gradually over a long period of 
time this area and its inhabitants were integrated into Russian national history and 
culture. In the previous section, the “fur rush” resulted in extensive advances to 
the northeast of Russia towards the White Sea (11
th
 century) and the Pechora 
basin (12
th
-13
th
 centuries) (Armstrong 1963:41). Slezkine and Diment (1993) 
point out that the first contact with Siberia east of the Ural Mountains took place 
already in the 11th century. Approaching this region, known as “the Rock” 
(Urals), these early advances, made by Orthodox Christians, were rather peaceful.  
The histories of the Russian Arctic and Siberia are closely related. Emmerson 
(2011:43) points out that interest in Northern Siberia was always supported by 
strong personalities and their particular interests. Representations of Siberia were 
similar to those from the ancient and medieval sources, “as both the frightening 
heart of darkness and fabulous land of plenty” (Slezkine and Diment 1993:2). 
The first military conquest of Siberia happened under the rule of Tsar Ivan the 
Terrible in the 16th century. It was sponsored by the Russian merchant, 
Stroganov, whose goal was to gain access to the rich forests of Siberia. The 
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Cossack detachment, led by Ermak, invaded the Khanate of Sibir in 1581 and 
conquered it in 1585. 
Afterwards, Russian territory extended gradually due to military campaigns. At 
the end of the 17
th
 century, only the far east of the Asian continent was left. This 
remaining task came upon the Russian Emperor, Peter the Great (1672-1725), 
who was an ardent proponent of Europeanization of the country. For the 
Emperor, Siberia was “an Asiatic colony” – exotic, but backward. As the most 
modern ruler since the creation of the Russian state, Peter the Great was the first 
to realize the importance of this “colony” – especially its northern territories – for 
the future progress and development of the country. To the mind of the time, 
“still exotic, Siberia continued to combine the ridiculous and the sublime, except 
that now it was the presence of minerals (zolotoe dno) that made it wonderful and 
the absence of culture (dikost’) that made it terrible’’ (Slezkine and Diment 
1993:3). 
During Peter’s rule, a remarkable contribution was made to the maps of the 
Siberian coastline. From 1739 to 1742, the Russian Baltic Fleet, under the 
guidance of Dmitry Laptev, mapped the Siberian coasts. Vitus Bering’s 
expedition first rounded the Kamchatka peninsula in 1729 (the First Kamchatka 
Expedition). One of the tasks was to test the possibility of reaching Asia through 
the Northern Sea Route. The Emperor valued the potential of the region, so he 
relegated the development of the northern territories to the descendants of the 
colonization. 
The Great Northern Expedition (the Second Kamchatka Expedition, 1733-1743) 
was the biggest and longest scientific expedition in the world at the time. It 
resulted in mapping northeast Asia, exploring Alaska and several North 
American archipelagos. The scientists taking part in the expedition contributed to 
natural scientific and ethnographic research.  
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Another effort to sail through the Northeast Passage was supported by the famous 
Russian scientist, Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov (1711-1765), the head of the 
geographical department of the Russian Academy of Science. The expedition, led 
by Vasili Chichagov, did not succeed in sailing through the entire passage in 
1765. Nevertheless, the contribution to cartography was significant. Lomonosov 
was the author of the first circumpolar map (1764). 
Scientific research on Siberia came along with the development of the first 
industrial factories during the 18th century. Bobrick (1992) points out that the 
development of copper mining made the Russian Empire into the leading 
exporter of copper in the world by 1740. Apart from copper, several deposits of 
minerals and precious metals were exploited. Greenberg (2009:1351) states that 
the Russian population of Siberia was estimated at about 300,000 people in 1700 
and grew to 1.8 million by 1850. Apart from those who moved to the region 
voluntarily in search of employment, the vast majority of mining and factory 
workers were exiles and convicts. Slezkine and Diment (1993:4) portray Siberia 
as the “ultimate symbol of both independence and exploitation”:  
On the one hand […] [Siberia] represented the tradition of “free 
and popular colonization”, communal values, personal dignity, and 
relative peasant prosperity; on the other, it was a backward and 
long-suffering colony used as a source of raw materials and as a 
dumping ground for human refuse from Russia. (Ibid.) 
One of the regime “victims”, Josef Djugashvili – known as Josef Stalin – was 
exiled to the area of Kureika, northern Siberia from 1914 to 1917. Emmerson 
(2011:33) points out that “the Arctic had left its mark on the man [...] Siberia 
remained lodged in [Stalin] for the rest of his life”. Undoubtedly, almost none of 
the Soviet leaders knew the Arctic and understood its difficulties and potentials 
as well as Stalin. This knowledge may have served as inspiration for the future 
soviet program of Arctic development and the development of the GULags. 
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Thus, by the time the Bolsheviks came to power after the October Revolution of 
1917, the new government faced the same contradiction related to development 
of Siberia and Russian Arctic that had to be overcome in order to build socialistic 
space equally throughout Eurasia. The “schizophrenic” present of Siberia 
(Slezkine and Diment 1993) – its great past of romantic backwardness in 
combination with a promising, prosperous future – did not frighten the positive 
builders of communism. As soon as they ruined the old state foundations, the 
creation of the new ones started. It was followed with a special focus on the 
development of the Siberian Arctic, or “The Far North” (Krajnij Sever). 
The first priority of the Soviet government was industrial development generated 
through “...enormous increases in Russian settlement, mining, and 
industrialization to extend the Soviet power across all northern territories and 
exploit rich deposits in iron, copper, nickel, lead, zinc, iron ore, rare metals [...] 
and energy resources...” (Greenberg 2009:1354). Stalin’s claim about the 
concentration of “colossal wealth” in the Arctic and Northern Siberia made this 
region of the highest priority for infrastructure development and scientific 
research (Ibid. 1354). 
Thus, the government established a state monopoly on scientific research which 
was accompanied by constant efforts to set new records in Arctic exploration. 
Youngs (2010:145) argues that the period of 1932-1938 can be considered “the 
Soviet golden age in the Arctic”. The most remarkable achievements of that 
period were the first one-year navigation of the Northern Sea Route in 1932 led 
by Otto Schmidt and the landing of the aircraft flown by Valerii Chkalov at the 
North Pole in 1937. The most outstanding innovation in research by Soviet 
scientists was the establishment of the polar stations on drifting ice floes. The 
first station, “North Pole-1” (Severnij Polus-1 or “SP-1”) was led by Ivan 
Papanin in 1937. The dual tasks of the stations were to gather scientific data and 
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“colonize the Polar region” in order to show that a great number of people could 
live “normally” in Arctic conditions (Frank 2010:117). 
Nevertheless, development and research on the region could not be separated 
from the development of the rest of the Soviet territories. One of the peculiarities 
of this development project was its emphasis on connecting the Arctic to the 
center and rest of the country (Ibid. 117). In other words the synchronized 
development of the center and periphery could occur by means of 
“normalization” (Ibid.).  
All the activities in the North were accompanied and reviewed by the state 
propaganda machine. In the 1930s, the polar explorers were the first heroes of the 
country celebrated in Soviet mass culture. Moreover, Soviet literature was an 
important agent of ideology. Narrating the successful polar explorations was 
important in order to integrate “the Arctic into symbolical construction of 
national space” (Ibid. 107). Here we can talk about the creation of the specific 
soviet Arctic narratives. 
Frank (2010:109) argues that the main characteristic of the soviet Arctic narrative 
was to overcome the image of a cold and hostile place. The soviet literature of the 
1930s used several techniques of compelling representations: appealing to 
technical innovations, social warmth and imagination. The most famous Soviet 
science fiction author, Aleksandr Beljaev, wrote his novel Under the Arctic sky 
(“Pod nebom Arktiki”) in 1938. The main idea of the book is to convince the 
reader that innovative technologies can overcome the general darkness and cold 
of the Arctic. The artificial warming and lighting provide the perfect living 
conditions in a utopian place which is associated with a prosperous Soviet future.  
Another example is Ilya Selvinskij’s epic poem, “Celjuskinites” (1937-1938). 
The members of Cheluskin’s expedition are portrayed as new Soviet heroes who 
overcome the harsh conditions by social warmth and imagination. They are not 
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like the typical Western heroes who constantly struggle against nature and suffer 
from its severe conditions. The Soviet heroes live in the atmosphere of the social 
warmth which is achieved by “irradiating the heat from inside” and sharing it 
with each other (Frank 2010:115). The second method includes “transporting 
oneself by imagination into warm surroundings”. Frank (2010) points out, that 
the “Soviet ‘warmth’ – sympathetic or imaginative as it may be – is powerful 
enough to overcome even Arctic cold and to enable Soviet people to withstand 
the conditions of Arctic climate as if they were quite ordinary” (Ibid.). Thus, the 
Soviet Arctic narrative represents an Arctic counter-discourse which transforms 
this place of death into an area where life thrives.  
Frank (2010:110) concludes: “what today in the age of actual polar warming is 
perceived as a symptom of catastrophic climate change, was considered as a 
positive utopian perspective in the Soviet Union of the 1930s”. 
The dystopian image of the development of the North appears when we think 
about GULag, the Soviet system of forced labor camps. The practical and 
economic account of using free, forced labor overshadowed the essence of the 
great human tragedy that happened in the North during Stalinist development. 
Slave and free labor built the “Stalin Sea-Baltic Sea Canal,” the Arctic railways 
and the Kolyma and Vorkuta mines. Forced labor abounded between 1928 and 
1958 and declined some years after Stalin’s death (Armstrong 1963). In order to 
stimulate the population influx to the North, the government attracted skilled 
labor by using economic incentives – increased salaries and pensions, longer 
holidays – and loud patriotic calls (Armstrong 1963, 1967). 
This part of Arctic history was not forgotten but reincarnated in the illegal camp 
literature from 1960s that started steadily eroding the utopian Stalinist ideas and 
illusions about “normal life” in the Arctic. 
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The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) was a turning point in the history of the 
country. During the post-war years of recovery, Soviet Russia tried to regain its 
status both within and outside the country. Due to the period of confrontation 
between the superpowers – the “Cold War” – the discourse of the Arctic became 
predominantly militaristic. To portray the progress in development in the sphere 
of space exploration, scientific and military innovations the state propaganda 
machine found new Soviet heroes and narratives. Thus, Yurii Gagarin, the first 
man who flew to space, overshadowed Valerii Chkalov, the first man to fly to the 
North Pole. 
The arms race between the USSR and the USA facilitated constant military 
training exercises, rocket-firing, and nuclear weapons testing. Several military 
firing ranges and bases were built in the Arctic. The multiple nuclear weapons 
experiments resulted in a myriad of nuclear waste dumped into the ocean, which 
became “the submariner’s private sea” (Greenberg 2009: 1373). The North was 
of the highest strategic importance because the nuclear warheads could hit the 
target across the shortest distance.  
Later, the establishment of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” was an unexpected 
proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, made during his speech in Murmansk in 1987. 
The demilitarization of the region was aimed at making northern Europe 
“nuclear-free” and, thus, to decrease stress on the Arctic environment. In terms of 
environmental protection, Gorbachev stressed the importance of cooperation 
between Arctic coastal countries (Gorbachev 1987). Additionally, he referred to 
Gro Harlem Brundtland and thanked her for the contribution that was made 
during her chairmanship of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED). 
Gorbachev’s speech laid the foundation for the end of the Cold War. 
“Desecuritization” of the Arctic left the region in relative peace for another 15 
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years. However, the ignorance of the region, like during medieval times, did not 
last long. The wave of interest in northern Russia surged again a few years after 
Vladimir Putin became the Russian president. From 2000 until 2010, the issue of 
the Russian Arctic gained moderate coverage in Russian media. This study shows 
increased media exposure of the Arctic-related articles in printed sources and 
topics on the radio during the period of May 2013-2014. The region’s resource 
potential and security, along with its ecological status became topics of interest 
once again.  
Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech seemed to be filed away in the history vault when 
in October 2013 Vladimir Putin was informed about a Russian professor who 
proposed to place the Arctic under international control. The president’s reaction 
was sharp and he accused the professor in public for being a “meathead” 
(pridurok) and supporting an “anti-patriotic mood” (Kolesnikov 2013; Medvedev 
2013). Furthermore, the president's counter-argument was the fact that the “flight 
time of American missiles over the Bering strait to Moscow amounts to 15-16 
minutes” and that submarines “…are there… [under the North Pole]” (Ibid.).  As 
Greenberg points out, the Arctic is “a regional theatre for NATO-Russia military 
confrontation and nuclear proliferation in the Cold War era, and today” 
(2009:1388).  
3.3 Arctic Narratives in Norwegian History and Culture 
Norwegian contributions to the earliest representations of the Arctic cannot be 
underestimated. First and foremost, Norwegian Vikings were famous for their 
voyages and establishment of the first settlements in Iceland and southern 
Greenland. In 874 the Viking, Ingolfur Arnarson, arrived with his family and 
followers and made a homestead near what is now the center of Reykjavik 
(Vaughan 1987:316). Another Viking, Erik the Red, prosecuted by law, escaped 
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from Norway in 986 with a colony of people. This colony reached and settled in 
southern Greenland, founding a community that lived there for the next five 
centuries (Ibid.). Although, these territories are commonly perceived as northern 
lands, they lie below the Arctic Circle, so we can conclude that Vikings’ colonial 
expeditions were directed rather westwards than northwards.  
At the same period, Vikings’ advances eastwards at the end of the ninth-century 
opened more Arctic territories. These journeys were driven both by commercial-
trading interests and by desire for military conquests and plundering. The journey 
led by the adventurer, Ottar, included sailing around the North Cape of Norway. 
Vaughan (1987:317) points out that due to this journey the parallel of 70º north 
was undoubtedly reached. After the North Cape expedition, Ottar sailed 
southwards along the Eastern Kola Peninsula, reaching the coasts of the White 
Sea – the territory known as Bjarmaland. Thus, Vikings were first to contact the 
area’s local peoples: the Sami of northern Norway and Bjarmaland. The Svalbard 
archipelago (74º-81º north latitude) was discovered by Vikings, according to the 
Icelandic annals under the year 1194 (Ibid. 319). 
The discovery of Bjarmaland resulted in the start of a fur trade in 1026 and the 
establishment of the Bjarmaland trading company by the Norwegian King, Olaf 
the Fat (Ibid. 318). Only in the 13
th
 century did Norwegian settlements begin 
appearing in the far north of Norway (Ibid. 319). After the last recorded 
Bjarmaland expedition in 1222, the Russian manufacturing center, Novgorod, 
organized several expeditions to the north of Norway. In order to protect the 
territory against plundering, the fortress of Vardø was built in 1307, which 
“blocked further Norwegian settlement eastwards from Vardø and Kirkenes, and 
Russian settlement north-westwards” (Ibid.). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the general ignorance about the Arctic 
dominated in medieval Europe. Admittedly, this was less true for Norway, which 
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was one of the closest lands to the Arctic. The Norwegian journeys northwards 
resulted in extensive knowledge about the northern seas and their inhabitants. 
Two sensational manuscripts by unknown authors were created in 13
th
 century 
Norway as a result.  
Konungs skuggsjå or “King’s mirror”, written in Norwegian is a dialogue 
between a father and son, containing a unique account of marine creatures. 
Despite the mention of mermen, mermaids and more realistic polar bears that 
wander about on the ice and hunt seals, 24 species of whales were described with 
impressive details, including their appearance and diet (Whitaker 1984). Research 
on the manuscript concludes that it circulated in Scandinavia for a while though it 
was first published in 1763. The English translator of the manuscript points out: 
It was written in the most backward section of Scandinavia on the 
very edge of European civilization; and yet it reveals a knowledge 
of the world, an appreciation of culture, and liberal outlook that we 
should not expect to find in thirteenth century Norway (Whitaker 
1984:9). 
Another manuscript written in Latin, Historia Norvegiae, was created 
approximately at the same time as Konungs skuggsjå. Despite repetition of the 
same facts from Konungs skuggsjå, some peculiar details emerge from this 
manuscript. For instance, Greenland is said to be a “promontory of a mainland 
linking it to Bjarmaland and Russia”; the descriptions the Finns resemble those 
written by Adam of Bremen and describe them wearing skins, eating half-raw 
meat, practicing magic and providing furs to Norwegian kings (Vaughan 
1987:328). 
The written sources were undoubtedly important, but artifacts and living 
testimony were equally significant. Apart from trading, the “arctic goods” were 
either circulated among European rulers in the form of gifts or displayed in public 
(Ibid.). The earliest known instance of captive polar bears being from Iceland to 
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northern Europe is known to have been in 880 CE. Such “goods” started flowing 
in to Europe from Greenland around the 11th century (Oleson 1950). In this 
nascent trade, Norway played an important role as middleman between Icelandic 
and Greenlandic vendors and the consumers in European kingdoms. Polar bears 
were the most prized possessions of medieval monarchs while their pelts were 
considered valuable possessions by the Catholic Church. In 1432, a polar bear 
skin was admired by Venetian traveler, Pietro Querini, in Trondheim’s Nidaros 
Cathedral (Vaughan 1987:329). Other valuable Arctic relicts were musk-ox 
heads, reindeer antlers, walrus tusks, and “unicorn horns” (in reality, narwhal 
tusks). Oleson (1950) notes, with irony, that in medieval times polar bears were 
much more important than in the modern world.  
Furthermore, research points out that the Arctic relicts were practical instruments 
of diplomacy. Around 880 CE the traveller, Ingimundr the Old, presented two 
polar bear cubs to king Harold the Fairhaired of Norway, who rewarded him with 
a sea-going vessel (Ibid. 48). Secondly, possession and circulation of Arctic 
goods resulted in the spread of valuable geographical knowledge about the North.  
The late Middle Ages were marked by the Kalmar Union (1397-1523) – the 
union between Scandinavian nations. In this period Norway lost its independence, 
which would not be regained for several centuries. After the kingdom eventually 
split, Denmark-Norway appeared on the European map until 1814 when, at the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, Norway was forced to enter into a union with 
Sweden until 1905.  
The nineteenth century – the “period of unions,” according to Bravo and Sörlin 
(2002) – resulted in dominating positions of Sweden and Denmark in Arctic 
exploration and research in the 18th and 19th centuries, even though these 
activities were concentrated on the northern coast of the Scandinavian Peninsula 
and Greenland. Moreover, the authors point out the present-day “Arctic 
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claustrophobia” of Sweden, Denmark and Norway which “emphasize their 
investigations separately” (Ibid. 7).  
Nevertheless, Norwegian culture did not lose its connection with northern nature 
while occupied by Denmark and Sweden. The Norwegian poet, Petter Dass 
(1647-1707) wrote the famous lyric poem, Norlands Trompet, which gives bright 
descriptions of Nordland and Sami people’s life. The images of nature that he 
created correspond with the national idealization of idyllic peasant life.  
The absence of sovereignty did not ruin Norwegian national identity and northern 
pride. The Norwegian Lutheran missionary, Hans Egede (1686-1758), made a 
trip to Greenland in order to search for evidence of the Viking’s settlements 
there. In 1729 he published a book, Det gamle Grønlands nye Perlustration (“Old 
Greenland’s New Perlustration”), which described Scandinavian colonies in 
Greenland. Thus, the cleric from Norway founded Nuuk – the present capital of 
Greenland – on the land where his barbarian Norse predecessors founded their 
first settlement several centuries before.  
A few decades before regaining its independence in 1905, Norway became one of 
the main players in the “polar rush” at the turn of the 20th century. The main 
Norwegian contribution was made by the polar explorer, Fridtjof Nansen (1861-
1930).  Nansen’s first major achievement was crossing the Greenland ice sheet on 
skis in 1888, and later, he nearly reached the North Pole (up to 86°14′ north) 
during his 1893–1896 expedition. Another Norwegian polar explorer, Roald 
Amundsen (1872-1928), led the first successful navigation of the Northwest 
Passage in 1903. In a competition to reach the North Pole, Amundsen was outrun 
by Nansen, but he did not despair and in 1911 turned southwards to Antarctica 
and reached the South Pole. Otto Sverdrup (1854-1930) is a Norwegian explorer 
famous for his participation in the majority of Norwegian expeditions, as well 
several others organized by the Soviet Union. 
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This period was characterized by the flowering of exploration and adventure 
narratives. The typical trait of this time, according to Eglinger (2010), is that 
scientific progress was the milestone of the polar scientific and nationalistic 
explorations, whereas before the end of the nineteenth century the main driver 
was economic. Eglinger points out that the real motivations of the polar 
explorations were competition for conquest and “hunts for the record” (Ibid.). 
This narrative reveals explorers’ dreams, in which the discovery is equated with 
“taking the possession”, and “the documentation of achievements becomes the 
actual achievement” (Ibid.). 
The dreams of Norwegian Arctic heroes were accessible to the readers of many 
countries, since all of them had written and published books about their 
adventures. Their “documented achievements” were translated into different 
languages and supplemented a popular genre of adventure narratives. 
Nansen’s book, The First Crossing of Greenland (1890), became a national 
bestseller – remarkably, the same year Knut Hamsun became Nobel Prize winner 
in literature for his novel Hunger (1890). Nevertheless, “while Hunger was 
printed in 2000 copies, but only sold a couple of hundred, First Crossing of 
Greenland sold 6621 copies in Norway in the autumn of 1890” (Henning 
2010:43). The style of Nansen’s writing was rather entertaining. He starts the 
description of his adventure referring to the first Viking colonists of Greenland 
and about   traces they left for their descendants to find. According to Eglinger 
(2010:11), Nansen attempts “to ingrain and authorize the excellence of his nation 
with a tradition of dating back a long time”.  
Beyond the significance for Nansen himself, the collective importance of his 
expedition on cross-country skis became evident through its “nationalization”. In 
the beginning of the book Nansen constructs the history of cross-country skiing 
with nationalistic undertones referring to the medieval source, Speculum regale 
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(1250). As Henning (2010:46) argues “on the one hand, no other nation could 
have done the same; on the other, the polar regions appear like the most national 
of the Norwegian sceneries”. 
The Fram expedition (1893-1896), in contrast to the relative minimalism of the 
Greenland crossing, became a great symbol of technical innovation. The book 
based on the expedition, Farthest North (1897), combines a scientific report and 
Nansen’s personal account. His emotional passages create a strongly subjective 
narration that contributes to the creation of the special myth about “the lonesome 
traveler, a heroic explorer and survivior” (Karlsen 2008:203). 
However, Fridtjof Nansen’s figure is controversial because of political factors. 
On the one hand, he was a vocal supporter of Norwegian independence and got a 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for his work with the victims of famine after World 
War I. Nansen “used” his heroic worldwide past in order to create an image of 
Norway: as a country of a great stature. That is why, as Karlsen (2008:200) notes, 
“It was very important to define the nation in relation to Sweden, by, for instance, 
being first on the Poles”. On the other hand, he expressed sympathy for the Soviet 
Union, which was not forgiven by his contemporaries. 
Although Nansen belonged to the pantheon of Western polar heroes, he was not a 
typical one. He was the favorite foreign polar hero of the Soviet public of the 
1930s. Many of his books were translated into Russian and were very popular. 
Frank (2010:124) points out that in Soviet mass culture Nansen was described as 
a paternal type of leader, whereas the image of Amundsen is shown as egoistic, 
acting only for his own purposes. The allusion to Nansen’s “warm” personality 
was appealing to the Soviet reading audience. 
After the age of polar exploration, the next Arctic sensation was the discovery of 
oil and gas fields in the North Sea. This was the beginning of Norwegian 
“petroholism”. Due to the oil Norway has become one of the richest countries in 
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the world. But a large area of the oil deposit is situated above the Arctic Circle, 
which puts its fragile ecosystems in danger. Such concern for the environment 
has resulted in a long-term public debate on “extraction versus protection”. After 
the publication of the report by the US Geological Survey in 2009 on projected 
oil reserves in the Arctic, Norway as well as Russia have become increasingly 
interested in resource potentials of the Arctic across national borders.  
3.4 The Arctic of the Natives 
Historically, nations conquered the discovered territories and established 
sovereignty over them according to the principle of international law, Terra 
Nullius (the land without inhabitants, see Greenberg 2009:1336). The rights of 
indigenous people were not taken into consideration, and the natural resources 
were used according to the needs of the occupants. Indigenous peoples’ 
knowledge and practices were not important to the newcomers. Some peoples 
were conquered by force and others integrated through cooperation.  
According to legal historian Stuart Banner, “indigenous people had never been 
understood to possess the power to withstand a claim of sovereignty by 
Europeans or their descendants” (Banner S. as quoted in Ibid.1337). The Arctic 
people were not an exception. Their history has been highly integrated into global 
history. “No community or environment in the Arctic remained untouched and 
unchanged by the larger historical forces, ideologies, and economic engines that 
have shaped the international system as it evolved since the beginning of the 
European nation-state system” (Ibid. 1315). Thus, from the very beginning the 
North represented a theater stage for the international actors who claimed their 
rights of possession and exploitation. The leading roles were played by 
researchers and adventurers who pursued their own objectives while no 
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significant role has been devoted to indigenous people according to the official 
records of the colonizers: 
Consult any atlas and one will find the names of the great, 
courageous European explorers of Arctic lands and seas. These 
men undertook momentous journeys on behalf of nation, king, or 
queen, and triumphed over adversity or died miserably in a failed 
effort to escape a frozen prison of polar ice. However, even in the 
most detailed maps of the circumpolar North, it will be difficult to 
find the names of any man or woman born in the Arctic or Sub-
arctic community, who grew up there and had made their home 
there throughout their lives. [...] Consult any atlas, and one will 
find the names of no Evenky, Sami, or Khanti shamans; no Komi or 
Dolgan reindeer people; no Inuit or Aleut fishermen; no Tlingit, 
Athabaskan, Dene, Dogrib or Grinch’in chiefs; nor a remembered 
hero of any other indigenous nation. (Ibid. 1339) 
 
The first contact of the civilized world with the “uncivilized” Arctic communities 
generally resulted in a negative picture of northern peoples. The cultural practices 
and values of indigenous people were far from being ideal in the eyes of the 
colonizers. Judging by the northern peoples’ traditions and rituals, Europeans 
underestimated their actual fortitude and resilience. Lack of understanding of 
their life in a constant struggle to survive in the inhospitable climes was linked to 
the colonizer’s poor knowledge about the Arctic landscape and nature. 
According to Doubleday (1999:192), “prevailing over nature rather than adapting 
to it” is the dominant narrative of the Western civilization. This evidence can be 
traced in the historical backgrounds of the colonizing countries, literary works, 
and stories narrated by polar adventurers. Arctic indigenous people – living 
within Arctic nature – experience it as home. Thus, while the natives keep the 
link in perception between landscape and transformation of soul, colonizers’ 
perception of the landscape was limited by the need of adapting to it.  
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In order to understand the perception of the Arctic as home, Greenberg 
(2009:1328) suggests having a closer look at two factors: 
sovereignty/territoriality and sustainable resource use. The factor of sovereignty 
and territoriality includes the porous borders between the Arctic nations. It means 
that the absence of defined borders could allow one to exercise sovereignty 
domestically (inside the borders, defined by community) and in external relations 
(between the Arctic communities). The second factor includes the use of 
traditional knowledge while practicing natural resource sustainability: 
“maintaining small populations and subsistence-based societies; preserving 
animal, marine and plant populations; replenishing communal traditions closely 
related to cooperative economies; [...] spiritual practices [...] [and] nurturing close 
relationships with the souls of animals and other living beings…” (Ibid. 1329).  
Both factors stipulate a deep and intimate interrelation with nature – something 
that has always been missing in the occupants’ attitude toward it. Newcomers 
brought new rules to the game, imposing them on the alien culture in order to 
create a dynamic of dependence that they could exploit. While northern peoples 
were obliged to pay the tributes in furs, Europeans awarded them with tobacco, 
alcohol and disease. Nowadays, Arctic governments develop programs for 
maintaining cultural identity, supporting local languages and traditional crafts of 
Northern communities. However, the consequences of the past continue to affect 
their way of life today. 
The peoples of the Arctic treat it as ‘home’ and possess a very gentle attitude 
towards the environment in which they live. Despite the violence that is inherent 
in their land, Inuits preserve nuannaarpoq – the quality of “taking extravagant 
pleasure in being alive” (Lopez 1986:135). Inuktitut use the word nunatsiaq to 
describe their land, which means “the beautiful/shining land” (Doubleday 
1999:190). The Northwest territory of Canada is named Nunavut, which means 
“our land” in Inuit (Greenberg 2009:1310). 
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Arctic indigenous peoples, like other cultures with an animated sense of nature, 
respect supernatural powers to which they believe they are subordinate (Shelagh 
1997:193). Different spirits are concealed in nature and are usually represented as 
one of the main characters of oral and written narratives. The social practice and 
worldview of Shamanism amongst the aboriginal peoples of the Russian Arctic, 
moreover, serves as “a marker of ethnic identity and cultural survival” (Walker 
2003:41).  
The cultural legacy of Arctic peoples represents a rich and self-sustaining system 
– a relationship which is reflected in the narratives from across various cultural 
groups. The legends and stories from the North tell us about Arctic heroes and 
their interaction with nature and spirits. Despite the impressive variation of these 
narratives, some storylines and motifs are circulated and maintained across the 
whole Arctic space. For example, according to Kennedy (1997:218), the myth 
about the sea goddess, Sedna, in every variety of its contexts represents a pan-
Arctic narrative “extending from Greenland across Canadian North to Siberia”. 
The present day presents limited possibilities for Arctic peoples to influence the 
official debates about the future of their homeland. There is little evidence of 
their participation in the public debate either. Since 1991 the Arctic Council – the 
intergovernmental body dealing with northern issues – has aimed to regulate 
disputes between indigenous people and the Arctic coastal states. Its agenda is 
broad and urgent, especially now as the Arctic and the whole world are facing 
rapid climate change and its consequences. Yet, this organization has not yet 
proven to be a powerful actor on the global stage nor managed to take a stand 
against the dominating economic interests of outsiders.  
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3.5 The Outsiders’ Arctic 
What we know of the Arctic now, even of the oral tradition, is 
largely filtered through the screen of literacy, so that the Arctic of 
scholars, adventurers and to some extent of the Inuit themselves, is 
a literary construct. Yet as we experience it through story, barriers 
crumble, boundaries blur; we can if we listen, hear ourselves 
breathe. 
Moss (1997:2) 
 
Before going further it is important to have a closer look at the problem of 
understanding and perceiving the Arctic from the perspective of people who 
never lived there. In the study of the representations of the North in ancient 
thought, Romm points out that “despite continuing advances in science and 
exploration, the average citizens of Greece and Rome clung to the conceptions of 
the earth's edges that best suited their imaginative needs” (1992:41). At the same 
time, in the study of modern representations of the Canadian Arctic, linguist John 
Moss points out that “the Arctic is a condition of our imagination” (Moss 
1997:5). From both perspectives, it is possible to conclude that imagination has 
played a crucial role in our perception of the Arctic across time. This statement is 
not true regarding the indigenous northern populations, and we will see why. 
The patterns of understanding the Arctic are complex and ambiguous. The 
audience and participants of official and public debates on the region can 
generally be divided into two groups: the majority – who have never been to the 
North – and the minority – who have visited the North due to professional, 
scientific or touristic interests. Without giving preference to any group in 
particular, Moss portrays both types as outsiders (Moss 1994, 1999, Doubleday 
1999). 
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If the outsider’s mind approaches the image of the Arctic, it collides with three 
barriers: geographic borders, imagined landscape and understanding of Arctic 
nature. 
First of all, geographic perception of the Arctic reveals its vague boundaries. 
When we talk about the Arctic we usually mean “the cultural notions surrounding 
this area as representing a generalized North” (Ryall et al. 2010:xii). In any of the 
Arctic narratives these borders are set by the author. According to Emmerson 
(2011), different fields of science have different views regarding what the Arctic 
is. For example, for political scientists the Arctic boundaries extend according to 
the ambitions of different states. From the perspective of discourse, “the 
geographical boundaries of the Arctic themselves are both set discursively and 
affected the formation of the discourses” (Ryall et al. 2010:xiii). 
Secondly, the remoteness of the Arctic affects our representation of the 
landscape. For the majority it is problematic to visit the area and see it with one’s 
own eyes. We will never experience the landscape as it is experienced by 
indigenous people. Moss points out that “the Arctic of outsiders is a landscape of 
the mind, shaped more by reading than by experience and perception” 
(1999:336). The general representation of the Arctic is based rather on textual or 
visual resources, using data we have absorbed from books, films, articles and 
other sources that reflect “the dreams of writers’’ (Ibid. 342). The officials create 
their rhetoric and make political decisions about a territory that they have never 
seen and make “legislation affecting land claims, ecology, and human welfare 
[…] enacted on the basis of an Arctic written into [the] imagination of legislators, 
whose own experience of the north is often limited to, and always shaped by, 
what others write of it” (Ibid. 341). In addition, Doubleday concludes that “while 
we perceive the Arctic as a horizon, not home, we become more remote from it” 
(1999:194). So, it is not the Arctic that is remote, but us who distance ourselves 
from it. 
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Thirdly, the majority of outsiders have contradictory feelings regarding Northern 
nature and populations. For some the Arctic is a lifeless and cold place, while for 
others it is in constant metamorphosis, churning with life in rich ecosystems.  Yet 
still for others, both views are accepted. Probably, outsiders’ attitudes to Arctic 
nature are purely discursive constructs, while people who live there experience it 
as home (Doubleday 1999). Lopez (1986) points out that people, in general, have 
lost any sense of affinity with nature. Whichever is the case will come to 
influence the construction of the public debate. 
To sum up, Moss stresses that (1999:342) our story of the Arctic “... is shaped by 
the desire of the narrator…” Thus, a contemporary Arctic outsider cannot have a 
realistic understanding of the Arctic, since that understanding is always 
constructed. What is conceived in one’s mind is a combination of images related 
to the narratives of the Arctic. Moreover, as a member of the public debate, the 
outsider “consumes” different ideas about the Arctic provided by various actors, 
such as national governments, oil companies or environmental organizations. 
3.6 Cold vs. Warm Arctic 
Myths about Hyperborea and Ultima Thule have contributed to the emergence of 
opposing ideas of a “cold vs. warm” Arctic (Frank 2010). This dichotomy, 
moreover, plays an important role in the present-day understanding and 
representation of the Arctic. Deriving from ancient cultural legacies, these 
“motives’’ have been developed through the centuries and appear nowadays as 
important narratives of the Arctic. 
The myth about the Hyperborean region is akin to the concept of “utopia”. The 
world of Hyperboreans served as a mirror for greedy Greeks to help them reflect 
on their immoral sides (Romm 1992). Briefly, Hyperboreans were superior beings 
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that lived blissfully in a warm and blooming land. Referring to the myth about 
Atlantis, Plato stresses that people who live in oikoumene (“known land”) are of 
the lower level than those who live beyond (Ibid. 125). 
Many centuries after Plato’s musings, Friedrich Nietzsche referred to 
Hyperboreans in his work, Antichrist, in order to dispel the myths and prejudices 
of his contemporary society. Nietzsche transforms the narrative by focusing on 
Hyperboreans’ superhuman nature and their ability to exist in cold conditions. 
According to Nietzsche's ideal representations, man should be placed in a cold 
environment, preferably the Arctic or the Alps, in order to become a “higher type 
of Man… who is longing for power and has freed himself of morality… to live in 
isolation from the ‘warm’ community...of Christians” (Frank 2010:107). 
Further transformation of the narrative of the “warm Arctic” can be found during 
the “golden ages of the Soviet Arctic” (Youngs 2010) and in modern public 
debates, which will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter. 
The myth about the island of Thule has contributed to the idea of a “cold Arctic”. 
This image, according to Greenberg (2009:1310), represents “the awesome, 
icebound, resource-abundant northernmost boundary of classical and early 
modern European imagination and ambition.” The “cold Arctic” is that which is 
not easily subdued. However, the idea of “mastering” (in the Victorian sense) or 
“opening” the Arctic (in 21st century terms) has remained attractive up to the 
present-day due to the common expectation of garnering wealth from the region 
through extractive or exploitative means. As we have seen, Romans desired to 
attain “greatness” and “wealth” from Thule (Romm 1992), whereas, the history 
of the twentieth century showed that the conquest of the “cold Arctic” would give 
even more: fame, wealth, mastery, scientific data, resources and so on. 
Returning to reflections about colonial discourse, many authors conclude that the 
dichotomy of “man vs. nature” refers to Western cultures (Chartier 2006, Ryall et 
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al. 2010, Doubleday 1999 ets). Oswald Spengler was the first modern philosopher 
that opposed and criticized occidental civilization (Frank 2010). In his view, the 
Arctic rush of Europeans was a symptom “...of the Western tradition of ‘Faustian 
culture’ which began with the renaissance and aimed at a global extension of its 
power” (Ibid. 110). As Doubleday (1999:192) observes, Europeans adhered to 
ideas of “prevailing over nature, rather than adapting to it”. 
Frank (2010) argues that the same opposition was a common part of the Soviet 
Arctic discourse of the 1930s. Moreover, colonization of the Northern territories 
of Russia date back to the 12
th
 century, while active Arctic exploration and 
scientific research started at the same time as Western ones. Russian experience 
can generally be referred to as a Western tradition, albeit with particular 
differences. 
3.7 Conclusion: Arctic Narratives in Russian and 
Norwegian Public Debates 
From global and national perspectives, Arctic history reveals a multitude of 
embedded narratives which inform modern Arctic discourses. And Arctic 
discourse is in turn a part of the broader discourse of the North. Representations 
of the Arctic – or the North more generally – from antiquity has undergone a 
certain transformation. The main peculiarity of these representations is that they 
have always tended to have a dual nature, particularly as a contradiction between 
rational and imaginative. The imaginative aspect was driven by the lack of 
knowledge about the North and curiosity of the unknown, and the rational, rather, 
by the expectation of gaining wealth, fame or status. 
If we start from antiquity, the prevailing notion of the North, from the 
imaginative dimension, was “cold vs. warm” (Ultima Thule vs. Hyperborea, 
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respectively). The rational dimension was concerned with approaching the 
territory as prospectively rich, yet difficult to subdue (e.g. Ultima Thule).  
Further down the line during the Middle Ages, the rational representation was in 
direct opposition to the imaginative one, which constituted the dichotomy “rich 
vs. mysterious”. Despite, people’s general ignorance of the Arctic geographically, 
the “fur rush” stimulated the northward advance of medieval traders and 
travelers. This led to formation of the first resource discourse enforced by the 
development of trade (e.g., Bjarmaland and Hanseatic trade). The mystery of the 
Northern lands and seas appealed to the ambitions of travelers, who tended to 
describe them with fantastical abandon (e.g. mermaids and dragons). The first 
traces of military discourse can also be found at this period. For instance, with 
focus on Siberian riches, the Russian state forced the military annexation of 
Siberia.  
In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, the narratives of the “rich and mysterious Arctic” 
became the points of departure for intensive industrial development and scientific 
research. Thus, the resource discourse was further facilitated by demands for 
mineral resources. At the same time, scientific discourse started to “gain 
momentum”. These trends have not slowed down up until the present time.  
20
th
 century explorations and research contributed to the “denothernization” of 
the Arctic (see Chartier 2007), whittling away at the region’s mysterious allure.  
At the same time, it became more “explorable”, as expeditions from the mid-19th 
to the mid-20
th
 centuries attest. The increased militarization during the Cold War 
along with progressive industrialization led to enormous pollution of the North. 
The scientific evidence of the growing global-scale of contamination led to 
intense environmental discourses about the Arctic in the face of the climate 
change. Thus, this century is marked by the appearance of a new environmental 
type of Arctic discourse.  
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Historical narratives, thus, have shaped representations of the Arctic in the 21
st
 
century. The present-day enforcement of the resource, security and environmental 
discourses around the Arctic has resulted in the combining and interrelation of 
several representations.  
According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2013), if we consider the 
“Arctic” to be the nodal point of the discourse of the North, historical narratives 
produced the following Arctic dichotomous representations: cold—warm, rich—
poor, and mysterious—explorable. These representations circulate in the 
discursive space as signs, which tend to fix the meaning of the nodal point. They 
can be seen as moments (with fixed meanings) or elements (signs with unfixed 
meanings). Among the representations mentioned above, only ‘cold’, ‘explorable’ 
and ‘poor’ serve as moments with fixed meanings. The rest of the signs are of a 
non-single-valued nature. This means that representations ‘rich’, ‘warm’, 
‘mysterious’ are the elements which imply the Arctic-sign with diverse meanings 
depending on the discursive context. As Table 1 below illustrates: 
 
Table 1: REPRESENTATIONS AS DISCURSIVE ‘ELEMENTS’ WITHIN THE 
ARCTIC DISCOURSE 
Representation 
(Index) 
Meaning 
Rich (1) diversity and amount of Arctic natural resources 
Rich (2) diverse Arctic ecosystem 
Warm (1) warming of the Arctic climate due to climate change 
Warm (2) 1930s Soviet narratives of “normal living conditions in the Arctic” and 
social warmth 
Mysterious (1) Arctic environment represents a latent and diverse world, regulated 
internally, endangered by human interference  
Mysterious (2) belief in a land that contains real marvels (e.g. medieval representations) 
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I would like to give several examples of how these representations have 
constructed Arctic discourses:  
 The Arctic as ‘cold, rich(1) and explorable’ constructed the old resource 
discourse with focus on the occupation of hostile Arctic territories, 
extraction of resources, and endeavor of scientific research; 
 The Arctic as ‘warm(1), rich(1) and explorable’ constructs the new type of 
resource discourse. The easing of resource exploitation due to the climate 
warming and reliance on scientific research in terms of development of 
technologies for resource extraction and gaining the knowledge about the 
region with economic purposes; 
 The Arctic as ‘cold, rich(1)/rich(2) and explorable/mysterious(2)’ 
construct scientific and adventure discourses; 
 The Arctic as ‘warm(2), rich(2) and mysterious(1)’ constructs the 
environmental debate – the Arctic environment that is able to sustain a 
rich ecosystem, for which conditions were optimal until anthropogenic 
influence on climate; 
 The Arctic as ‘rich(1) and explorable’ – the classical basis of militaristic 
discourse which emphasizes the need to protect the resources of the land 
without regard to its nature. 
Russian and Norwegian historical and cultural traditions contain an inventory of 
Arctic narratives that shape national representations about the North. We can say 
that national narratives are the roots of the modern discourses in various struggles 
– resource, security and environmental.  
The main storyline common for both Russian and Norwegian contexts, however, 
is nationalism. Bravo and Sörlin (2002:7) point out, “nationalism remains a 
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crucial narrative in modern Arctic history”. This narrative is actively used in both 
official and public debates in order to represent the significance of the Arctic as 
part of national pride and identity. The point of departure for all discussions in 
the Russian and Norwegian medias postulates that the state must be responsible 
for the Northern territories and their inhabitants. 
Continuity is one of the main arguments of nationalism. According to Emmerson 
(2011:66), “… as Russia seeks to recreate a heroic self-image for itself in the 
twenty-first century, it is natural for it to return to the glorious successes of the 
Soviet Union, just as the Soviet Union appropriated the exploration successes of 
Imperial Russia”. In the Norwegian context, Nansen was the most significant 
figure, successor of the Viking’s explorations of the North and who established 
cross-country skiing as a part of national identity.  
However, the mechanisms of power transferred through the national narratives 
work differently in Russian and Norwegian contexts. The modern Russian state 
puts enormous emphasis on the scientific achievements of the Soviet past. Thus, 
commemorating Soviet polar heroes, the stress in on how important it is to 
continue the tradition of the polar stations on the drifting ice floe (i.e. ‘Severnij 
Polus’, see on page 43) and scientific research in the Arctic. Norwegian officials 
claim a deep-rooted affiliation with northern nature, which is shared by the whole 
nation. Thus, the activities of Norwegian oil and gas companies in the North are 
nothing more than environmentally friendly acts contributing to both 
conservation of nature and national prosperity (see Jensen and Skredsmo 2010). 
As I argue in following chapters, public debates in Russia and Norway draw on 
the imaginative dimension and revive the story of the warm Arctic in different 
ways. Thus, the Soviet legacy of a “warm Arctic” can be found in modern 
Russian public debate on the almost-utopian project that was presented at the 
International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk in 2011. According to the UMKA-
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project, a space-station type high-tech city with a life-supporting system could be 
built on Kotelny Island beyond the Arctic Circle (Kommersant FM 2011). A huge 
area built-up with laboratories, schools and farms will be covered by a cupola in 
order to protect the citizens from the cold and regulate the climate from inside. 
Ideally, scientists and workers in the oil-gas industry would be provided with all 
necessary products and commodities (Vasiljeva and Drankina 2011).  
Remarkably, the project’s name, UMKA, represents a reference to a cultural 
narrative. Umka in the Chukchi language refers to a male polar bear. The 
narrative of a bear cub named Umka is also the title of a well-known cartoon 
(1969) from the Soviet period. According to the plot, little bear is very curious 
about newcomers – the Soviet scientists that arrived to establish the polar station. 
He tries to befriend them with a little husky puppy, who explains to him who the 
strange people are and that they are kind and not dangerous. In the end Umka gets 
into trouble. He disobeys his mother’s warning and goes to explore the station in 
the middle of the night. Thus, he is caught by the inhabitants and taken by 
helicopter to the zoo. In the last scene, we see his happy face, waving his paw to 
his mother, saying: “Don’t worry!” The message of Umka being sent to the zoo 
was meant to reassure young viewers about the cub’s fate. From the perspective 
of mass culture, Soviet zoos “would save the threatened polar bears from 
extinction” (Frank 2010:110).  
To sum up, the project of the utopian city in the Arctic aims to realize the targets 
missed in Soviet times, reconstructing the myth of the warm Arctic where people 
are able to live a normal life. The name of the city alludes to the successes of the 
scientific progress of Soviet Russia. If we read between the lines, the point of the 
UMKA-project is probably the claim that “even the polar bears will benefit”.  
Russian historical narratives support the old Soviet type of scientific and resource 
discourses in modern debates. The relation between humans and nature is defined 
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by the mastering of nature. Environmental concern plays only a supplemental 
role. The nationalistic image portrays the state which inherited a vast legacy of 
experience capable to satisfy the needs of every aspect of society, whether 
industry, the army, indigenous people, or local ecosystems. 
Norway has significant scientific and resource interests in the North. However, 
Norwegian public debate expresses more controversial issues concerning the 
Arctic environment such as the activities of oil companies and climate change. 
The data reveals no direct reference to the key Norwegian figures and narratives 
of the past. But Fritjof Nansen’s contributions can be found between the lines of 
some sources. Modern Norwegian narratives reflect an opposition between 
representations of the North as a resource and an area of environmental fragility.  
Summary: The remote and mysterious territory on the northern edge of the 
world has provided full freedom for the imagination since antiquity. The impulses 
to explore the unknown were suppressed by the discourse of fear of the unknown. 
During the Medieval Age, this fear was enough to reduce curiosity by simply 
describing the North as a dangerous, empty, cold and lifeless place with hints of 
it being even place of demons. The prevailing ignorance of the Arctic in this 
period ended approximately in the second half of the nineteenth century with the 
boom of polar exploration. Demystification of the Arctic in the 20
th
 century 
(‘denothernization’, see Chartier 2007) led to strengthening of scientific and 
resource discourses. Furthermore, industrialization and military confrontation in 
the region contributed to significant pollution in the region which enforces 
environmental debates and discourse of climate change.  
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4. Arctic Discourse in Russian and Norwegian 
Media 
This chapter aims to provide a comparative analysis of discourse on the Arctic in 
Russian and Norwegian media for the period of May 2013 to May 2014. As has 
been previously argued in Chapter 3, historically, key nodal points – resources, 
security and the environment – were a part of discourses of the Arctic in both 
countries.  According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse approach (2013), these 
nodal points form the basis of discourses which struggle for hegemony. As such, 
these discourses are examined within two debate dimensions, the official (i.e. 
governmental rhetoric) and public. Each dimension articulates its position with 
respect to the different discourses in the form of storylines, or a type of narrative 
which provides understanding of a discursive issue in a specific way (see Hajer 
1995). According to Chapter 2, the concept of a storyline represents ‘‘a 
generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive 
categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” (Hajer 
1995:56). Hønneland (2004:41, Jensen and Hønneland 2011) argues that “people 
draw on such simplified representations of reality rather than complex systems of 
knowledge in creating a cognitive comprehension of a subject matter”. Moreover, 
this analysis draws on the classification of environmental discourses by Dryzek 
(2013). 
Media is a stage where authorities and the public can express their perspectives 
regarding Arctic-related issues. As has been mentioned in the introduction, 
different political and media systems in Russia and Norway condition the 
relationship between the respective governments and public. The Norwegian 
tradition of corporatist democracy involves pluralism, freedom of speech and 
social responsibility, while the Russian one is based on hegemonic state rhetoric. 
Debate is the process of negotiating meaning within a discursive framework. 
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While the official debate has a prior position in the process of institutionalization, 
the public debate has the capacity of either supporting or opposing this process 
(Fairclough 1989). The present debate on the Arctic is a challenge for the 
opinion-makers in both Russia and Norway. The next section focuses on these 
opinion-makers and their positions, and elucidates why in the Russian media, the 
debate on the Arctic is framed in terms of a “battle”, while in Norway it is framed 
in terms of “cordial opposition”. 
4.1 Opinion-Makers and the Issue Puzzle 
In the previous chapter, I argue that pre-modern representations of the North have 
had an impact on modern Arctic discourse. Natural riches of the mythical 
northern island, Ultima Thule were the target of the Roman Empire’s exploration 
(Romm 1992). This created a narrative about a distant and cold land, uneasy to 
reach but valuable due to its resources. Therefore, it is possible to trace how this 
storyline re-emerged in the form of a representation of the Arctic as the region of 
resource abundance. Resource discourse is tightly intertwined with the issues of 
energy, petroleum and economy and represents one of the main discourses in a 
society’s struggle to “dominate” nature for its benefit. It aims at fixing the 
meaning of the Arctic as a “future energy province” (Jensen and Skredsmo 2010) 
– corresponding to the “dream” or aspirational representation of the region 
articulated by the Russian and Norwegian states and business stakeholders. 
At the same time, the “opening” of the Arctic is becoming increasingly possible 
due to climate change, the warming of the environment, and the melting of the 
ice, actualizing the ancient myth about Hyperborean (see Chapter 3). Current 
representation of the ‘warm Arctic’ has two consequences. On the one hand, an 
ice-free and resource abundant Arctic enforces the debate in favor of extraction 
of non-renewable resources – an argument which supports the Russian and 
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Norwegian official positions. On the other hand, representation of the ‘warm 
Arctic’ – in terms of biological diversity and its rich ecosystem – influences an 
environmental debate which opposes the resource argument (Ryall et al. 2010). 
This representation is especially strong in the Norwegian media debate (discussed 
further herein).  
Along with national interest in the region, ambitions of the Russian and 
Norwegian business sectors are high. Primarily, Rosneft, Gazprom and Statoil are 
the main stakeholders with interest in resource extraction activities in the Arctic. 
These companies face the difficult mission of drilling in the stormy, deep 
offshore waters. However, there are no safe technologies to implement in such a 
harsh environment. This study shows that the general rhetoric shared by state and 
business sectors in both countries claims the following: there is, possibly, enough 
knowledge about the north; new, advanced technology will be developed and 
successfully applied, avoiding risks to the region’s environment. This basic story-
line draws on both countries’ long-term experience of “unique domestic” 
resource management. However, the official rhetoric of both countries differ in 
details, which will be discussed in further sections of this chapter. 
The modern geopolitical debate rests on close connections to other polar states’ 
ambitions to divide the Arctic. The issue of national security emerges as 
geopolitical tensions flare during Arctic border re-establishment. This discourse 
is especially articulated in Russia, where the Arctic has been seen as an 
important, strategic territory since Cold War times. Thus, the media portrays the 
armed forces as seeking to protect national borders and securitizing access to the 
Arctic’s resources. The Norwegian approach to the security issue is much 
broader, including debate on “soft securities’’ (e.g. environmental, human, etc.) 
(see Jensen 2013b, Zysk 2013). 
74 
 
Environmental discourse represents the opposite side of the story, arguing 
strongly against any petroleum activity in the Arctic. Environmental stakeholders 
draw on different storylines in order to justify the mission to ‘save the Arctic’ 
from the oil giants. From the environmental point of view, the Arctic is 
represented as an area with vulnerable, but rich ecosystem. The following 
sections in this chapter show that modern Russian and Norwegian environmental 
discourses portray the climate change issue in different ways. Moreover, within 
the framework of Dryzek’s (2013) classification, the Promethean, administrative 
rationalism, sustainable development, ecological modernization, and green 
consciousness discourses are all reflected in Russian and Norwegian 
environmental contexts. 
The previous list of environmental discourses – apart from the Promethean and 
administrative rationalism – are reflected in the rhetoric of the following opinion 
makers. The eco-oriented political parties support the position of ‘anti-petroleum 
activity in the region’ in both the official and public debates. Along with the 
green parties, international and domestic NGOs make their contribution to 
environmental discourse through public debate. This study shows that 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are the most active 
participants of environmental debate both in Norway and Russia. Both 
organizations run programs for Arctic protection internationally. However, these 
organizations get considerably less space to express their opinion in the Russian 
media. 
Nevertheless, the “interdiscursivity” (Fairclough 1989) of Arctic discourse is 
conditioned by other topic-related issues which are frequently taken up on 
international agendas via forums and conferences. The Arctic Council (AC) is the 
main intergovernmental actor providing a stage for governments to discuss and 
address a wide scope of Arctic-related problems and issues. One of the 
organization’s focus areas is the creation of a regional sustainable development 
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strategy. Scientific studies on climate change and environmental degradation 
claim the warming of the Arctic is reason for alarm, rather than for celebration. 
Thus, although melting sea ice means the opening up of the Northern Sea Route 
and access to the oil-rich continental shelves, the economic benefits should be 
seen as overshadowed by climate change, and it is this kind of complexity that the 
AC must maneuver.  Aside from national actors, the body is also the main 
international stage where Arctic indigenous peoples are represented. However, 
the Council’s important role in providing environmental vision for the Arctic was 
little mentioned in Russian and Norwegian media during the examined period.  
The main concern of the articles about the AC’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna in 
May 2013 was primarily devoted to the prospect of including Asian countries in 
the AC with observer status.    
The wide variety of stakeholders in the Arctic, from a diverse set of backgrounds 
fill the discursive space with different meanings reflecting their different aims 
and ambitions in the region. They focus on what each considers ‘major issues’ 
and seek to promote the hegemony of their position. In the next section, I will 
show how the Arctic discourse, with its multitude of stakeholders, is structured in 
Russian and Norwegian media.  
4.2 Arctic Discourse in the Russian and Norwegian 
Medias 
Analysis of Russian and Norwegian media sources from May 2013 to May 2014 
reveals a huge number of issues circulating in the Arctic discursive space, some 
of which agree and others which oppose each other. However, the character of 
the Russian media debate implies a single-opinion power structure. It is very rare 
to hear two opinion-makers’ voices engaged in a discussion in either Russian 
newspapers or on the radio. This is in sharp contrast to the Norwegian media 
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tradition, which usually presents a discussion between two or more opinion-
makers with different backgrounds. 
The frequency of media attention to resource, security and environmental issues 
prevails in comparison to other Arctic-related issues. According to Fairclough (as 
pointed out in Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:67), the configuration of topic-related 
discourses constructs interdependent networks, or the “order of discourses”. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the order of discourses is defined as “the sum of all 
genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain” (Ibid. 
72). In each country authorities construct the order of Arctic discourse in the 
media, structuring it in a specific way. Societies either oppose or accept such 
order within the public debate. The role of power at the level of social institutions 
or at that of society has a “capacity to control orders of discourses” (Fairclough 
1989:30). The structuring can be changed over time which is “determined by 
changing relationships of power at the level of the social institution or of the 
society” (Ibid.). 
The resource and security discourses are the frontrunners of the Arctic debate in 
the Russian media reports examined. It is not by mere chance that the Arctic-
related articles belong to the rubric, “Battle for Resources” (Bitva za resursi) in 
the Russian periodical, Rossijskaya Gazeta. The business newspaper, 
Kommersant, covers security along with economic issues, signaling their 
interdependency with regard to Russian ambitions in the Arctic. In addition, 
Kommersant dilutes the monotony of official rhetoric by representing positions of 
alternative expert opinions, such as economists, local politicians and scientists. 
The editorial board of the radio station Ekho Moskvy invited several independent 
experts during the study period. Literarily, they were allotted the task of 
answering the question: “Why does Russia, eventually, need the Arctic?” 
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The non-official opinion-makers of the Arctic debate in the Russian media 
provided a critique of Russian authorities’ ambitious security and economic 
rhetoric. The official position’s superlative – the mixture of ‘vital interests’ and 
‘existence of implicit threads’ – can be clearly seen in the words of Russian 
deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin: “Russia is risking to lose its own 
sovereignty unless it protects its political and economic interests in the Arctic”13 
(Zubkov 2013). Unfortunately, the typical trait of the modern Russian media 
tradition is that critical opinions are not presented ‘always and everywhere’. The 
typical trait of the modern Russian public is to ‘turn a deaf ear’ to problems, 
which are weakly related to their life. These traits, as well as the specifics of the 
Russian environmental debate and its complementary role in the order of the 
Arctic discourse will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
The Norwegian media contributes to the resource and environmental discourses 
in order to be the frontrunners of the Arctic debate. Primarily, it reflects the 
Norwegian public’s own split opinion regarding the dilemma of ‘resource use or 
climate abuse.’ In contrast to the Russian pattern, where resource and security 
issues supplement each other, the Norwegian pattern reveals the opposition of 
two poles, the state-business sector versus environmentalists. The issue of 
national security in the High North is an important one, but if compared to the 
Russian case, it appears to be rather weakly reflected in the media. This tendency 
is evident in the newspapers analyzed, the conservative Aftenposten and business-
oriented Dagens Næringsliv. A significant amount of Arctic-related topics have 
been discussed on the nationally broadcast NRK P2 radio station. The radio 
program, “Dagsnytt Atten”, usually invites opinion-makers who previously 
brought up important topics in the print media. The popular-science perspective 
                                              
13 Unless stated otherwise, all translations from sources in Russian and Norwegian in this study are mine. 
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created by the program “Ekko” on NRK P2 is a significant source of ethical 
debate related to the Arctic. 
The next sections are devoted to the analysis of the resource, security and 
environmental discourses in the official and public debates on the Arctic in 
Russia and Norway. The analysis includes the vision of the official and public 
storylines as articulated in Russian and Norwegian media.  
4.3 Resource-Energy-Economy Discourse 
The Russian and Norwegian economies are two extreme examples of a ‘paradox 
of plenty’. Comparing the present economic development of their oil and gas 
based economies and the level of democracy, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the curse has befallen the Russian case while a magic fairytale happened to 
Norway (Goins 2012). Both systems have been addicted to oil since the 1950s 
and 60s. Vladimir Putin emphasized several times that the country has no 
program for the transition from the oil economy (Morozov 2013). Moreover, the 
present political focus on innovations ideally corresponds to the oil industry’s 
intentions to develop innovative technologies for offshore drilling. Not least to 
mention, Norway got a new government this year but its political-economic 
course seems to be unchangeable in terms of reliance on resources. The present 
ambitions regarding the Arctic resource potential testify to the lack of intention in 
both countries to abandon their oil dependency. 
This section focuses on resource and other economic aspects of opening of the 
Arctic. Russian and Norwegian official resource discourses are driven by interest 
in Arctic reserve stocks and follow the logic of the ‘pro-oil production discourse’ 
(Jensen 2007). Similarly, Johnston (2012:16) points out that Arctic offshore oil 
and gas extraction will enable both countries “to meet ongoing contractual sales 
79 
 
obligations” and particularly Russia will be able to provide Asian markets with 
gas and oil.  
The official resource discourse storylines in Russian and Norwegian cases are 
based on ‘interest’ but different in terms of ‘expectations’. Russian practical 
interest in the Arctic’s potential is sustained by the expectation of the money flow 
due to extraction of offshore resource deposits and the opening of the Northern 
Sea Route. The brief version of this storyline states that “Russia’s national 
interest in the Arctic is fueled by expectations to improve the economic 
situation”. The Norwegian governments’ interest in the Arctic is fueled by the 
expectation of securing the stability of an oil-based economy. The abbreviated 
storyline of Norwegian official resource discourse runs: “Norway’s interest is 
based on the expectation of maintaining the fabulous wealth and welfare of 
Norway”.  
Russian authorities’ expectation of ‘improvement’ and Norwegian authorities’ 
expectation of ‘maintenance’ reflect a fundamental difference in the official 
rhetoric. The policy document, The Fundamentals of State Policy (Russian 
Government 2009), postulates the “realization of the Russian Federation’s 
sovereignty and national interests in the Arctic…” The phrase ‘national interests’ 
is broadly referred in Russian media to justify an assertive approach for 
protection of the country’s ambitions in the Arctic. The High North Strategy 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006) similarly postulates that 
“Norwegian interests in the High North will be safeguarded primarily by 
strengthening our presence and increasing the level of activity in a number of 
policy areas at both national and international level” (Ibid. 7). The ambition of 
sustaining the Norwegian welfare state, however, is followed by more careful 
official rhetoric than compared with Russia’s. It draws on moderate assertiveness 
regarding the Arctic’s resource potential, since it is widely admitted on both 
80 
 
political and public levels that no one has yet estimated the precise potential of 
the Arctic’s resource reserves.  
Economic feasibility of Arctic oil and gas extraction is the main economic 
argument against industrial activities in the region. Nevertheless, Russian and 
Norwegian business communities are always able to introduce a range of 
statistics and facts speaking in their favor. According to the evaluation by the 
Russian Gas Community (Rossijskoje gazovoje soobshestvo), the estimated 
recoverable Russian Arctic resources amount to 106 billion tons of oil equivalent 
in 2014 (ITAR-TASS 2014). Previously, this sum amounted to 76 billion tons 
(Ibid.). Statoil, the Norwegian state oil company, follows a line of 
uncompromising rhetoric, stressing the absence of energy alternatives to fossil 
fuels.  According to Statoil’s Energy Perspectives 2013, by the year 2040, the 
demand for oil and gas will significantly increase, while the use of renewable 
energy will just increase from 1% to 8% (Statoil 2013:3).   
Russian authorities have hastened to exploit Arctic resource reserves stressing 
both national interest and increasing interest in the region from other countries. A 
journalist, Prokhanov (2013), points out the possibility of military conflict in the 
Arctic: “it is the question of struggle... [the] philosophy of space [...] it is neither 
a struggle for [a continental] shelf, nor for walruses and seals, it is a struggle for 
the future theater of war...”. The geopolitics of national and energy security is an 
important part of the official rhetoric, and it is interesting to note that official 
Russian resource discourse is followed step by step by the issue of security.  
The Norwegian media devotes significant attention to the growing Arctic 
ambitions of other states, but the country is not in a hurry to start drilling in the 
Arctic, since certain areas in the north have already been attained in 2009 
according to their application to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
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Shelf (CLCS) in 2006.14 Currently, Statoil is considering to open new oil and gas 
fields on the icy edge of the Barents sea, an initiative which was heavily 
criticized by WWF in the Norwegian newspaper, Dagens Næringsliv (Langved 
and Endresen 2013:8). In the article, “Want to close a half of the Barents Sea’’ 
(Vil stenge halve Barentshavet), WWF’s representatives claim “Norway should 
not start petroleum production in areas covered with ice during the last 30 years. 
This territory corresponds to half the size of the Barents Sea’’ and represents a 
vulnerable ecosystem (Ibid.). Therefore, this example shows that Norwegian 
resource discourse is closely trailed by the issue of environmental conservation.  
However, Statoil’s assertive rhetoric claims to have overcome all challenges and 
taken into account environmental risks due to past successful industrial 
experience and innovative technologies (Andersen 2013:29, Goins 2012). 
Debates in Aftenposten and NRK P2 often refer to scientific perspectives which 
conclude very little is known about this region facing climate change, creating 
uncertainty and potential risks for eventual industrial activity (Dagsnytt Atten 
2014, Sand 2013:6).  
It is against this background that public debates respond to the state’s economic 
ambitions in a contrasting way in Russia and Norway. In 2010, Jensen and 
Skredsmo (2010) observed weak discursive mobilization regarding the Arctic 
issue in the Russian media. However, qualitative analysis reveals an 
approximately equal number of articles about the Arctic in Russian and 
Norwegian newspapers examined during the period of this study. This period 
corresponds to the last chance to report on fulfilment of the requirements of The 
Fundamentals of State Policy (Russian Government 2009), with the deadline in 
2015. Concurrently, the Norwegian political agenda was occupied with the debate 
                                              
14 According to their application to the UN CLCS in 2006, Norway claimed three separate areas in the northeast 
Atlantic and the Arctic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean and the 
Banana Hole in Norwegian and Greenland Sea (UN CLCS 2009). 
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on resource reserves in the Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja areas due to 
parliamentary elections held in October 2013.  
Despite the frequent coverage of the Arctic in Russian media, the information is 
articulated predominantly from the official position with Vladimir Putin as a key 
opinion maker. From the readers’ position, the Russian people are not really 
engaged in the debate and there are very few comments on the Rossijskaya 
Gazeta homepage. However, the expert’s voice – as an alternative source of 
public opinion – can be rarely found in independent media. Apart from the radio 
programs on Ekho Moskvy, the Arctic issue was actively discussed on the 
television channel, Dozhd TV, and on the websites, Slon.ru and Livejournal.com. 
These critical opinion sources are not followed by the majority due to censorship 
and the problem of access to the information. For example, Dozhd TV was 
disconnected by broadcasters since the Russian government found a pretext for 
accusing them of being unethical (see the “Leningrad scandal” in Davidoff 2014). 
While the Russian government and businesses present the Arctic region as one of 
the highest national priorities for future development some expert opinions 
criticize this ambition arguing that the Arctic is portrayed as a symbol of welfare; 
the nation may never benefit from it. Thus, in an interview with “Ekho Moskvy,” 
professor Sergey Medvedev, accused by Vladimir Putin for being unpatriotic15, 
argues that national oil companies tend to exaggerate their business ambitions in 
the Arctic, seeking their own profit before the benefit of the nation:  
                                              
15 Professor Medvedev, in a social network, gave his opinion that the Arctic should be placed under international 
control, similar to the Antarctic model. In October 2013 President Putin reacted sharply,  accusing the professor in 
public for being a “meathead’’ (pridurok) and supporting an “anti-patriotic mood’’ (Kolesnikov 2013, Medvedev 
2013). 
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Rosneft and Gazprom do not so much tap oil reserves as disburse 
the state budget; […] no ecology, no small nations, no fishermen 
can offset their lobbyism and influence on the Russian government. 
[...] Gazprom and Rosneft or Statoil and Shell need this state of 
affairs, as any time they announce proven reserves, their market 
value increases. It is all about capitalization of companies rather 
than about interests of the country. We may never see that oil. […] 
It will go directly for export. (Medvedev 2013). 
Another example of expert opinion criticizing the general perception of the 
Arctic as a “future energy province’’ points to the fact that expectations for 
Arctic oil production are low. In an interview given to Kommersant, Valery 
Andrianov, head editor of the journal, Russian Oil (Neft’ Rossii) points out that: 
In spite of a quiet common perception among the general public, in 
the foreseeable future, the Arctic shelf will not play a significant 
role in Russian companies’ hydrocarbon production. According to 
RF’s [the Russian Federation’s] Energy Strategy up until 2035 the 
share of Arctic oil production will comprise no more than 5% or 
10% of oil production. (Andrianov 2014:14) 
However, the public does not consist only of the experts. On the general level, the 
Russian public is little engaged in the resource debate. Therefore, it is difficult to 
define the resource debate’s storyline. The resource discourse is one for which 
the Russian public keeps a ‘voluntary or enforced silence’ regarding the issues at 
hand, or simply treats them with skepticism. The silence is ‘voluntary’ because no 
one really asks what people’s opinion is, except in seldom opinion polls. It is 
‘enforced’ either because there are no conditions to express the opinion or no 
initiative to create such an opportunity. Public debate of the Arctic issue is 
generally weak, but this reflects the broader socio-political climate in Russia.  
People approve state policy and rely on official media – which leads to a lack of 
pluralistic democracy in Russia – but it is all fueled by the fear of criticizing the 
state. The pace of the development of civil society, thus, is quiet slow. Skepticism 
or indifference of at least part of the Russian public can be explained by their 
disappointment in Putin’s political course and its outcomes. However, as 
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mentioned above, this part of the critical public debate is constructed by experts 
and is rarely presented in the critical, investigative media. 
Nevertheless, despite the difference in discursive mobilization of the Russian and 
Norwegian publics, statistics show that both societies are split in opinion 
regarding the problem. According to the results of the research by the Russian 
Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obsjestvennoje mnenije) published in 
Kommersant, 45% of Russians think that Arctic resources should be extracted if 
they are there while 42% are against industrial operations in the Arctic because of 
the ecological consequences and want the resources “to be untouched” 
(Goryashko 2013:3)16. Thus, the opinion poll shows that Russians are aware of 
the Arctic’s economic potential (due to state rhetoric) and environmental 
consequences of the industrial activity. However, the same opinion poll shows 
that generally Russians are not preoccupied by either resource or environmental 
issues related to the Arctic. Thus, only 4% of Russian people associate the Arctic 
with “rich resource reserves,” 3% associate it with ecological problems and 1% 
with a recent “Greenpeace scandal” (this event is discussed further in this 
section) (Ibid.).  The majority of respondents – 69% – associate the Arctic, 
simply, with “ice, snow and permafrost” (Ibid.).  
The famous Russian writer and journalist, Dmitry Bykov (2013), in an interview 
with “Ekho Moskvy” (reporter, Marina Koroleva), explains the attitude toward 
the Arctic from the position of the Russian majority: 
Marina Koroleva: Why do you believe that the policy Putin pursues 
toward the Arctic region will not find any support from most of the 
Russian people? 
                                              
16 This data is based on the telephone interview among one thousand respondents in Russia (Goryashko 2013:3). 
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Dmitry Bykov: I do not think that at the moment the Russian people 
are seriously concerned about dominance. The issue of dominance 
is not as important for the Russian people; in the second wave of 
the crisis, the problem of survival has moved to the front burner. 
Marina Koroleva: Think of the situation when a person gets a 
utility bill that is scarily high, but he or she knows that in the Arctic 
Region… 
Dmitry Bykov: That the Russian troops are in the Arctic region… 
Marina Koroleva: …that the Arctic region and the North Pole 
belong to his country 
Dmitry Bykov: It’s nice to think about that…especially when the 
temperature in some apartments stays almost at the levels typical of 
the north pole area. In fact, the polar concept and the concept of 
global ice have always been popular in Russia, though I would not 
overestimate the population’s anxiety for dominance. I think people 
are more interested in compassion, amicability, mutual 
understanding... 
 (Bykov 2013) 
In the above interview, the participants were discussing the 2013 Greenpeace 
activism incident in the Russian Arctic, which ended in scandal. As mentioned 
previously, the acceleration of Russian activity in the Arctic during this study 
reached its culmination in September 2013 when Greenpeace activists 
approached the Prirazlomnoje oil platform in the Pechora Sea. The activists were 
arrested and imprisoned for two months. However, this protest action did not 
protect the Arctic from drilling. In October 2013, Gazprom announced the 
extraction of the first barrels of Arctic oil from the platform. During this period 
of time, the Russian press was following the court process where the activists 
were accused of piracy. Later the indictment was softened and changed to 
hooliganism.  
An opinion poll in October 2013 reflected negative attitudes toward the 
Greenpeace team from the majority of Russians polled. 42% of respondents 
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thought that this action was the result of a conspiracy by foreign intelligence 
services and governments aiming to deprive Russia of its own resources and 
sovereign rights (WCIOM 2013b). Among other answers, only 20% of the 
respondents believed that Greenpeace members were attempting to save Arctic 
nature (Ibid.). Ultimately, the statistics justified the influence of the official 
discourse and the relatively low level of compassion and amicability among 
Russians (which Dmitry Bykov mentions in the above interview).  
Nevertheless, several Russian experts stressed the symbolical character of the oil 
extraction from Prirazlomnaya platform. In the words of Muratov (2013) it was a 
“political show-off’’ which enabled the government to claim to be the first to 
extract Arctic oil despite the difficult conditions. Another critique of Gazprom’s 
project on the Arctic concerned its profitability. The company accepted the huge 
environmental risk of a possible oil spill from Prirazlomnaya platform, even 
though the extraction of very expensive oil would last only a few years provide 
only low returns (see the critiques by Medvedev 2013, Muratov 2013, and 
Chuprov 2013 on Ekho Moskvy).  
By contrast, from the resource discourse perspective, the Norwegian public 
debate reflects uncertainty about the choice between environmental values and 
the logic of the oil-based economy. Both aspects are strong arguments which 
raise ethical dilemmas and question whether the heroes of the “Norwegian fairy 
tale” can sacrifice their welfare at the cost of environmental destruction. The 
brief storyline, thus, reflects a challenge and contradiction to the public debate: 
we are the citizens of a prosperous country and claim to be an environmentally 
responsible nation, however, it is hard to judge industrial activities in the Arctic 
which can both contribute to economy and bring harm to the vulnerable 
ecosystem. The tools that the Norwegian public uses for active participation in 
this debate include not so much expert opinion as publication of comments and 
popular science articles (kronikk). Resource and environmental issues of the High 
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North discourse display a central challenge for both Norwegian authorities and 
the public. 
As mentioned in previous sections, the transition from ‘red-green’ to ‘blue-blue’ 
politics in Norway was raising worries about the new coalition’s position 
regarding Arctic resources. Norway follows the European tendency towards 
right-wing policy, which is traditionally less preoccupied by environmental 
issues. During the election campaign, Nina Jensen (2013a:38), general secretary 
of WWF, criticized the former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Ola Borten 
Moe, for using the renewable energy argument for the purpose of his political 
campaign. She points out in her article to Dagens Næringsliv that ministers are 
more “renewable’’ than the politics of a renewable energy future that they claim 
to support (Ibid.).  
However, the decision-making process regarding the Lofoten case was postponed 
until the next Parliamentary term in 2017. Further, the media articulated the 
opinion that nothing would change regarding the oil-dependence of the economy: 
“We are going to have the economy based on oil and gas for several more 
decades” –a journalist in Aftenposten stated (Hagesæther 2013:9). It reflects the 
awareness of the public regarding expectations of Norwegian authorities to 
continue sustaining national welfare with the resource reserves of the North.  
During the post-election period in Norway, the ‘fathers’ of High North politics, 
Jonas Gahr Støre and Espen Barth Eide, continued articulating support for the 
resource-based economy in the media: “We must manage the oil wealth with 
wisdom” (Støre and Eide 2013:4). The wisdom that they are talking about 
includes several aspects of technology’s role in the High North debate. According 
to Goins’ (2012) research, two aspects can be outlined regarding the unique 
Norwegian experience of dealing with resources. First of all, this wisdom has 
roots in the successful past experience which enables the technology optimists to 
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claim the ability to deal with the risks in a safe manner (Ibid. 95). Secondly, the 
environmental benefits of Norwegian technologies are not supposed to be 
underestimated, since “Norwegian innovation has made a global impact on 
developing safer and more environmentally friendly extraction technologies” 
(Ibid. 96). The use of the issue of the environment in the service of the resource 
discourse is stressed by Jensen (2007).17  
Some months before September 2013 – the start of the campaign for 
parliamentary elections in Norway – public engagement increased in the debate 
surrounding the government’s initiative to extract natural resources in the sea 
areas around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja islands. First of all, a nation-wide 
Aftenposten opinion poll showed that 41% of respondents viewed oil activity in 
these regions negatively, and 39% positively (Andersson 2013b). The relatively 
even split in public opinion on the Lofoten issue also reflected in Norwegian 
media sources. However, in contrast to the Russian case, this poll and the article 
published on it presented concrete opinions reflecting the public’s attitude and 
attention to the problem, including several perspectives from Lofoten residents 
themselves (Ibid.): 
Resident #1 (Kaja Sørensen): I think that it's most important to 
ensure the future for fishermen and their jobs. Besides, fish and 
whales can be scared away due to the seismic shooting that they 
[oil companies] are preoccupied with. (Ibid.) 
Resident #2 (Ståle Ditlefsen): I doubt that those who are sitting in 
cafes in Oslo and drink their café lattes have ever seen what it 
looks like here along the coast line. We need new activities. Every 
winter there is a 'fish Klondike' but the business community needs 
several 'footholds’. (Ibid.) 
                                              
17
 Jensen’s (2007) variant of storyline – “drill in order to save the environment” – is considered further in 
the section on “Environmental discourse” below. 
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The first example shows the position of the young local environmental activist, 
Kaja Sørensen, who supports an anti-oil production discourse. She draws on 
ethical considerations, viewing science and technology as potential disasters for 
the environment. The second example demonstrates the opinion of a local 
fisherman and worker in the oil industry, Ståle Ditlefsen, who speaks in favor of 
industrial activity in the region. The “new activities” he mentions refer to the oil 
companies which, in his opinion, will ensure business development in his home 
area. In general, the Lofoten debate represents a microcosm of the broader Arctic 
resource debate.  
The rush for Arctic resources increases the rush for implementation of offshore 
drilling technologies which are still under development in many countries. It is 
remarkable how Norwegian anti-oil production adherents are engaged with the 
media’s rush to give a quick response to the issue. These efforts seek to expose 
illusions about Arctic resources, challenging the right of oil companies to use the 
world’s greenest technologies. The main counterarguments consider: 1) the lack 
of scientific knowledge; 2) the aggravation of climate change; 3) questionable 
profitability of oil activities in the region; and 4) development of alternative 
energy sources or a “shale revolution.”  
For example, the argument about the lack of scientific knowledge was challenged 
by the Norwegian public in the following way: In October 2013, Joseph Mullin, 
leader of the project, Joint Industry Program (JIP) claimed to the newspaper, 
Stavanger Aftenblad: “Now the oil and gas industries possess technology for 
drilling in the Arctic region and have developed emergency response plans in 
case of an oil spill” (Lewis 2013b:24). In response, the authors of the article 
“Damaging Emissions in the Arctic” (Utslipp i Arktis gjør mer skade), Sand 
(2013:6), argues that not all research is taken into account by the oil companies. 
For example, the journalist showed that the inevitable emission of soot due to oil 
extraction would increase the speed of the climate warming. 
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The core of the technology discourse in both the Russian and Norwegian media 
depends on the argument of the advancement of innovations. The common point 
of departure of technological development draws a familiar parallel between the 
Arctic and space exploration. Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, 
qualifies the Arctic as “a hydrospace”, claiming that “to master the global ocean 
throughout its oceanic depth in technical terms is much more difficult than to fly 
into space or even reach other planets” (Rogozin 2014). Norwegian Statoil signed 
a cooperation agreement with NASA in the US in order to research how space 
technologies can contribute to oil prospecting and drilling in deep waters 
(Bertelsen and Ellingvåg 2013:28). Likewise, Statoil’s representative claims that 
the Arctic is the area of the Earth whose harsh conditions are the most 
reminiscent of space (Ibid.). 
In Chapter 3 it was concluded that extensive polar explorations (in form of 
adventures or scientific research) contributed to the phenomena of 
“denorthernization” of the Arctic by the end of the 20th century (Chartier 2007). 
As a result of this process, the last ‘white spot’ on the global map was 
(seemingly) finally explored and subdued by human. However, the modern 
official debate both in Russia and Norway stress the need for a new wave of 
Arctic exploration in order to justify the excitement and importance placed on 
technological development and innovation in the industrial sphere.  
The Norwegian ambition to provide high-speed Internet in the region is also 
related to space – infrastructurally speaking – since it would be impossible 
without a satellite system (Aftenposten 2013b:8).  Rossijskaya gazeta gave 
attention to Ola Anders Skauby, Statoil’s vice president of communication, who 
stressed that Internet access is one of the most important aspects of the region’s 
development and will lead to advances in scientific research (Zabrodin 2013). On 
the other hand, the dependence of Russian Arctic navigation on foreign satellite 
technologies is pointed by Mikhailov (2013). 
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The development of the Northern Sea Route in the foreseeable future will 
demand new technologies as well. Both the Russian and Norwegian media 
emphasize economic perspectives of this route as an important alternative to the 
Suez Canal. The potential cargo turnover of the canal amounts to 30 million tons 
per year (Borisov 2013). However, economic enthusiasm is not yet overshadowed 
by environmental worries because of the possible increase of vessel pollution in 
the region. This problem receives only modest concern in the Russian and 
Norwegian media (Endresen 2014a:24, Muratov 2013). 
Ultimately, both Russian and Norwegian official resource debates, according to 
Dryzek (2013) belong to the Promethean discourse type. This discourse, 
moreover, rests on the belief that advanced technologies can overcome all 
problems, including the ecological crisis. 
4.4 Security Discourse on the Arctic 
It is often discussed in the media that the opening up of the Arctic shelf will lead 
to a conflict of interests between the states which lay claim to the Arctic’s 
resources. Russian and Norwegian official security discourses use this argument 
as the point of departure for their rhetoric. Classical geopolitical discourse 
reflects the interests and claims of Arctic polar states. Flint defines geopolitical 
conflict as a “struggle over the control of space, focuses upon power or the ability 
to achieve particular goals in the face of opposition or alternatives” (Flint 
2012:39). The issue of national security is within the scope of this approach. 
However, the critique of this position is presented by Ó Tuathail et al. (2006) and 
can be found in Chapter 2. The critical geopolitical approach provides the 
possibility to extend the focus from national to environmental and human 
security. 
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On the level of practical geopolitics, the Russian official debate reveals the most 
conspiratorial security rhetoric. According to Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry 
Rogozin, “There is the possibility that Russian installations for oil and gas 
production can become targets of hidden sabotage by states-competitors” 
(Krivoshapko 2013). The storyline of this debate reflects the existing paranoia 
related to the possibility of losing control over natural resources in the Arctic. 
Furthermore, the geopolitical aspect of the official discourse is understood in 
terms of ‘historical necessity.’ In March 2013, Rogozin pointed out: 
The increased footprint in the Arctic region is crucial for the 
strengthening of the defense capability of the country. Since the 
1950s the Arctic region has been seen by our potential enemies as 
one of the main targets, and today our northern borders are the 
most poorly protected. The project involves building a high-tech 
defense barrier not only under water, but also on the surface. The 
Foundation for Advanced Research Projects has already started 
working on the innovative system of illumination of the surface and 
air environment where breakthrough and leading-edge solutions 
will be implemented. (Rogozin 2014) 
The main message of official media concerns defense of national interests 
through an enhanced military presence in the Arctic region. Therefore, since 
Arctic resources are of primary national interest, resource security is a strategic 
priority for national security. According to the military priorities announced in 
The Fundamentals of State Policy (Russian Government 2009), the main targets 
of security policy include the creation of Russian Arctic military units and 
optimization of the regional monitoring system, including checkpoints on 
maritime borders. Other goals include the development of “early warning, 
prevention, and crisis management capabilities” (Zysk 2013:288). The creation of 
Russian Arctic military units was declared to already be formed by 2014 
(Rossijskaya Gazeta 2013). Progress since 2009 has been slow in fulfilling these 
measures but results have been visible nonetheless since the end of 2013. 
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Hence, official media sources reveal significant advances in militarization of the 
region. The Russian Security Council announced its plans to establish a Joint 
Strategic Command (Objedinennoje strategicheskoje komandovanije) in the 
Russian Arctic (Mikhajlov 2014). On the 14
th
 of March 2014, the newspapers 
announced the first landing of Russian troops in the region (Gavrilov 2014). 
According to Shamanov, the commander of the Airborne Troops, “With such bad 
weather conditions nobody in the world, except us, jumps with a parachute. Here 
we are, fortunately, keeping the leading position in the world” (Ibid.). At the 
Security Council meeting in April 2014, President Putin declared the creation of a 
base for next-generation surface ships and submarines (Rossijskaya Gazeta 
2014). 
The flurry of military activities in the Russian Arctic provoked even less response 
from the public in comparison to the previously examined resource issue. The 
border fortification plan included the reconstruction of the military base on 
Kotelny Island (part of the New Siberian Islands) with the aerodrome, “Temp,” 
which has not been functional during the last 20 years. Within the task of 
restoration of the military presence and supporting the air patrol of the Arctic 
several analogous bases are planned to be reconstructed in the future along the 
Russian Arctic coastline. This event was presented enthusiastically to the public 
through a variety of media outlets. In response, the public silence was broken by 
Alexander Golts (2013a:14, 2013b), a journalist who commented that these 
activities are unnecessary and strategically pointless. From his point of view, the 
actions of the Russian state have the same “symbolic effect” as a classic military 
build-up: 
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However, this diplomatic game can go on as long as Russia does 
not appeal to arms: When it dares to use this threat, the collective 
defense of the NATO member-countries will be brought into play. 
Then, instead of advancing its interests and building tactical 
alliances with individual countries, Russia will have to stand up to 
the united front of the Western countries. In the meantime, Russia 
needs the wealth of the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and the 
advantages offered by the transit only to “sell” this wealth at a 
profit to the countries, toward which it flexes its military muscle. 
(...) Therefore, the Arctic Region can perfectly serve as a stage for 
playing cold-war games. I am afraid that it will be extremely cold 
for the military personnel of the airfield service detachment located 
on Kotelny Island.  (Golts 2013a:14) 
How is this ‘parody on the Cold War’ perceived in Norwegian media? The 
Norwegian Ministry of Defense considers northern Norway to be “the 
Government’s most important strategic area” where priority is given “to support 
(…) international peace operations and conflict management, primarily under the 
auspices of the UN and NATO” (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2013). The 
brief storyline of this debate goes: Norway does not lag behind other Arctic 
coastal states and is able to defend national interests in the High North, taking 
into account, of course, environmental and human security risks in the region. 
According to Jensen (2013b), Norwegian security discourse can be divided into 
two phases: 2000-2005 and 2005-2010. During the first period, the “echoes of the 
Cold War” played a significant role in framing national security discourse. On the 
other hand, attention to oil and gas resource reserves structures the Ministry of 
Defense’s focus significantly: “[O]ur strategic position is enhanced by the natural 
resources we manage. Oil and gas on the Norwegian continental shelf are of 
major strategic importance to other states” (as quoted in Jensen 2013b:86). 
During the second period, an evolution of the concept of security “... has led to 
more uncertainty in the shape of a fragmented, incoherent debate in which 
‘everything’ is security” (Ibid. 92). 
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Analysis of data for May 2013 to May 2014 revealed the media’s considerable 
disinterest in the military aspect of the North. Some articles focus on Russian, 
Canadian and Danish claims to the North Pole (Dragnes 2013:3). Other 
Norwegian articles report about increased military activity of its neighbor, 
Russia, in the Arctic. It is difficult to judge the level of Cold War rhetoric in the 
Norwegian media in the sample period of this study, but in general, yet there 
seems to be a neutral attitude. For example, the case of frequent flights of 
Russian military planes along the Norwegian border is considered ordinary: 
“Russians have a dual purpose: the pilots must exercise and Russia must show for 
both Norway and NATO that it is a superpower to be reckoned with” (Samuelsen 
2014:18). In the Arctic, the Norwegian army is represented by the military unit, 
Brigade Nord, which is often criticized for being less effective than expected 
(Bentzrød 2013:3, Bentzrød et al. 2013:24). 
Otherwise, since Norway does not have a “natural enemy” (Jensen 2013b), its 
rhetoric nowadays does not treat Russia as a potential threat in the High North. 
On the contrary, the Norwegian business community stresses the importance of 
commercial collaboration with Russia in the Arctic despite the recent Ukrainian 
crises:
18
 
Though there is a political ice-front between Norway and Russia 
after Ukraine and Crimea, the commercial cooperation is 
flourishing. Half-national Statoil cooperates with half-national 
Rosneft in the sphere of exploration agreements both on the 
Russian and on the Norwegian sides of the border. It is about 
possible billions [of kroner] from oil and gas extraction in the 
North. (Ask 2014:12)
19
. 
                                              
18 The crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 is characterized by a  reincarnation of Cold War rhetoric in the 
media. 
19 This article (i.e. Ask 2014) was written at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which focused on 
events in Crimea. Later stages of the crisis – sanctions as a result of the separatist war in Eastern Ukraine – has 
recently led to more serious implications for Russian-Norwegian business cooperation within the oil and gas sector. 
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Moreover, the main opponent of resource or energy security in the Norwegian 
case is the public, which criticizes environmentally risky offshore drilling in the 
High North. This position stresses the importance of environmental and human 
security issues with regard to the Arctic. The brief storyline claims to protect 
Arctic resources, not from the enemies from the outside world, but from the 
Norwegian population in general. With this in mind, the guardian of national 
security – the Norwegian Ministry of Defense – proved to be a successful 
mediator between the state and public interests in terms of taking into account a 
broad spectrum of security issues in their rhetoric: 
Current challenges in the North are qualitatively different, but not 
necessarily less demanding than those that faced us during the 
Cold War. Today’s challenges are related to resource management, 
unresolved jurisdictional questions and the environment, all of 
which affect societal security. We cannot, however, disregard 
situations likely to entail challenges also entailing state security.  
(Ministry of Defence, 2008, as quoted in Jensen 2013b) 
Considering the question of environmental and human security in Russia, this 
study finds little attention to these aspects. Referring once again to Rogozin 
(2014), we see that he considers the ecological aspect as a pretext that can be 
used in terms of limiting Russian ambitions in the Arctic. Thus, currently, the 
environmental issue cannot be put at the top of Russian priorities because of the 
danger of being “squeezed” out of the Arctic: 
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The environment is not the only factor that will set the highest 
safety requirements and standards Arctic explorers will have to 
stick to. As the experience of the past years shows, our immediate 
competitors in exploitation of the Arctic subsurface resources have 
almost an unlimited array of options, including military ones, to 
gain access to natural resources. We cannot disregard the 
probability that Russian exploitation sites can be turned into tools 
of hidden technical manipulation aimed, for example, to squeeze 
Russia out of the region on the pretext of its failure to meet 
environmental standards. The participants of the project think that 
the risk of interference can be prevented through building subsea 
base stations accommodating unmanned submarine vehicles, which 
will locate and fight off the threat. Such stations will be arranged in 
a chain of Arctic outposts, subsea “hornet nests”, which will be 
able to defend not only production fields, but also the entire Arctic 
borderline. (Rogozin 2014) 
In these circumstances, all concerns about environmental and human security in 
the Arctic recede into the background as insignificant. However, the issue of 
ecological security was the main focus of scientific conference on “The Arctic: 
Territory of Dialogue” (Salekhard, 25-26 September 2013).  Mainly, discussions 
were devoted to climate change scenarios in the Arctic, the influence of industry 
on the life of indigenous Arctic peoples and ecosystems, elimination of the 
negative impacts of industrial activities, and the legal framework for 
environmental protection (Zavrazhin 2013). Unfortunately, the author of the 
article confined himself to general review of the conference agenda without 
giving more explicit details of the discussions. 
4.5 Environmental Discourse: the Power of ‘No’ 
“The Arctic is not special in legal terms; it is just an ocean. The area is of course 
ecologically vulnerable. But it is possible to have responsible drilling”,  declared 
the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the inventors of 
High North rhetoric, Espen Barth Eide (Seidler 2012). Similarly, the Russian 
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Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin (2014), was not short of ideas when 
claiming that “The Arctic – is a unique ecosystem which was formed in extreme 
natural climatic conditions, thus, we must penetrate it with great surgical 
caution”. In practice, both ways of talking about the Arctic represent the 
communication of the pragmatic power through the language of official 
stakeholders. As mentioned before, the Promethean discourse is characterized by 
indifference to nature and belief in technologies (Dryzek 2013).  
In response to this pragmatic position, the Russian public is engaged in the 
environmental debate only partially, while the Norwegian public on the contrary 
is very actively engaged. Russian participants of the public debate draw mainly 
on compassion towards the unique, but fragile Arctic ecosystem. As Professor S. 
Medvedev (2013) points out in his interview to Ekho Moskvy, there is a need for 
a more ‘human approach’ to the Arctic since the government’s logic of ‘national 
interest’ does not consider Arctic nature and inhabitants on the institutional level.  
Norwegian public participants of the debate use different rhetoric tools with 
different capacities in order to ruin the ‘oil illusion’ of authorities. Public rhetoric 
is sometimes moderately critical and sometimes full of accusatory statements. It 
is fueled by the understanding of the global consequences of climate change and 
rich in metaphors related to Arctic discourse. Based on analysis of Norwegian 
media sources in the sample period, this study proposes the selection of topic-
related metaphors and expressions as expressed in the following brief but blunt 
summary, which could be entitled, “How the Norwegian public accuses the pro-
oil adherents of ‘criminal madness’ (kriminell galskap)”: 
The ‘Lottery country’ (Lottolandet Norge), Norway, continues its ‘carbon-
party’ (karbonfesten), while maintaining the ‘Janus face’ (Janusansiktet) 
of environmental commitment, on the one hand, and the ‘banality of 
washing our hands of it’ (ansvarsfraskrivendens banalitet), on the other. 
Thus, Norway ‘inhales artificial life’ (puster kunstig liv) into the ‘Oil Age’ 
(oljealderen) in order to sustain its life in the ‘carbon bubble’ 
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(karbonboblen). (sources: Endresen 2013:8, Melli 2013:4, Stanghelle 
2013:2) 
Such rhetoric could not appear out of nowhere.  In fact, it is the direct outcome of 
the traditional appreciation of nature (i.e. Arne Næss philosophy of ‘Deep 
Ecology’) which is further reflected in the global environmental political agenda 
(see Brundtland Report, WCED 1987). The roots of the Norwegian commitment 
to environmental ethics and the idea of sustainable development are further 
examined in Chapter 5. 
The global ecological crisis is approached more broadly within the Norwegian 
political agenda than the Russian one. The Fundamentals of State Policy (Russian 
Government 2009), for instance, mentions climate change as a challenge to 
global ecological stability, but the practical focus of this official document is 
devoted only to the stability of the Russian Arctic ecosystem. Norwegian 
acknowledgment of the ecological crises due to anthropogenic influence grasps 
all levels: local (Lofoten case), national (opening of new oilfields in the Barents 
Sea) and global (export of Norwegian oil contributes to higher CO2 emissions 
outside the country). While Norwegian officials claim to act responsibly on each 
of the levels, the pro-environmental public claims that “responsible drilling,” in 
Jonas Gahr Støre’s words, is an absurdity. However, Norwegian officials have 
identified the scapegoat on whom to put the blame for unethical environmental 
behavior since the 1990s: the example of Russian environmental performance.  
This, furthermore, is used in the Norwegian media in order to justify the better 
Norwegian experience of environmental management (Jensen 2007).    
The question of responsibility for the Arctic is shown from a different perspective 
by the Russian authorities. The blame is put on the irresponsible past of the 
Soviet environmental performance which is often reflected in the media. 
Reviewing the results of the international conference, “Prevention and 
Elimination of Emergency Situations in the Arctic” (Problemi preduprezhdenija i 
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likvidatsii chrezvychajnykh situatsij v Arktike) journalist, Andrey Evplanov 
(2013), points out: 
The cooperation of environmentalists is fueled by visible warming 
effects in the Arctic region and, consequently, by the shrinking of 
sea ice cover. Our country, however, has a specific national 
problem in the Arctic region and this problem is not caused by 
global warming. According to the data from Russian scientists, 
critical levels of environmental pollution were registered in a 
larger part of the Arctic area of the Russian Federation. The 
quality analysis showed that the surface water in the Arctic area of 
Russia is contaminated with petroleum products, phenol, heavy 
metal compounds, nitrogen and other contaminants, which are 
present in waste water coming from industrial and utility facilities. 
For many years the Arctic region has been supplied with everything 
required for its development and the support of human life, but 
hardly any waste has been removed from the Arctic area. 
(Evplanov 2013) 
The pollution of the Russian Arctic is the direct legacy of the Soviet era. 
According to different estimations, around four thousand fuel barrels were 
disposed of throughout the Arctic during Soviet military and scientific expansion. 
The barrels served as fuel supplies for vehicles in the empty, vast ice desert. 
Russian publicist, Dmitry Muratov (2013), points out that Arctic pollution is a 
direct but pervasive consequence of the romantic Soviet generation’s desire to 
“leave their mark.” The “barrel issue” – referring to the dumping of barrels filled 
with hazardous waste – was mentioned by Vladimir Putin as an inherited problem 
which the country is forced to deal with: “You think we threw them away? They 
have been there since Soviet times. And we are taking them away” (Kolesnikov 
2013). Neglecting the issue of climate change as an outcome of global 
anthropogenic influence, Russian officials seek to shift responsibility to 
anthropogenic effects of the past, thus, offering the ‘spring-cleaning’ 
(general’naya uborka) of the Russian Arctic as the only and best way to 
overcome the ecological crises. Additionally, technological advances are 
expected to be developed and exploited in accordance with all environmental 
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standards. In other words, the official environmental storyline in the Russian case 
states that the “Arctic environment will not ‘suffer’ as badly as during the Soviet 
era.”  
The official Norwegian position invokes the contrasting pro-environmental 
discourse in order to justify the story of “drilling to save the Arctic environment” 
(Jensen 2007). As previously mentioned, the picture of Russia as an 
“environmental laggard” has been circulating in Norwegian media since the 
1990s (Ibid.).  The recent efforts of cleaning the northern islands of solid waste 
left by Russians could not help to improve this image, since Norwegian opinion 
makers continue to use ‘Russia’ as a key nodal point in the pro- and anti-
petroleum debate (Ibid.). Jensen (2007) points out the reverse effect of pro-
environmental discourse according to which drilling in the Arctic by Norwegian 
companies will save the environment. It sounds paradoxical, but it works. 
According to this logic, Russians have already left their mark, so their further 
activities – without environmentally-safe technologies and enough experience – 
will make it even worse. That is why the prerogative of resource extraction in the 
Arctic should belong to Norway which is able to prevent the risks and conduct 
the drilling in the most responsible way.  
On the other hand, according to Jensen (2007:250), environmental discourse is 
used to lobby against drilling in the Arctic in order to show an example of “good 
environmental management” to Russia.  Moreover, by demonstrating the example 
of the ‘best’ environmental stewardship, Norway’s performance simultaneously 
contributes toward climate change mitigation.  
However, there is ambivalence towards climate change in Russia. It is similar in 
part to Western environmental skeptics who argue against anthropogenic climate 
change and dismiss argumentation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). But the IPCC is never mentioned in the Russian media or by 
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officials. If a report in the media refers to the global scientific community in any 
way, it uses general phrases like, “foreign scientists claim/believe/etc…”  
The environmental organizations, Greenpeace and WWF – and their positions in 
the environmental debate – are rarely referred to or examined in the Russian 
media either. After the September 2013 incident on the Prirazlomnaya oil 
platform, when a group of Greenpeace activists tried to put a banner on the 
platform’s wall but were captured, then imprisoned, the media was more 
preoccupied with the conditions in the Murmansk pre-trial detention center and 
the protestors’ court hearings. The main message of the activists – the 
environmental dangers of oil extraction in the Arctic – however, was not 
conveyed very extensively to the public.  
With respect to global warming, it is difficult to say what Russian scientists tend 
to believe in.  According to material from Rossijskaya gazeta, scientists from the 
Russian Academy of Science (Rossijskaya Akademiya Nauk, RAN) support the 
theory of the ‘cyclical’ rather than anthropogenic nature of climate change and 
claim that: 
...the warming in the Arctic region is a temporary phenomenon. It 
is caused by the climatic cyclic recurrence. (...) The cycles are 
regular; the rate of recurrence ranges from 11 to 60 years. Due to 
such a phenomenon, [some] ships are trapped in Black Sea ice, 
while [other] ships sail in ice-free water of the Kara Sea. The 
picture is totally confusing. (Bezmenov 2014)  
Another article from Norsky (2014) in Rossijskaya gazeta quotes the words of 
Vladimir Katsov, director of Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory, who 
emphasized the facilitation of access to Arctic resources due to climate change, 
adding his disbelief in its anthropogenic cause: 
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I deal with monitoring of climatic changes, – the scientist said. – I can 
say with confidence: Global warming is a reality. The impact of the 
anthropogenic factor is a fact that is as certain as the fact that the 
Volga flows into the Caspian Sea. 20 (Norsky 2014) 
Some Russian scientists, however, tend to combine both arguments – the 
anthropogenic factor and climate cycles – in order to explain climate warming 
(see Vilfand et al. 2014, Golts 2013b). But they stress that human influence on 
the climate does not make a significant impact on these processes. In general, 
there is little attention given to the climate change problem in the Russian media 
since neither Russian authorities nor the scientific community ring the alarm. 
However, according to an opinion poll conducted in August 2013, Russians 
consider that climatic anomalies are the results of global warming (55%) rather 
than single incidents (35%) (WCIOM 2013a).  Moreover, the percentage of those 
who believe in global warming in 2013 increased in comparison to the results in 
2010 (Ibid.). 
As previously mentioned, the Norwegian environmental public debate is 
intensive and uses strong rhetoric related to Norwegian environmental 
performance on different levels. There are several arguments used by the 
Norwegian public in the articulation of pro-environmental discourse and in order 
to expresses a strong ‘no’ to industrial activities in the Arctic.  
The first argument comes from the critics of the Norwegian economic and 
political system which has been strongly dependent on non-renewable resources. 
In this respect, Norway is derogating other types of business sectors which, as a 
result, produce non-compatible goods for the world market. The adherents of this 
discourse draw on a ‘hypothetical’ situation – the depletion of the country’s oil 
                                              
20 Here, Katsov alludes to the fact that the expression, “the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea” is a disputable one, 
since according to alternative interpretations, the Volga flows into the Kama River before flowing into the Caspian 
Sea. Norsky’s choice to emphasize this particular statement in the context of the article illustrates Katsov’s and the 
author’s skepticism of the alleged anthropogenic causes of climate change. 
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and gas reserves. If it comes true, other commercial enterprises would not be able 
to restore and sustain the Norwegian economy at the level of the present day (see 
De Rosa et al. 2013). 
Secondly, Norwegian faith in the power of technology creates more frustration. 
Ole Mathismoen, environmentally concerned journalist from Aftenposten, 
criticizes the initiative to equip oil platforms with ‘green’ electricity from the 
mainland. (Mathismoen 2014:3). He claims that such electrification with the help 
of Norwegian renewable electricity will serve as ‘ecological decoration,’ whereas 
the facts show that emissions increase when Norwegian oil is burned outside the 
country (Ibid.). The question of whether cutting oil production is an effective 
precaution against CO2 emissions was discussed several times in Aftenposten and 
on the radio NRK P2. On the one hand, it is believed that if Norway decreases oil 
production, it will increase in other countries (reflecting economic arguments of 
supply and demand). On the other hand, according to the above argument, there is 
no difference when the Norwegian oil industry produces less CO2 compared to 
foreign oil companies, because the majority of petroleum is exported and, thus, 
burned outside the country (Aftenposten 2013a:4). There is no single opinion 
about the effectiveness of this measure. 
Furthermore, there is critique of Norway’s environmental commitment. 
Norwegians are “unconcerned people” – according to the results of TNS Gallup’s 
annual climate survey (Andersson 2013a:14). The majority believes in the 
anthropogenic nature of climate change and supports environmental 
organizations more than the oil industry, but at the same time “deep down 
Norwegians are not scared” (Ibid.). Responsibility is assumed on both official 
and public levels but instead of taking precautions in reality, the majority relies 
on technologies with a ‘green’ label. 
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Ultimately, Russia and Norway reveal different patterns in their respective public 
environmental debates. The Norwegian public is more concerned with climate 
change impacts and the outcomes of melting ice in the Arctic, stressing Norway’s 
responsibility as an oil nation. The Russian public, on the other hand, seems to 
accept the political course of conservation policy (prirodookhrannaja politika) in 
general, which is formalized in environmental policy documents. To the neglect 
of global warming, this conservation policy focuses on the national level and 
aims to improve the local (Russian Arctic) ecological situation to maintain 
ecosystem stability in the region. Judging by examples from opinion polls 
mentioned in this chapter, the number of Russians who believe in climate change 
is on the increase (WCIOM 2013a). However, since the media does not provide 
much attention to this issue, the public does not even address the question of 
responsibility for global warming.  
Taking into consideration the wide variety of possible environmental arguments 
against the opening of the Arctic for resource extraction, the power of the 
Russian and Norwegian public debates have different “capacit[ies] to control 
orders of discourses” (Fairclough 1989:30). Simply stated, Russians say a weak 
‘no’ to Rosneft and Gazprom’s activities in the Arctic, while Norwegians express 
strong ‘no’ to Statoil’s extraction activities in the Arctic. These patterns 
correspond to the orders of discourse proposed in the beginning of this chapter. 
Since the Russian official debate structures this order, placing environmental 
issues after resource and security issues, the public as of yet has little space to 
anticipate the official position and enforce environmental arguments against 
drilling in the region. The first explanation is the “controlled” nature of the media 
and limited freedom of speech (see the Introduction on the ‘neo-authoritarian’ 
media model). Secondly, with such a slow development of a democratic political 
tradition, society tends to leave the problem solving to the experts. Thirdly, after 
the collapse of the USSR, ecological scientists continued relying on the research 
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legacy of the Soviet era. When an ecological crisis was first put on the 
international agenda, the Soviet state was closed off from western influence. This 
is likely why Russian scientists prefer relying on the Soviet research legacy rather 
than on the Western one (cyclical nature vs. anthropogenic nature of climate 
change).   
Referring to Dryzek’s (2013) classification of environmental discourses, the 
Russian official debate follows Promethean discourse, while some elements of 
the “administrative rationalism” discourse can be traced with respect to Russian 
environmental perspectives on the Arctic. The latter discourse appeared in the 
1960s and is defined “as the problem-solving discourse which emphasizes the 
role of the expert rather that the citizen or producer/consumer in social problem 
solving, and which stresses social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality 
or competition” (Ibid. 75). The hierarchical tradition of social order is prevalent 
in Russian history.
21
 It results in the fact that “environmental problems are 
serious enough to warrant attention, but not serious enough to demand 
fundamental changes in the way society is organized” (Ibid. 89). In addition, 
Russian public policy is traditionally “accorded substantial status to scientific 
expertise harnessed by administrative structures” (Ibid.).  
While Russian scientists do not ring the alarm for climate change, a number of 
scientific conferences devoted to the Arctic issue were conducted during period 
examined, several of which were mentioned in the Russian press. For example, 
the already-mentioned Third International Forum on the “Arctic – Territory of 
Dialogue” (Salekhard, 25-26 September 2013) was organized by the Russian 
Geographical Society (Zavrazhin 2013). The current president of the organization 
is Sergey Shoygu, also known for his role as the Russian Minister of Emergency 
                                              
21 By this I mean the traditional centralization of political power in the leader’s hands and structuring of social order 
within “vertical hierarchy” (see Sakwa 2012). 
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Situations (1992-2012) and afterwards as the Minister of Defence (2012-present). 
The international conference on Preventing Emergencies in the Arctic was 
organized by the Russian Ministry of Emergencies in the city of Naryan-Mar on 
August 20
th
-22
nd
, 2013 (Evplanov 2013). The fact that a government 
administrative body was involved in Arctic problem-solving creates a certain 
trust that the Arctic region is ‘in good hands,’ eliminating the need to stimulate 
debate and create a critical response in the public sphere. 
The Norwegian case has also demonstrated the possibility of combining several 
types of environmental discourses as classified by Dryzek (2013). From the 
global perspective, the commitment to the idea of sustainable development is 
reflected in the Norwegian media. However, Norway, the country that ‘lit the 
torch’ of sustainable development, nonetheless carries it with reluctance (Lafferty 
and Meadowcroft 2000, Lafferty et al. 2007). The Norwegian media’s reference 
to the concept of sustainable development in the Arctic, for instance, is quite low. 
For example, Aftenposten published only 5 articles combining the words ‘Arctic’ 
and ‘sustainable development’ in the period examined.22 The argument in favor 
of sustainability is used in the critique of the resource-oriented economy, which, 
according to the opinion of the majority of its adherents, affects future 
generations, aggravates climate change, and destabilizes the ecosystem.  
The Arctic environmental issue is referred to within the ‘weak sustainable 
development’ (WSD) framework in the Norwegian media. Major emphasis is 
given to the fact that the wellbeing of future generations is dependent on 
decisions and actions taken today. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two 
approaches to understanding this concept: weak and strong sustainable 
development, (WSD and SSD, respectively) (Nilsen 2010). Nilsen points out that 
officially, both approaches have been used within the official climate change 
                                              
22 As checked through the media archive, Retriever. 
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discourse in Norway. Nevertheless, “in practice […] Norwegian policy is 
predominantly WSD, a fact which is demonstrated through the continuous rise in 
greenhouse gases and the reliance on the non-satisfactory international regime of 
the Kyoto Protocol” (Ibid. 496).  
An important finding of this study is that the Norwegian public often argues in 
favor of the transition to a renewable-energy based economy.  This argument, 
according to Dryzek (2013), belongs to the discourse of ecological 
modernization, which has a family resemblance to sustainable development 
discourse. The former discourse draws on political commitment and retooling of 
industrial and agricultural sectors with “environmentally sensible but profitable 
lines”. Public support is crucial for this, since it “must identify with new 
technologies such as renewable[s]” and the business sector “must have incentive 
to embrace rather than resist ecological modernization, provided only that 
business is sufficiently far-sighted, rather than interested only in quick profits” 
(Ibid. 170). This approach is more practical but less preoccupied with eco-
philosophical questions of relations between humans and nature, and is more 
applicable on the regional and national level. The Norwegian public likely sees 
more potential for maintaining a living in a ‘fairytale’ by implying this approach 
as the first priority and as the reason to come off of oil dependency.
23
 
In the Introduction, I point out that Norway is characterized by the ‘corporatist’ 
media model (see Hallin and Mancini 2004) due to its specific political tradition 
(i.e. welfare state democracy). As discussed in this chapter, the public sphere 
does not expect the policy making of the new ‘blue-blue’ government to 
introduce significant changes in the economy. Currently, the new government 
tends to support the resource-based economy according to the corporatist 
                                              
23 Examples of such argumentation can be found in the following sources: Endresen 2013:8, Sand 2013:6, 
Mathismoen 2013:23, Jensen 2013a:38. 
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governing tradition. As Lafferty et al. (2007:186) point out, “the priority of 
welfare built upon oil and gas revenues is treated by the officials as given and 
inherent[ly] good since the discovery of oil in the Barents Sea”. Moreover, 
Dryzek et al. (2003, mentioned in Dryzek 2013:239) point out that the Norwegian 
case of the corporatist government is characterized by “depletion of the public 
sphere, as former activists are attached into government, and accept moderation 
as the price to be paid”.   
Judging by the Norwegian public debate reflected in the media from May 2013 to 
May 2014, this study concludes that there is more potential for “social 
movements and [an] oppositional public to push the country further” (Ibid.). This 
means that the present discursive mobilization in Norway allows for efficient 
public containment of the government’s potential political moves, including such 
maverick prospecting as in the case of Arctic resource exploitation and 
extraction. Strong public opposition to the opening of Lofoten, Vesterålen and 
Senia for oil extraction is a case-in-point: the decision to start any petroleum 
related activity there was successfully postponed due to public engagement.   
The Russian public sphere does not reveal such potential, yet. However, this 
study shows that the discursive mobilization of environmental concern has a 
potential to pick up steam. Russia is at the beginning of an “environmental 
awakening” (Lassi 2013). The main barriers to a strong environmental public 
debate in the Russian media are represented by social-economic problems along 
with the political system, which conditions the neo-authoritarian media system 
(see the Introduction; also in Becker 2004). In order to introduce substantial 
support for the protection of the Arctic ecosystem, the Russian public does not 
have to address the discourse of climate change, as it has in Norway, but should 
overcome the barriers of domestic policy and the lack of will to defend the Arctic 
ecosystem’s ecological stability. 
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The prospect of sustainable development does not seem promising in the case of 
the Norwegian public debate on the environmental, whereas it is totally absent in 
the Russian one. The introduction part of this chapter suggests the presence of 
another type of environmental debate – the discourse of ‘green consciousnesses’. 
According to Dryzek (2013) this discourse concerns ethics. The ethical 
component of the Russian and Norwegian environmental debates will be 
considered in the next chapter.  
Summary: The order of Arctic discourse is structured by three main discourses – 
resource, security and environment. From the official debate perspective, the core 
of the Arctic discourse in the Russian case represents the collaboration between 
resource and security discourses. In the Norwegian case the core is represented by 
opposing resource and environmental discourses. The environmental debate on 
the Arctic is less significant in the Russian case, and there is little commitment to 
climate change discourse and ecological problems are considered predominantly 
from the local and national perspective. Norway is more committed to the climate 
change issue and often refers to the interdependence between climate change and 
the Arctic. The Norwegian debate, furthermore, extends the issue of security 
from a narrow ‘national’ perspective to a broader perspective of environmental 
and human security in the Arctic. 
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5. Environmental Ethics in the Arctic Context in 
Russian and Norwegian Media 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, people have historically explored the Arctic out of 
economic, adventure and scientific interests. The diplomatic principle of Terra 
Nullius gave right to the colonizers to expand sovereignty over lands without a 
sovereign and treat indigenous populations as subservient (Greenberg 2009). 
Native populations were compelled to adopt foreign rules and, partly, lifestyles, 
despite the fact that their lives had been bound to the Arctic landscape for 
centuries. The vast variety of Arctic resources—from natural to mineral—was the 
main driver of the outsider’s intrusion into the region. The so-called “Oil Age”24 
has significantly affected the world energy system, which the 2008 USGS report 
states is inextricably dependent upon Arctic resources25. Arctic reserves are 
considered vital to helping avoid the depletion of fossil resources at a global 
scale. Interestingly, long before the USGS report estimated Arctic “riches,” 
Terence Armstrong (1963,1967,1978), a famous researcher of the Soviet and 
Canadian Arctic, predicted that development of the region was an inevitable 
process. Furthermore, in 1978 he pointed out that “the northern incursion” raises 
an important question whether “such activity [is] in essence a plundering of local 
resources or amenities, carried out by distant authority for its own enrichment or 
protection, or is [a] reasonable use of that authority’s sovereign territory?” 
(Armstrong 1978:3).  
People’s use of resources, either sustainable or not, is the aspect of the human-
nature relationship which has often being characterized as “human prevailing 
                                              
24 The energy era of the twentieth century based on oil and gas production is associated with the 'Oil Age', however, it 
dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when the oil and gas industry 'was born' due to the 'discovery 
of Pennsylvania' in 1857 (Campbell 2013). 
25 In 2008 the USGS published a report that the Arctic region contains 13% of world’s oil and 30% of world’s gas in 
undiscovered reserves (Brigham 2013). 
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over nature” (Doubleday 1999:192). According to Chapter 3, the Arctic 
represents ‘home’ for the native population that develops a “sense of belonging” 
to the landscape (or a “sense of affinity”, according to Lopez 1986). Barry Lopez, 
the “nature writer,” as Dryzek (2013) calls him, points out that “the differing 
landscapes of the earth are hard to know individually. They are as difficult to 
engage in conversation as wild animals. The complex feelings of affinity and 
self-assurance one feels with one’s native place rarely develop again in another 
landscape” (Lopez, 1986:255). This rather emotional connection with the natural 
world is characteristic of indigenous peoples’ intimate relationship with nature, 
which becomes endangered when outsiders introduce their new lifestyles and 
change the landscape for commercial purposes. Moreover, the issue of peoples’ 
adaptation to the challenges related to climate change becomes crucial. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the ethical component of environmental 
public debate within Russian and Norwegian media sources as it pertains to the 
Arctic. This issue is worth exploring since it can help highlight the mainstream 
representation of the Arctic within these societies, and reflects the public 
commitment to the future of the Arctic ecosystem. Moreover, the main sources of 
environmental ethics (or, ‘ecological ethics’, see Curry 2011) will be presented in 
the context of both countries. Ethics is a set of moral principles that guide “how 
people... ought to live and act” (Curry 2011:28). As mentioned in the 
introduction, the public sphere is a main driver of environmental debate (Dryzek 
2013, Lassi 2013). This environmental debate highlights questions about the 
value of the Arctic ecosystem and its protection from any type of human 
interference. Secondly, it concerns the issue of indigenous people and how to 
support their traditional way of life. 
The definition of ‘environmental ethics’ is a disputable issue. The common way 
to define environmental ethics considers “how humans should live with each 
other and the environment” (Rozzi et al. 2012:233). This is an anthropocentric 
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type of morality that gives a perception that the non-human world possesses an 
‘instrumental value’ (O’Neill et al. 2012:7).  Clark (1999:103) refers to this 
approach as “an ecologically-backward ‘stewardship’ conception of humanity’s 
relationship to nature.” 
Many authors reject this approach to explore the relationship between the human 
and non-human world. For example, Clark (1999) and Næss (1999) point out that 
the Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, made a significant contribution to the 
environmental philosophy back in the 17
th
 century. Spinoza’s main argument 
postulated that “man has no privileged position in nature” (Lloyd 1999:73).  
However, some scholars do not agree with this position and argue that Spinoza’s 
approach – ‘nature-centered’ type of environmental ethics – is still man-centered. 
For example, Lloyd (1999:74) argues, that Spinoza’s approach is a combination 
of “...a strong rejection of anthropocentric perception with an equally strong 
affirmation of a man-centered morality”26. Further, Lloyd (1999:87) concludes 
that “Morality, on the Spinozistic approach, remains circumscribed by what is 
good for the human species. But it is good for human beings to perceive 
themselves as parts of wider systems, as parts of wholes; to perceive themselves 
as they really are.” 
Ultimately, Patrick Curry (2011:7)  approaches the  anthropocentric perspective 
on ethics by arguing that its core is related to vagueness and ambiguity of the 
word ‘environment.’ Instead, the author chooses to use the concept of ‘ecological 
ethics,’ which, in his view, corresponds to ecological understanding of nature “as 
an extraordinary complex and subtle web of organic and non-organic life” (Ibid. 
8). However, this ‘ecocentric’ approach, according to the author, “is not intended 
to replace traditional human-centered ethics, which has a legitimate and 
important role in intra-human relationships. The point is to, rather, that adding 
                                              
26 See the arguments against Lloyd’s (1999) interpretation of Spinoza’s ethics in Clark (1999) and Næss (1999).  
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something new will enable an ethical behavior that a more anthropocentric ethics 
cannot, on its own, accomplish” (Ibid. 7). 
Ethics is a matter of values. O’Niell et al. (2012:7) point out that “nature has 
‘intrinsic’ value, or value as an end in itself.” In other words, such values are 
inherent, meaning that “in order to exist, intrinsic value, while still inheriting in 
the person or thing concerned, also requires one or more valuers” (Curry 
2011:52). The source of ethical values of nature in the context of Russia and 
Norway can be found in historical and cultural background or environmental 
movements of the countries. Environmental, or ecological, ethics as a part of 
environmental discourse can be addressed directly with references to the sources 
of ethics, or unconsciously, by being embedded in the values of the cultural 
sphere of the nation.  
According to Dryzek’s (2013) classification, “green consciousness” and “green 
politics” are categories of environmental discourse of “green radicalism.” 
Overall, this discursive dimension possesses a significant ethical component and 
aims at changing “both the way people think and so behave on the one hand, and 
social institutions and collective decisions on the other” (Ibid. 185). The 
discourse of “green consciousness” is an umbrella term for a variety of ecological 
movements
27
.  
The Norwegian philosopher, Arne Næss, founded  the ecological movement of 
“deep ecology.” Næss (1973) argued that the ecological scientific community 
needs to shift the focus from solving solely pollution and resource depletion 
problems
28
. In his view, a deeper concern within environmental studies is to raise 
                                              
27 According to Dryzek (2013), it includes: “deep ecology,” ecofeminism, bioregionalism, lifestyle greens, 
ecotheology.  
28 “Shallow” ecology movement, according to Næss (1973:99), draws on ecology as “a limited science which makes 
use of scientific method” 
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“ecological sensibility” (Dryzek 2013:187). Such an ecology movement would be 
based on “a philosophy of ecological harmony and equilibrium” (the concept of 
“ecosophy” in Næss 1973:99). Thus, “deep ecology” opposes the 
“anthropocentric arrogance” with the principle of biospherical egalitarianism, 
which claims “the equal right to live and to blossom” (Ibid. 96). In other words, 
biocentric equality implies that “no species, including the human specie, is 
regarded as more valuable or in any sense higher than any other species” (Dryzek 
2013:188). Witoszek (1999:452) points out that Næss’s ecophilosophy reveals 
“intimate connection, not just with contemporary ideas of environmental future, 
but with the indigenous [Norwegian]  nature tradition.” Næss’s “deep ecology’s” 
principles have been criticized (e.g. see Curry 2011:102). Nevertheless, Curry 
(2011:110) points out that “the ethical heart of Deep Ecology itself, so to speak, 
is in the right place, and in a world so saturated with anthropocentrism, justifying 
the domination and exploitation of nature, it continues to offer a lifeline to those 
seeking an ecocentric alternative.” 
Moreover, Næss’s (1973, 1999) principle of ‘biocentric egalitarism’ is not an 
occasional contribution to eco-philosophy and ethics. Witoszek (1999:452) points 
out this idea can be traced in Norwegian cultural and philosophical tradition. His 
eco-philosophy derives from “socio-ecological factors such as low population 
density, the salience of rural culture and indeed the very exuberance of nature 
itself” and the “ancient semiosphere” going back to the  Nordic sagas (Ibid. 452). 
This philosophy has helped shape Norwegian environmentalism; as Witoszek 
(1999:452) points out, it “established a green canon (…) a set of standards and 
cognitive strategies which have been transmitted from generation to generation.” 
As well, it includes the transition of “an expanded version of values of the 
Norwegian rural Enlightenment to the rest of the globe” (Ibid. 456). 
Though the influence of Arne Næss’s  deep ecology on the public at large is 
debatable, the growing wealth due to oil and gas production has not diminished 
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the environmental consciousness of Norwegian society. First of all, Norway has 
made two significant contributions to the environmental agenda by introducing 
the concept of “sustainable development” (WCED 1987) and the “deep ecology” 
movement. Secondly, analysis of the environmental public debate in Norwegian 
media from the previous chapter has shown significant disquietude on the 
ecological situation in the High North. While presenting an “anti-oil production” 
position in Aftenposten, DN and Dagensnytt Atten (on the radio NRK P2) 
environmental proponents stress the issues of peoples’ irresponsible attitude to 
nature with the message, “we can’t treat the Arctic the way we do.” Interestingly, 
this rhetoric fails to  refer to the ethical values traced in Norwegian culture 
(nature narratives), or Arne Næss’s ecophilosophy. Also, when pointing out the 
necessity of commitment to sustainable development, the Norwegian public 
criticizes its framing within the “weak sustainable development” discourse, 
which means “sustainable development where utility or consumption is non-
declining over time” (Nilsen 2010:497). 
Nevertheless, the country’s economic system is still directing the nation toward a 
practical economic approach to the North, emphasizing environmental safety of 
conventional oil extraction and insisting on the growing importance of    
Norwegian ‘green’ technologies. The logic of economic growth cultivates 
expectations of further enhancement of industrial activities in the region. These 
expectations are fueled by the economic success broadcast by media. For 
example, “Between 2000 and 2010 North Norway has experienced significant 
economic growth” (Endresen 2014b:18). As a result, as has been discussed in the 
Chapter 4, Norwegian public debate in the media often stresses the 
‘schizophrenic’ essence of the present which reflects both the coexistence of oil 
dependency and environmental commitment (see Chapter 4, page 93). 
Analysis of Norwegian ‘general audience’ newspapers (Aftenposten and DN) 
reveals evidence of how the utilitarian ethics  seeks to overshadow traditional 
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ecological concern, which is embedded in Norwegian culture and was ‘preached’ 
by Arne Næss. Nilsen (2010:497) further points out that utilitarianism became 
“the prevailing type of ethics,” a framework within which economy is expected to 
be substituted by nature in order to achieve “the greatest total well-being of 
affected agents.” Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the tendency of 
“marketization” has a strong effect on media (Midttun and Witoszek 2014). It 
means that commercialization processes and business lobbyism fuel utilitarian 
values, which dominate in  the public opinion. Indeed, the media contribute to 
spreading  the myth of  the power and efficiency of Norwegian technologies and 
supports official resource discourse “drilling to save the Arctic environment” 
(Jensen 2007, also see discussion in chapter 4, page 96).  
This being mentioned, during the examined period, the deeper concern on the 
aspect of environmental ethics regarding the Arctic region was discovered in the 
Norwegian radio program Ekko on NRK P2. Many discussions on this radio 
program  covered issues of the Arctic population (e.g. Ekko 2014a,b,c,d). They 
related them first and foremost to the aspects of globalization and the question 
how modern technologies and increased industrial activities influence the 
traditional lifestyle of native peoples. For example, the access to the Internet in 
Greenland has affected the mentality of young people, who, according to the 
older generation of Inuits, worsened their skills to throw the harpoon during seal 
hunting (Ekko 2014d). The radio program draws the conclusion that, the habit 
among the youngsters to surf the Internet starts “competing” with the 
development of the traditional hunting skills (Ibid.). Moreover, the modern 
technology of GPS-navigation is brought by outsiders for local Arctic hunters to 
use and is considered to “facilitate” and make the hunting more secure in the 
tough climate conditions (Ekko 2014b). However, over centuries indigenous 
people went hunting relying on their traditional knowledge of the landscape and 
ground orienteering skills. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first newcomers to the 
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Arctic land “awarded” the indigenous population with tobacco, alcohol and 
diseases, however, modern influences in terms of technologies affect their 
lifestyles and contribute to ‘disconnection’ from nature (Doubleday 1999, Lopez 
1986).  
The Russian ecophilosophical tradition derives from soviet environmental studies 
and is associated with the Russian academician, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky, 
and his model of evolutionary change. According to his theory, evolution goes 
through the transformation from the “biosphere” (‘the living layer of the Earth’) 
stage to the “noosphere” (“sphere of reason”) (Oldfield and Shaw 2006). Oldfield 
and Shaw (2006) point out that, in general, “the noosphere concept has symbolic 
importance for certain sections of Russian society and is typically associated with 
imprecise notions of society-nature balance” (Ibid. 147). The transition towards 
the “noosphere” is conditioned by the increased degree of human impact on 
nature which gradually turns the “biosphere” into “a new geological phenomenon 
on our planet” (Rutkevich 2002:26). 
Oldfield and Shaw (2006) argue that Vernadsky’s ideas have influenced the 
perception and integration of the Western sustainable development paradigm into 
Russian environmental program documents, namely, the Presidential decree of 
1996
29
. This program outlines the stages of transition towards sustainability and 
compares its attainment “with the emergence of the noosphere” (Ibid. 146). 
Additionally, according to Oldfield and Shaw (2006) conflating Vernadsky’s 
“noosphere” with the idea of “sustainability” is mistaken. It implies that Russia’s 
transition to sustainable development should instead be conceptualized “as an 
example of a consciousness attempt of humankind to respond to the enormous 
moral dilemmas posed by the emergence of a “sphere of reason” and the 
                                              
29 Presidential Decree (1996) concerned Russia’s transition to sustainable development paradigm. 
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corresponding ability of humankind to influence fundamentally the state of the 
biosphere” (Ibid. 152). 
It can be argued that, originally, Russian eco-philosophical tradition framed in 
Vernadsky’s approach has been  human-centered. Vernadsky’s 
“conceptualisation of humankind as a defining and principal component of the 
biosphere” can be criticized by the adherents of more egalitarian approach to 
environmental ethics (Ibid. 152). However, his approach involves going beyond 
the general attempts to estimate human impact on environment and tries  to 
understand “the moral basis of our activities,” which are often uncoordinated in 
order to respond to “the general call for ‘balance’ in the relation between society 
and nature” (Ibid. 153). 
Judging by the present state of Russian environmental politics and the 
environmental concerns of the majority of the Russian population, such 
understanding, in Vernadsky’s sense, failed to provide good environmental 
performance. According to Yablokov (2010:2), state policies follow the logic of 
“de-environmentalism,” according to which “environmental costs are deemed 
acceptable in the quest for economic gains.” As well, the author concludes, “that 
a significant change in mindset towards the environment is required in both the 
power structure and wider society in order to arrest the trend of environmental 
neglect in Russia” (Ibid.). Such  political course would be seen as unacceptable in 
the Norwegian context, since even the official adherents of industrial activities in 
the Arctic claim to take into consideration the environmental costs. 
This study has shown that environmental indifference or  neglect on  the part of 
the Norwegian media debate is related to the “utilitarian ethical framework” 
(Nilsen 2010). In the Russian case, this framework can be defined as a “resource-
centered” type of morality, strongly connected to the past cultural traditions and 
present political course. Historically, the Norwegian economy was based on fish 
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and later on non-renewable resources (oil and gas). Several centuries of the 
history of the Russian state reveal an orientation towards  a broader range of 
natural and mineral resources
30. Siberian and Russian Arctic resource “riches” 
represent traditional source of wealth and an ‘object’ of national pride which is 
no exception for modern Russia. Additionally, the social differentiation of the 
modern Russian society cannot provide the ground for a dominating position of 
the utilitarian ethics among the majority. The majority does not have the standard 
of living, as in Norway, which would be worth desiring to sustain. On the 
contrary, the majority would rather share the authorities’ expectations to improve 
economic growth by means of exploiting resources.  
Furthermore, the limited number of NGO’s and weak political performance of 
Russia’s “green” parties, in addition to the absence of a visible climate change 
policy, cannot stimulate the “environmental awakening” of the post-Soviet 
population (Charap 2010, Lassi 2013, Tysiachniouk 2010, Yablokov 2010). Lack 
of the environmental concern reflects the tendency of weak environmental public 
debate in Russian media.  According to a critique by a Russian environmental 
activist, Evgenia Chirikova, “in Russia there is widespread propaganda supported 
by Mr. Putin and the media to say that stories about global warming are untrue 
and that people shouldn’t be concerned about it at all” (Chirikova 2012).  
Within the examined Russian media, several articles and radio programs touched 
upon the topics regarding environmental ethics. The ethical aspects which were 
discussed in Rossijskaya Gazeta and Kommersant were related to support of the 
traditional lifestyle and improvement of collaboration between business and local 
population. Thus, in Kommersant, journalist Pljusnina (2013:18) points out that 
in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug the eternal question considers “how to 
maintain the traditional lifestyle of the Northern indigenous communities, but at 
                                              
30 Read about the resource aspect of Russian Arctic history in Chapter 3. 
121 
 
the same time continue and increase extraction of gas.” Ultimately, the article 
presents indigenous people’s opinion, according to which their interests are not 
taken into account because of “failure of the federal initiatives” (Ibid.). The same 
topic, as discussed in Rossijskaya Gazeta (Tajursky 2014), is concerned with the 
influence of the big holding companies that affect arrangement of the indigenous 
people’s life. It concludes that when “big money” comes to the region, new 
lifestyles follow. As well, the article cites the opinion of the head of a local 
nomand camp, who says “It offends my ear to hear how parents abuse children 
when saying: if you will not study well, you will become reindeer-breeder as your 
grandparents” (Ibid.). Climate change, as a factor challenging indigenous 
people’s life is not discussed. The focus of the Russian media is devoted to the oil 
and gas companies, which have long-term experience in intervening their life, 
exercising this right basing on “resource-centered” morality. 
 
Summary: Public debate in both Russia and Norway brings up some ethical 
aspects within the environmental context. This section argues that the main 
sources of environmental/ecological ethics can be found in historical and cultural 
backgrounds of Russia and Norway. The Norwegian environmental agenda draws 
on the discourse of “sustainable development” and “deep ecology” (Dryzek 
2013). The source of the neglect of the Arctic issue in Norway is presented by the 
strength of utilitarian ethics (Nilsen 2010). Russian politics of “de-
environmentalism” (Yablokov 2010) provides the official rhetoric of the 
“resource-centered morality” and creates the barriers for participation of the 
public sphere in the media debate. The public debate in the media during the 
examined period gave attention to indigenous people’s life:  in the Norwegian 
case the influence of new technologies and new lifestyles were discussed; in the 
Russian case the relationship of the Arctic people with authorities and the 
business community was addressed. However, in both cases media debate does 
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not provide ethical suggestions about the intrinsic value of the Arctic ecosystem 
and how we, as the outsiders, ought to act in respect to Arctic people and nature. 
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Conclusion 
 
The focus of this study has been to examine the patterns of environmental public 
debate on the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian media over the period of May 
2013 to May 2014 and  discuss the influence of these debates on policy-making 
processes.  The issue of resource use and development in the Arctic has been 
presented as an important media topic in both countries during the sample period.  
In a broad sense, Arctic media discourse addresses three main themes—
resources, security, and environment. 
Russia and Norway are the Arctic coastal states that have always stressed the 
significance of their northern territories in their culture and history, and that  have 
pursued an active policy regarding the Arctic.  Despite different political 
traditions, the economic systems of both countries are strongly dependent on non-
renewable resources.  The governments of both countries support the 
“Promethean” environmental discourse, according to Dryzek’s (2013) 
classification.  As the analysis of the official resource media debates has shown, 
neither Russia nor Norway are seeking to abandon their oil extraction activities in 
the Arctic. 
Global warming is expected to facilitate access to Arctic resource reserves, which 
has increased the economic interests in the region.  This thesis argues that 
Russian ‘interest’ in these resource reserves is linked to expectations of an 
improved economic situation for the country, while the Norwegian government is 
interested in maintaining the continued development of the Norwegian economy.  
This state of affairs results in a policy environment that favors resource extraction 
in both countries.  The pro-petroleum production political course supports the 
representation of the Arctic region as an ‘abundant resource province’. Moreover, 
124 
 
both countries claim to keep the environmental risks associated with their 
industrial activities under control. 
Moreover, from the global environmental perspective the vision of the Arctic 
future implies doubting the possibility of risk-free petroleum activities conducted 
by any country in the world.  It rests on the assumption that anthropogenic actions 
in different parts of the world—by people who have never seen and probably will 
never visit the Arctic region—contribute to the global pool of CO2 emissions, 
which have a direct effect on the Arctic ecosystem.  This study reveals that within 
the public media, the discourse on climate change presents a basis for the 
argument against exploitation of the Arctic ecosystem in Norway.  Within the 
Russian media, by contrast, the ecological issue is presented in the context of 
pollution resulting from the enhanced Soviet Arctic development and research 
program. 
Furthermore, in Russia the Arctic is viewed as a region of strategic importance 
and is central to protection of national interests and an intense debate on security.  
The issue of sovereignty and northern border protection is a vital reason why 
Russians want to enhance the military presence in the Arctic, restoring military 
bases and aerodromes on the bases of the old Soviet ones.  During the sample 
period, the Russian official debate mediated the paranoia about the vulnerability 
of the Arctic in terms of national security.  Border security in the Norwegian 
North is also an important strategic priority of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defense.  However, when the public stresses that environmental and public 
security need to be taken into account, the security institutions change their focus 
from the purely national to include environmental and human security aspects. 
The ‘rush for the Arctic resources’ is not a new trend judging by the 
environmental history of the Arctic.  The evolution of representations and 
narratives related to the Arctic embedded in world history exemplifies the 
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statement that “history repeats itself.”  This study has shown how Arctic 
narratives survive through time and reveal new representations under the veil of 
the old ones.  First of all, the representation of an ‘abundant resource but uneasy 
to subdue land’, derived from ancient mythology, was re-created during Medieval 
times and again in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries.  During the Roman Empire, society 
argued against the need to reach and discover the island on the Northern edge of 
the world, Ultima Thule, which could lead to peril rather than to enrichment. The 
main barrier was the unpredictable cold waters surrounding the island.  Further, 
during the Medieval times the territory was seen to be inhabited by dangerous 
monsters, while concurrently attractive in terms of its natural riches.  Nowadays, 
when we observe the phenomenon of “denothernization” (Chartier 2007) and 
development of technologies, it was difficult to predict that the Arctic would be 
so ‘explorable’ and its resources so technically ‘accessible’.  However, global 
climate change represents the moral reason of the modern time — or, a new 
imaginative barrier — for the proponents of the resource-based economy. 
Environmental issues appear within Russian and Norwegian media through 
official rhetoric but to a different end.  Both countries’ governments find 
different ways to avoid this barrier in order to provide realization of their 
interests.  The narrative of nationalism plays a significant role in both countries’ 
state rhetoric.  As has been argued in this thesis, the North as a symbol of national 
pride and identity in both countries is conditioned by historical continuity, which 
repeats itself in the modern debate.  Moreover, the narrative of a “warm Arctic” 
(Frank 2010) derives from the ancient Greek myth about Hyperborea and can still 
be found within modern Russian nationalistic discourse and modern Norwegian 
environmental discourse.  
Specifically, Russian official rhetoric tends to refer to the “great polar past” of 
the Soviet Russia, thus, justifying the importance of the Russian Arctic.  Russian 
North represents not just an object of national pride, but also the main source of 
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the country’s prosperity.  The Soviet heroes, either adventurers or polar 
researches, become ‘the benchmark for others to follow.’  Modern Arctic 
“heroes,” traced in the articles of Rossijskaya Gazeta and Kommersant, plant the 
flag on the sea floor under the North Pole
31
, create an Arctic city project of a 
utopian type
32
, set a mission of exploring the Arctic Ocean, associating it with a 
“hydrospace” (Rogozin 2014), and undertake parachute jumping on the drifting 
ice (Gavrilov 2014).  Moreover, authorities rolled out plans to restore the 
tradition of polar research stations on the drifting ice flow
33
.  Thus, certain Soviet 
experiences of development of the Arctic were actually ‘borrowed’ by the current 
Putin administration.  Arctic heroes of Putin’s time—as mediated through 
Russian media—possess characteristics distinct from the Soviet prototypes: they 
overcome the severe Arctic climate without difficulties.  
The Norwegian approach, in general, is more practical and closer to a 
representation associated with a “cold Arctic.”  The Roman Empire did not 
succeed in reaching the treasures of Ultima Thule, however, Norway 
accomplished this mission in the 20
th
 century.  This period provided Norway with 
several symbols of “national pride,” one of which was Fridtjof Nansen and his 
“realistic conquest of the cold,” which took the form of the Fram Expedition to 
ski across Greenland.  Furthermore, oil was discovered in the 1960s and since 
that time Norway has made significant progress in developing its offshore 
exploitation of this resource under harsh climatic conditions.  However, the 
representation of the “warm Arctic” did not escape the Norwegian discourse of 
                                              
31 The expedition led by A. Chilingarov in August 2011 involved a Russian team that planted the state flag at the 
geographical point of the North Pole. 
 
32 The project of the city UMKA was developed by Russian architects (Kommersant FM 2011, Vasiljeva and 
Drankina 2011)  
 
33 The first “drifting” station, “North Pole-1” (Severnij Polus-1 or “SP-1”) was established in 1937.  The latest 
expeditions were conducted in 2011 (“SP-39”) and in 2012 (“SP-40”). 
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the High North and was used within environmental debate justifying the 
“richness and diversity” of the Arctic ecosystem which is endangered by oil 
companies and climate change. 
The positioning of the environmental public debate within the broad Arctic discourse 
revealed different orders of Arctic discourse in Russian and Norwegian contexts 
(Fairclough 1989).  This study argues that the order of the debate in Russia has 
followed the “resource - security - environment” logic, while in Norway, the focus 
has been on “resource - environment - security”.  The first two topics of discourse in 
each of the orders represent the frontrunners of the discursive battle, whereas the 
third one plays an important complementary function.  In addition, the frequency of 
discussions within the third issue is inferior to the media coverage of the first two 
issues.  Thus, environmental discourse is framed differently within Russian and 
Norwegian media debates.  
This study has revealed a high level of coverage of the Arctic topic in Russian and 
Norwegian media for the examined period.  However, any serious  public debate on 
eth Arctic in the Russian media is almost nonexistent.  The general reliance on the 
‘official media,’ and little space to express skepticism regarding the political course, 
justifies the success of the “neo-authoritarian” media system that has been 
consolidated under Vladimir Putin’s administration.  Not surprisingly, the dominant 
opinion is presented by the authorities—the Russian president and government.  The 
figure of President Putin serves as a key role in discourse, since as has been pointed 
out in chapter 3, Russian Arctic development has always been associated with strong 
leader’s ambitions.  Therefore, in the sample period, the Russian public debate’s 
style can be characterized as keeping ‘voluntary or enforced silence’ regarding the 
Arctic.  However, the part of the critical public debate is constructed by experts and 
is rarely presented in the critical, investigative media. 
Norwegian environmental public debate is focused on the persistent tension between 
pro- and anti-petroleum production in the Arctic. There are good  conditions for the 
128 
 
open expression of the opinion: pluralism, freedom of speech and social 
responsibility.  However, the thesis has shown the existence of the similar split in 
both Russian and Norwegian public opinion regarding the Arctic issue on the basis 
of opinion polls (Andersson 2013b and WCIOM 2013a).  While such a split was 
reflected and discussed in Norwegian media34, the concrete opinions of the Russian 
population were never presented within discussions in Russian media.  
Russian and Norwegian patterns of public environmental debate have shown 
different construction.  The core component of the construction is the discourse 
of climate change.  The Norwegian public takes the anthropological aspect of 
climate change seriously, while for the Russian public this discourse seems to be 
nonexistent.  Some of Norway’s most vocal critics place the blame on the 
governments which encourage the most environmentally hazardous industrial 
activities under the mask of “environmental responsibility.”  The Norwegian 
environmental debate stresses that petroleum production does not affect only the 
fragile Northern ecosystem but also contributes to aggravation of climate change 
on the global level.  Russians are more preoccupied by the local and national 
levels and do not bring up the question of environmental responsibility on the 
global scale.  
Therefore, the proposed alternatives to solve ecological crises in the Arctic region 
are different.  Norwegians mention sustainable development as an alternative 
Arctic development, but the popularity of this idea seems to be overshadowed by 
the discourse of “ecological modernization” (Dryzek 2013).  The urgent need to 
make a transition from oil and gas dependency in favor of renewable 
technologies has been often stressed by debate participants within Norwegian 
media.  The tangible gap between the governmental promises and deeds provokes 
Norwegian proponents of environmental debate to argue in favor of enforcing the 
                                              
34 See the article by Andersson (2013b) which presented the views of different Lofoten citizens in respect to the issue 
which, as has been argued, represents "miniature'' of the Arctic issue. 
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development and practical implementation of “green energy” technologies.  
Moreover, this step might turn to be the first significant contribution on the way 
of achieving sustainability.  
Claims about the absence of the climate change debate and the politics of “de-
environmentalism” (Yablokov 2010) suppress the ecological concern of the general 
Russian public.  The predominant majority of Russians are not aware of the 
concept of “sustainable development” as a global trend of environmental 
discourse.  This fact, along with the passive engagement into the environmental 
debate, leads to the public behavior when the responsibility for solving 
environmental problems is shifting on the shoulders of the experts within the 
clear hierarchy of responsible state institutions.  Moreover, the Russian 
government’s promise to “free” the North from the destructive footprint of the 
Soviet generation creates the illusion that the main culprits of the ecological 
problems are found and that authorities are controlling the problem.  
The other focus of this study was devoted to Russian and Norwegian eco-
philosophical traditions, which derive from historical-cultural legacy and could 
become the source of environmental ethics within media public debates.  
Therefore, this study has revealed a “human centric” eco-philosophical tradition 
in Russia developed by V.I. Vernadsky (concept of ‘noosphere’, see Oldfield and 
Shaw 2006), as well as the “ecocentered” Norwegian eco-philosophical tradition 
developed by Arne Næss (principle of “biocentric egalitarism” see Næss 1973).  
However, the media platform in both countries seems to be filled by the 
economy-oriented type of environmental morality—a “utilitarian” type in the 
Norwegian case and “resource-centered morality” in Russia.  In general, both 
ethical frameworks advocate for nature abuse and resource exploitation at the 
expense of Arctic ecosystem—the “home” for indigenous communities.  
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To sum up, the possible impact of the environmental public debate on the policies 
regarding the Arctic has different pointed to two different paths in Russia and 
Norway. During the sample period the great amount of public debate – facilitated in 
Norwegian media –  in part due to the Norwegian identity  based on the morally 
charged nature tradition,  – led to postponement of the opening of Lofoten, 
Vesterålen and Senia for oil extraction. Russian society is just at the beginning of 
“environmental awakening”. However, the absence of the discourse of climate 
change, does not prevent Russian environmental activists and environmentally-
concerned people from  mobilizing in  all cases where local concerns  for the  
ecosystem become raised by the situation on the ground.  
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